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Abstract
The effects of pharmaceutical treatment on patient health, pricing of pharmaceuticals and
their regulation are the backbone of my research. My work reflects two current trends used to
advance our knowledge in the field: the use of dynamic structural models that is supplemented by
detailed administrative individual-level data.
This thesis consists of three chapters that address a number of policy-relevant questions in
health economics using both individual- and market-level outcomes. In the first chapter I take a
market-level approach to look at the effect of mergers between insurance companies on Medicare
Part D plan premiums and generosity of coverage. In the following two chapters I study the effects
of ADHD treatment on children's health and behavioral outcomes.
The first chapter focuses on the insurance design and pricing of insurance plans that cover
prescription drugs. We examine horizontal mergers amongst Medicare Part D insurers with the
aim of decomposing market power, cost efficiency, and bargaining power merger effects. We apply a
differences-in-differences identification strategy to panel data on plans offered between 2006 and 2012
to document the effects of mergers on plan premiums and drug coverage characteristics. The results
indicate substantial market power as plans affected by a merger increase premiums on average. But,
premiums fall and drug coverage improves for merging insurers that restructure plans and renegotiate
contracts with drug suppliers by consolidating existing plans. We attribute these effects to improved
cost efficiencies and increased bargaining power.
In the second and third chapters I look at the individual-level outcomes following medical
treatment of Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). In the U.S. the incidence of ADHD
diagnosis among children increased significantly over the past decade. The most recent National
Survey of Children's Health 2011/12 reports that over 5 million children aged 2-17 (7.9%) have
been diagnosed with ADHD. Over 68% of these children are taking medications for the disorder.
However, little is known about the existing prescribing practices, physician learning process, and
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relative efficacies of various ADHD treatment strategies. In Chapter 2, I build on the literature on
investment in human capital (see for example Heckman et al. (2006)) to model the timing of the first
diagnosis, treatment, and adverse outcomes over time. ADHD is a common chronic mental condition
that impairs noncognitive skills. A child who has ADHD has a relatively low stock of abilities at
birth. Once a child is diagnosed, her family can invest in medical treatment to reduce the gap in
abilities of a child with ADHD compared to her non-ADHD peers. In the model, ADHD treatments
are the only available type of investment. While on treatment, the child is able to improve her
outcomes in the short-run, accumulate cognitive and noncognitive skills and possibly improve her
long-run outcomes.
Using a 10-year panel of South Carolina Medicaid claims, I model the probability of the
initial diagnosis of ADHD, dynamic treatment choice decisions and subsequent adverse events later
in life. Controlling for endogeneity, I find that there is a strong persistence in treatment choices
across time periods. The results also suggest that pharmacological treatment has only short-term
positive impact on the probability of such adverse events as injuries, teenage pregnancy, and STDs,
and no impact on substance abuse disorders. Behavioral therapy alone is not as effective as it is
in combination with ADHD drugs, but for STDs and substance abuse disorders it seems to show
relatively long-lasting effects in contrast to drugs alone.
In Chapter 3, I extend Crawford and Shum's (2005) model to explore the effect of treatment
interruptions (drug holidays) in addition to the effects of various drug therapies. The evidence
suggests that children diagnosed with ADHD face significant uncertainty regarding efficacy and
severity of adverse effects of ADHD medications. Almost half of these children switch therapies
during the first six months of treatment. This suggests a considerable amount of experimentation
by doctors. Using South Carolina Medicaid claims data for 2003-2012, I estimate a dynamic model of
demand for ADHD drugs under uncertainty. In the model, highly heterogeneous patients learn about
the efficacy of available treatments through experimenting. I find that patients are heterogeneous in
the underlying illness severity. The probability that the patient will be able to function successfully
in their everyday life without ADHD treatment varies from 1.8% to 76.7% in the baseline model
specification. Although merely suggestive, it might point at the presence of overdiagnosis and
overprescription practices. I also find that there is a lot of uncertainty regarding patient-drug match
by both symptomatic and curative properties. Although some drugs are better than others for each of
the patient types by severity of their condition, their match value distributions overlap significantly.
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In other words, knowing patient type, does not resolve patient-drug match uncertainty.
Although the model with drug holidays yields overall similar results to the baseline model,
in their current formulation they cannot be directly compared because of the differences in the choice
set. Notably, drug holidays rank first for the healthy type by symptomatic relief properties.
Both dynamic models allow for policy-relevant simulations, for example one could evaluate
the effect of interruptions in treatment on the overall treatment cost and disease duration, account-
ing for patient heterogeneity in response to treatment for ADHD and potentially develop better
guidelines that can improve the quality of drug-patient matches and patients outcomes. This is left
for future work.
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Chapter 1
Mergers in Medicare Part D: Decomposing Market Power,
Cost Efficiencies, and Bargaining Power (with Daniel Miller
and Tilan Tang)
1.1 Introduction
The landscape of competition in the health insurance industry has experienced many changes
in the past several years, starting with the introduction of managed care plans in the 1980s, privatized
Medicare plans, expanded prescription drug coverage, and most recently the reforms in the 2010
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Throughout this period there have been waves of
merger and acquisition (M&A) activity as insurers adapted to the evolving marketplace (Town and
Park (2011)).
In this paper, we examine the effect that horizontal M&A activity amongst health insurers
has on prices and coverage characteristics of prescription drug plans offered in the Medicare Part D
market. Part D is a recently created program that established a regulated and subsidized insurance
exchange for senior citizens to purchase prescription drug coverage from competing private insurers.
The program lifetime overlapped with a dozen large scale horizontal M&A deals involving the parent
companies of insurers offering Part D plans. Each year, an average of 17% of all plans is directly
affected by an M&A deal. More, even larger deals are on the docket. If they all proceed, 22 of the
top 25 Part D insurers will have gone through a merger.
Theory suggests three major channels through which mergers affect markets. First, horizon-
tal mergers may be beneficial if they result in increased productive efficiency. In health insurance,
efficiency gains can be achieved through scale economies that appear as firms consolidate their ad-
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ministrative and marketing activities. Second, horizontal mergers alter bargaining dynamics with
upstream suppliers as the combined firm gains monopsony power over suppliers. For health insur-
ers the upstream suppliers are the providers of healthcare goods and services (doctors, hospitals,
drug manufacturers, and pharmacies). With greater bargaining power, an insurer may be able to
negotiate more favorable terms with providers. This merger effect is of particular importance in
Part D. The program designers relied heavily on the ability of private insurers to bargain with drug
suppliers and explicitly prohibited the government from participating in negotiations (Duggan and
Scott-Morton (2010); Frank and Newhouse (2008)). Mergers could have a positive effect if the im-
proved bargaining position allows insurers to increase the scope of covered drugs or negotiate lower
drug acquisition costs, which can be passed to enrollees either directly through reduced cost sharing
on drug copays or indirectly through lower insurance premiums. Finally, horizontal mergers give
firms more market power as markets become more concentrated. Reduced competition can lead to
higher prices for consumers or lower product quality if firms compete on quality dimensions.
Anti-trust authorities care about whether the beneficial effects of mergers (cost efficiencies
and monopsony power) in fact exist, and if so, whether they outweigh negative market power effects.
Stylized facts about Medicare Part D give reason for concern. Since the program's inception in
2006, premiums increased by more than 26% in real terms. Coverage has declined. The number of
drug offerings on plans' formularies has fallen by 29% and out-of-pocket costs paid by enrollees for
the most popular drugs has nearly doubled. While the typical consumer still has many choicesan
average of 30 plans available in each marketthere has been a drastic 31% decrease in the number
of plan offerings coinciding with this period of rising premiums and declining coverage.
Much of the decrease in the number of plan offerings can be attributed to merging insurers
consolidating their plan offerings; even more is due to non-merging insurers consolidating their plans.
By consolidation we mean that an insurer takes two or more plans offered in the previous year and
consolidates them in a single plan for the upcoming year. In any given year, about 20% of plans
are consolidated. To distinguish terminology, mergers can be thought of as inter -firm combinations;
plan consolidation, as intra-firm combinations. The distinction is important for anti-trust purposes.
If an insurer can realize the beneficial effects of mergers (cost efficiencies and monopsony power)
organically by consolidating its own plans, without engaging in a merger with an outside firm,
then there is a weaker case to be made in favor of mergers. Our empirical methodology explicitly
distinguishes mergers from consolidation to test whether merger effects only appear through external
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mergers or can be achieved internally.
Plan consolidation is a particularly important policy topic in Medicare Part D. In 2011,
Medicare began publishing regulations encouraging insurers to consolidate their plans. It recom-
mended that insurers consolidate low enrollment and meaningfully similar plans. Many insurers
complied, however there is no evidence of this rule being enforced. As of 2014, significantly more
stringent rules have been proposed that not only restrict incumbent insurers, but also limit entry of
new Part D providers.
In our application to Medicare Part D, we analyze the effects that horizontal mergers have
on market outcomes with the aim of separately identifying the three channels through which M&A
activity affects plans: cost efficiencies, monopsony power with upstream drug suppliers, and market
power. We use panel data on all plan offerings between 2006 and 2012 (over 9,000 plan-year observa-
tions) and consider two types of outcome variables: plan premiums and measures of plan coverage,
specifically the number of drugs covered on insurers' formularies and an index of the out-of-pocket
cost sharing an enrollee pays in drug copays.
To identify the treatment effect that M&A deals have on plans we use a differences-in-
differences approach. In our first specification, we examine how plans affected by a merger change
in the year following a merger as compared to the control group of plans unaffected by mergers.
This approach measures the combined effect of all three channels, which is useful to run a horse race
gauging whether the beneficial effects outweigh the adverse effects for insurers. However, simply
comparing outcomes of merged and non-merged plans is not informative about the magnitudes of
the three competing effects and indicates nothing about whether the benefits of mergers can be
achieved internally through plan consolidation.
In our second specification, we sort out the three competing theories of mergers. To do
so, we modify the differences-in-differences treatments to distinguish mergers that involved plan
consolidation from mergers that did not. Our hypothesis is that merging on its ownwithout
consolidating plansdoes not allow a firm to realize cost efficiencies and implies it is not exercising its
increased monopsony power to renegotiate contracts with drug suppliers. Thus, only market power
effects appear as the merging insurers coordinate pricing decisions. By merging and restructuring
plan offerings through consolidation, merging insurers can realize all three merger effects. In other
words, we can separate market power from cost efficiency and monopsony power effects by contrasting
mergers with and without plan consolidation. Finally, we examine cases where non-merging firms
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consolidate plans. Our hypothesis is that non-merging insurers only improve cost efficiencies by
consolidating plans; they gain no additional market power, nor monopsony power.
To further gauge outcomes, we examine coverage characteristics. The effects of mergers on
coverage are important as both prices and the terms of coverage are jointly determined in insurance
contracts. Under Part D regulations, coverage is heavily determined by the bargaining process be-
tween insurers and drug suppliers. These results provide more robust evidence about the monopsony
power effects than can be gleaned from evidence on insurance premiums and constitute an important
contribution to the merger literature which often lacks detailed analysis of product characteristics.
In summary, our results show that all three channels are at play. When insurers merge and
do not consolidate plans, premiums increase by an average of 9%. We attribute the rise to a strong
market power effect. For insurers that merge and consolidate plans, the net effect on premiums is
an average decrease of 4%, outweighing market power effects. Breaking down the results based on
our comparisons of non-merging insurers that consolidate plans, about two-thirds of the premium
decrease is due to cost efficiencies that even non-merging firms can realize, and the remaining one-
third comes from the increased monopsony power gained by merging.
The results for coverage characteristics corroborate the findings on premiums and highlight
the significance of the bargaining process between insurers and drug suppliers. For insurers that
merge and consolidate plans, there are large improvements in coverage. These plans increase the
number of drug offerings on their formulary by an average of 14%, and decrease enrollee out-of-
pocket copay costs by 4%. Merging without consolidating plans has a near zero effect on drug
coverage. Likewise, there is little effect for non-merging firms that consolidate. The evidence sup-
ports our hypothesis that bargaining gains cannot be achieved internally, only for merged insurers
that consolidate plans.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss related literature.
In section 3 we provide the background for our application to Medicare Part D. In section 4 we discuss
the data. In section 5 we present the econometric method, and in 6, the results. Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Healthcare Competition Literature
Economists have long been concerned about whether healthcare markets are competitive
and, if so, whether unfettered competition ensures the first best. Ellis (2012) cites evidence of high
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levels of concentration and raises concerns about market power in both provider markets (hospitals,
physician networks, pharmaceuticals) and insurance markets. Apart from market power, two other
channelscost efficiencies and the balance of bargaining power in the vertical relationship between
insurers and healthcare providersdetermine the performance of markets. This paper contributes
to the literature by decomposing these three channels as they apply to health insurance markets.
Merger studies provide an excellent avenue for analyzing competition as mergers events change the
structure of the industry.
The literature on health insurance claims an insurer's scale as measured by enrollment, which
we associate with cost efficiencies, is an important determinant of its cost structure. There is a strong
correlation between scale and insurance loads: the difference between what is collected in premiums
and paid out in benefits. For employer sponsored health insurance plans Karaca-Mandic et al. (2011)
document loads ranging from 4% for the largest insurance plans with over 10,000 enrollees to over
40% for the smallest with under 50. In Part D, the size of plans spans this same range. A leading
cause is that large insurance plans economize on administrative costs. Part D administrative costs
may be particularly high due to Medicare's stringent compliance and reporting standards and the
added complexities of real-time pharmacy claims processing at the point of sale. In the Medigap
market, insurers have high loads because of marketing costs (Starc (2012)). Insurers use the same
marketing tools for their Part D plans. Horizontal mergers may have tremendous benefits if the
increased scale of merging insurers reduces administrative and marketing costs. Legislation in the
PPACA aims to reduce loads by imposing minimum loss ratios (MLR) on insurers. Starting in 2014,
MLRs will be implemented in Medicare Part D. Mergers may be one of the most effective ways for
insurers to reduce costs so that they can meet the new MLR requirements.
The next channel we consider is the vertical market relationship between insurers and
providers. The industry has shifted towards a model where insurers selectively contract with
providers through a bargaining process. Insurers decide which providers to include in their net-
work, providers decide which networks to join, and the two parties negotiate over reimbursement
rates and the terms of enrollee cost sharing. There is a large literature on bargaining from the per-
spective of hospitals, (Ho (2009); Ho and Lee (2013); Gowrisankaran et al. (2013); Lewis and Pflum
(2011)), but less is known from the insurance side, particularly for prescription drugs. In Part D,
bargaining is quite important and has been credited with reducing drug prices for the Medicare
population (Duggan and Scott-Morton (2010)).
5
Our merger study allows us to gain a greater understanding of how competition impacts the
bargaining process. Mergers alter bargaining positions. The threat point in the Nash-bargaining
models applied to the industry is determined by the number of people enrolled by the insurer.
Insurers can expand their base of enrollees through merger to gain greater bargaining power. That
can translate into some combination of lower premiums, expanded network coverage, and reduced
cost sharing for its enrollees. We also provide evidence on whether internal plan consolidation, which
makes plans larger but doesn't change the size of the insurer, affects bargaining power.
Much less is known about the effects of M&A deals in health insurance markets. Two of the
most comprehensive studies are Dafny (2010) and Dafny et al. (2012). Dafny (2010) uses a large
panel of insurers offering plans in the employer sponsored health insurance market to investigate
whether health insurers have market power. The authors find non-trivial market power as evident
in their ability to price discriminate by charging higher premiums to more profitable employers,
especially so in highly concentrated markets. A similar conclusion is reached by Bates et al. (2012)
that finds higher prices and lower rates of health insurance enrollment in more concentrated markets.
Dafny et al. (2012) employs the same data set as Dafny (2010) to study the effect of con-
centration on premiums and payments to physicians and nurses. They focus on the 1999 merger
of Aetna and Prudential, two of the largest insurers in their sample. The deal between them re-
sulted in a sharp change in the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration Index (HHI). Their estimates
show that the average market-level changes in HHI between 1998 and 2006 caused a 7 percentage
points increase in premiums. They also find evidence of increased bargaining power with health care
providers. They estimate that payments to physicians and nurses decreased by 2% to 3% over the
same time period.
We build on Dafny et al. (2012) in two important ways. First regards the data. Whereas
they examine just 1 merger case, we use panel data that includes all merger activity between 2006
and 2012. The high churn rate of mergers yields a large sample of both treated (merged plans)
and a control group of plans (unmerged plans) to identify merger treatment effects. We also have
detailed plan-level data on coverage characteristics, not just premiums, that we consider as merger
outcomes. This is important as both prices and the terms of coverage are jointly determined in
insurance contracts. Our second contribution is to disentangle the three merger effects. Their
results show market power dominates, but are not informative of the extent to which the merger
created cost efficiencies or altered bargaining power.
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The effect of mergers on market performance is also an important topic in the finance
literature. While we address the question using product-level data, most papers in finance use
event studies on a set of multiple M&A deals. Most closely related is Fee and Thomas (2004) that
specifically aims to identify how mergers affect market power, cost efficiencies, and vertical bargaining
power. They use a large cross-industry sample of deals from 1980 to 1997 and examine stock price
movements for the merging firms, horizontal rivals, and upstream suppliers. Maksimovic et al. (2011)
examines post-merger plant closures and restructuring of supplier contracts as means of improving
efficiency. The analog to plant closures and restructuring in our paper is plan consolidation.
Finally, our paper contributes to a growing literature on Medicare Part D. Several papers
(Lucarelli et al. (2012); Miller and Yeo (2013); Ericson (2014); Decarolis (2012)) examine firm conduct
and competition, include important institutional details related to subsidies and market regulations.
Another strand of the literature (Abaluck and Gruber (2011); Heiss et al. (2013); Ketcham et al.
(2011); Kling et al. (2012)) uses individual level data on consumer choice and finds evidence that
enrollees make poor plan choices. These studies have been influential in guiding policy decisions.
The consumers' choice problem could be eased by reducing the number of available plan offerings.
The question becomes a matter of how to implement policy to reduce choice without compromising
competition or the breadth of offerings. There are two standing proposals involving plan consolida-
tion; forced consolidation of low enrollment plans and forced consolidation of meaningfully similar
plans. The most recent 2014 proposals extend these criteria to forbid new entry. Alternatively,
anti-trust authorities could adopt a tolerant stance towards merger cases. This study sheds light on
the policy debate by showing the effect that mergers and consolidation have on prices and coverage.
1.3 Medicare Part D Background
Medicare Part D introduced a prescription drug benefit to the Medicare program. It was
authorized under the 2003 the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
and fully enacted in 2006. The legislation created a coverage mandate requiring beneficiaries to
obtain prescription drug coverage when they first become eligible for Medicare or face penalties for
late enrollment. The act established a regulated and subsidized health insurance exchange where
beneficiaries can choose amongst plans offered by competing private insurers. The prescription drug
plans offered in this exchange are the focus of our study. About 60% of the Medicare population is
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covered by a Part D plan; the remainder either lack coverage or obtain prescription coverage through
other means such as employer/retiree benefits or another government program.
The Part D exchange was designed to rely on free market principles to provide competitive
drug plans. The benefit is offered by private insurers who may freely enter and exit the market,
choose the number of plans to offer, and set monthly premiums. Insurers are also largely responsible
for the benefit design. Each insurer selectively chooses which drugs to cover on its formulary and sets
cost sharing copay/coinsurance rates on a drug-by-drug basis. Drug prices are determined through
a bargaining process between and drug manufacturers, wholesalers, and pharmacies. Per regulation,
negotiated prices must be passed on to enrollees. This has been seen as a controversial feature of
the program because the legislation explicitly prohibits the government from being involved in price
negotiations with the pharmaceutical industry (Frank and Newhouse (2008)) as is the case for other
government drug benefits such as Medicaid.
The regulations establish a number of coverage standards. All providers are required to
offer at least one basic plan that meets (or is actuarially equivalent to) a minimum coverage level
with respect to the deductible, coinsurance and copay rates, and the scope of drugs covered on
the formulary. In addition to a basic plan, insurers may offer enhanced plans that have more
generous coverage through a combination of lower deductibles, lower copay/coinsurance rates, and
drug coverage for a larger set of medical conditions.
Plans have a large toolbox of formulary management techniques that they can use as
bargaining levers with drug suppliers and as a means to steer enrollees' usage of drugs. With the
exception of six therapeutic classes, they are allowed to selectively choose which drugs to include on
their formularies, place drugs on pricing tiers such as preferred, non-preferred, and specialty,
as well as impose usage restrictions in the form of quantity limits, step therapy routines, and prior
authorization requirements. These techniques are thought to be important tools for negotiating
favorable drugs prices, which will ultimately be reflected in the generosity of plans coverage and
premiums (Duggan and Scott-Morton (2010)).
Nearly all major health insurance companies and many regional insurers entered the Part
D market in the first two years of the program. There has been almost no entry in later years.
Geographically, the market is separated into 39 markets drawn around state boundaries. Insurers
offer and price plans individually for each market. In the typical market, enrollees can choose from
about 40 plans offered by 20 insurers.
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1.4 Data
1.4.1 Plan-Level Data
We utilize detailed longitudinal data on plans that includes an average of 1,500 stand-alone,
Part D plans (PDPs) per year. We exclude Medicare Advantage plans that bundle Part D coverage
with other Medicare coverage components. The data span 7 years from 2006 when Medicare Part
D was introduced to the most recently available data in 2012 and cover all 39 geographical markets.
The sample is constructed using both publicly available and restricted use data obtained from the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
Enrollment in stand-alone Part D plans has grown from about 17 million in 2006 to over
20 million by 2012. The average plan has 11,347 individuals enrolled per year. However, the plans
differ significantly on this margin. There are plans that have fewer than 10 insured, while others
insure more than 300,000 individuals. About 40% of the enrollees receive additional premium and
copay subsidies through the low income subsidy (LIS) program. Table 1.1 presents information on
market level trends. In the first year of the program, there were only 1,446 plan offerings, which
rose to 1,908 in the second year. But following 2007, the number of plan offerings has steadily
decreased down to 995 by 2012. Much of this decrease can be attributed to merger activity and plan
consolidation. During the sample period average premiums increased by 26% in real terms (by 43%
in nominal terms), and the average plan's market share increased 37%.
We collect information on each plan's premium, deductible, gap coverage, and drug formu-
lary. Table B.1 reports summary statistics on the plan-level data for 2006-2012. A plan's premium
is set up once a year, when private insurance companies submit their bids for contract with Medi-
care. The deadline for the plan sponsors to submit their bid is the first Monday in June each year.
The open enrollment runs from October through December, and the contract year begins January
1st. Premiums are paid monthly by the insured. Qualified individuals are provided with the Extra
Help, or low-income subsidy (LIS) by Medicare. This LIS program covers in full or partially the
monthly premium amount, deductible, copayments and coinsurance, and eliminates the coverage
gaps.
The deductible, followed by the initial coverage zone, is the amount the insured must pay
out-of-pocket before the drug plan cost-sharing kicks in. The yearly deductible for what Medicare
determines as the standard Part D benefit was set to $250 in 2006. Updated using annual percentage
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Table 1.1: Trends in Medicare Part D market, 2006-2012.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Monthly premium 42.55 40.63 42.99 49.03 48.61 54.73 53.41
(14.60) (16.70) (21.35) (22.15) (20.14) (25.79) (26.72)
Plan market share 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.012 0.013
(0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.024) (0.023)
N plans offered 37.08 48.92 45.54 41.69 38.28 26.51 25.51
(13.82) (16.47) (14.54) (13.10) (12.29) (8.65) (8.74)
Plan enrollment 10,730 8,473 8,573 9,415 10,594 16,201 17,297
(25,159) (23,066) (21,155) (21,912) (24,187) (37,194) (36,155)
LIS enrollment 5,588 4,196 4,051 4,377 5,042 7,699 8,069
(13,368) (13,820) (11,104) (12,387) (14,401) (20,340) (20,431)
Eligible population, in'000 1,275 1,279 1,305 1,329 1,364 1,396 1,480
(951) (963) (986) (1,010) (1,029) (1,049) (1,104)
Insurer regional presence 26.33 31.14 29.76 31.30 30.10 31.23 28.85
(12.04) (9.25) (11.15) (7.96) (10.68) (8.99) (12.12)
N plans affected by merger 293 4 541 173 129 272 245
N plans offered 1,446 1,908 1,778 1,626 1,493 1,034 995
Notes: All plans: renewed, consolidated, new and terminated in the next calendar year are included. Premiums are given in 2012
dollars. Number of plans offered and eligible population are calculated per Part D region. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
increase, it was raised to $320 by 2012. Most enhanced PDPs eliminate the deductible so that the
enrollee receives first dollar coverage.
The gap in coverage or donut hole begins when the insured reaches the limit on the
expenses covered by the initial coverage zone ($2250 in 2006). Prescription costs beyond the limit
and below the catastrophic level ($5100 in 2006) are paid by the insured out-of-pocket. Many
enhanced PDPs provide full or partial coverage in the donut hole. The ACA legislation eliminated
the donut hole effective 2014.
The formulary is a comprehensive list of the medicines covered by the plan, identified by the
National Drug Code (NDC).1 The formulary files contains data on the drug's tier, usage restrictions,
and copay/coinsurance provisions that determine the cost to a beneficiary. The formulary file is
complemented with drug pricing data that was first published in 2009. The pricing data contain
information on the average drug prices for every drug and plan. Specifically, the reported price is
the average transaction price, net of all rebates for a 30-day supply filled at the plan's preferred
pharmacies in the third fiscal quarter of each year.
To measure the comprehensiveness of formulary coverage, we count the number of drugs
1NDC is an 11-digit classification issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for all the approved drugs.
Under this system, different package and dosage sizes of the same drug molecule have separate NDCs.
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listed on the plan's formulary. The first measure counts the number of top 100 drugs. In early years,
the average plan covered more than 90 of the top 100 and fell to 75 by 2012. The second measure
counts the total number of NDCs on a formulary which plans select from a set of 5300 unique drugs
that qualify for coverage under Part D.2 Like the top 100 drug, the total number of covered NDCs
fell throughout the sample period.
Part D formularies typically have three pricing tiers that separate preferred drugs with
relatively more favorable coverage from non-preferred ones. Lower tiers indicate better coverage.
For example, a three-tier plan that has 1/3 of its drugs on tier 1, 1/3 on tier 2, 1/3 on tier 3 has
an average pricing tier of 2. Since the plans differ in the number of tiers (up to 7 tiers), for the
purposes of comparison we normalize a 2 on a scale of 1 to 3, to 0.5 on a 0 to 1 scale. The formularies
also might have up to three types of restrictions placed on drug consumption: step therapies, prior
authorization, and quantity limits. We sum up the restrictions and calculate the average number of
restrictions on a formulary using a 0 to 3 scale.
We use drug prices and cost sharing rates to construct a price index to compare out-of-pocket
copay prices across plans. This is our most refined measure of the generosity of plan coverage. It
is constructed by using actual copay/coinsurance rates and pharmacy prices to calculate the out-of-
pocket price an enrollee pays for a basket of the top 100 drugs ranked by the number of prescriptions
filled. These hundred drug prices are combined into a price index, where each drug is weighted
equally. If a drug is not covered by a particular plan, we assume that enrollees will have to pay
the full retail price out-of-pocket. We construct separate price indexes for the initial coverage zone
and donut hole. Three sources of variation affect the out-of-pocket price index: number of covered
drugs, drug pricing tiers, and a plan's negotiated price with the pharmacy and drug manufacturer.
More comprehensive formularies, lower pricing tiers, and lower pharmacy prices all contribute to a
lower value of the out-of-pocket price index.
The other measures of plan design are distinguishing characteristics of basic and enhanced
plans. Recall basic plans meet or are actuarially equivalent to minimum coverage standards set
by the Part D regulations, enhanced plans offer some form of additional coverage. Slightly more
than half of the plans are basic. Benchmark plans are a subset of basic plans that are priced below
the market average of basic plans. Benchmark plans qualify for the full subsidy amount of the low
2The method for counting NDCs changed after 2006. In 2006, identical drugs made by different manufacturers
were double-counted as distinct drugs. 2007 onward, identical drugs were only counted once.
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income subsidy (LIS). They also qualify to receive Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries.
Dual eligibleswho account for about 20% of the Medicare and 40% of Part D enrollmentare
randomly and uniformly assigned to the LIS eligible plans if they don't otherwise actively select a
plan. Given the large number of dual eligibles, LIS eligible plans receive a big boost in enrollment
from random assignment, which can be thought of as a characteristic making those plans more
desirable. The theoretical foundations for this interpretation are explained in companion work by
Miller and Yeo (2012). We include these other plan characteristics as control variables to ensure
that our differences-in-differences results attribute price changes to merger effects, and not pricing
responses to changes in coverage characteristics.
1.4.2 Data on M&A Deals
We collect data on M&A activity from the Securities Data Company (SDC) merger and
acquisition module which contains detailed information on all deals involving public and private
companies. In the time frame suitable for our analysis, from 2006 to 2011, we identified a total of
11 completed horizontal M&A deals amongst companies that offer Medicare Part D policies. Table
1.2 lists the details on each of the selected deals. All of the deals involve major Part D insurers
that offer plans across the entire nation with the exception of the Medical Mutual of Ohio/ Carolina
Care Plan acquisition. Note that some of the major plan providers were involved in multiple deals
during the sample period.
Table 1.2: M&A Deals' Details
N Acquiror Target Value Date Form
1 United HealthCare Services PacifiCare Health Systems 7,511 12.21.05 M
2 MemberHealth AmeriHealth Ins Co-Medicare N/A 11.16.06 AA
3 Medical Mutual of Ohio Carolina Care Plan N/A 05.18.07 AA
4 Universal Holding Corp MemberHealth 780 09.21.07 AA
5 UnitedHealth Group Sierra Health Services 2,425 02.25.08 M
6 CVS Caremark Corp Longs Drug Stores Corp 2,637 10.30.08 M
7 CVS Caremark Corp Universal American Corp N/A 12.31.08 DJV
8 United HealthCare Services Health Net-US Northeast 630 12.11.09 AA
9 HealthSpring Bravo Health 545 11.30.10 M
10 Munich Health North America Windsor Health Group 131 01.04.11 M
11 CVS Caremark Corp Universal American Corp 1,059 04.29.11 M
Notes: We list the acquiror and target names as they are recorded in the SDC data. For example, in deal #6 the acquiror is
UnitedHealth Group Inc. It is a parent of the United HealthCare Services Inc, a company that was the acquiror in deals #1 and
#8. Merger value is given in millions of dollars. The date is merger completion date. "AA" stands for acquisition of assets; "M"
for merger; "DJV" for dissolution of joint venture. AA is the purchase of a company by acquisition of its assets rather than its
stock.
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Figure 1.1: M&A deals timing with repect to the bid deadline date
We restrict attention to horizontal mergers and acquisitions of assets where either partici-
pants or their immediate subsidiary offered a Part D plan at least in the year prior to the merger
completion date. We exclude all the deals where one or both companies belong to a non-Part D line
of insurance (such as life insurance), joint ventures of Part D insurers into related lines of business
(such as pharmacy management) and vertical mergers with pharmacies. It is worth noting that we
exclude a few large deals that took place in the second half of 2011 and in 2012 due to our assump-
tion on the relative timing of the deal and its effects. The bids for each successive calendar year
are submitted before the first Monday in June of the previous calendar year. Thus, for the deals
completed prior to the deadline we measure the before period as the current calendar year and
after as the following calendar year assuming that their bid will reflect the effects of merger. For
example, case A in Figure 1.1 demonstrates a merger that was completed prior to first Monday in
June of year (t-1). In this case, year (t-1) will represent the before period and year (t) - the after
period. The merger from case B was completed after the bid date. It means that its before period
is year (t) and after period is year (t+1). We also go through the news reports and companies'
press releases for each of the 11 deals to obtain factual support to our assumption. The mergers
that were completed after June 2011 when all the bids for 2012 calendar year had been submitted
would require data from 2013. The latest CMS data available at the time of study are for 2012.
Including these later deals, 22 of the top 25 Part D insurers have been involved in an M&A deal
with the notable exception being the number 2 insurer, Humana.
We match the SDC data on deals to the plan-level data by company name. There are about
100 unique parent companies whose subsidiaries offer Part D plans during the sample period. Some
parents control more than one insurance company. As multi-product firms, insurers offer between
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Figure 1.2: Plan transitions from year-to-year
one and three plans per region with the requirement that at least one plan qualifies as a basic plan.
We look at the short-term merger effects by comparing plans prices and coverage charac-
teristics before and after the deal was completed. From year-to-year, plans can evolve in one of
four ways as depicted in figure 1.2. Plans can be renewed, terminated, consolidated, or new plans
can be introduced. To determine each plan's transition status we use the CMS crosswalk file that
links plans across years. Renewed plans carry-over enrollees from the previous year and typically
maintain the same product segment: basic or enhanced status. However, plan characteristics such
as the monthly premium, formulary list, and copay/coinsurance tiers, and drug prices can change
across years. Terminated plans simply stop being offered for the new calendar year, and previously
enrolled individuals have to actively select another plan. New plans are introduced to the market
for the first time and they have no enrollees from the previous calendar year. Consolidated plans
combine two or more plans from the previous year into one plan. Enrollees from the previous year's
plans carry over into the new plan. Like renewed plans, the product characteristics can differ from
the previous year's plan characteristics. Most consolidations combine two or more basic plans or
two or more enhanced plans, but there are examples of cross segment, basic-enhanced consolidation.
Consolidation of plans is undertaken by merging firms as well as by firms that did not
participate in a deal. We posit that the main reasons behind plan consolidation are to achieve cost
efficiency gains and, for merging insurers, as a means to renegotiate contracts with drug suppliers. A
similar idea is presented by Maksimovic et al. (2011). They find evidence of extensive restructuring
in a short period following an M&A deal. In the sample of U.S. manufacturing firms, acquirors were
likely to sell or close down targets' plants. It resulted in a boost in productivity in the retained
plants comparing to the industry. Health insurance is fundamentally different from manufacturing
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in that terminating plans is highly undesirable because enrollees are lost. Part D insurers are better
off consolidating plans when they want to restructure plans offerings so as to retain enrollees.
Table 1.1 shows the total number of plans offered during the sample period in each year and
the number of plans directly affected by an M&A deal. In each year, an average of 17% of all plans
are affected by a merger. Table B.2 shows how all plans and M&A affected plans evolve. There is
no systematic tendency for the plans of merged firms to evolve differently from non-merger affected
plans. Most plans are renewed or consolidated, few plans exit or newly enter the market. The only
difference between the two groups of plans is that firms that were not affected by a merger were
more likely to create a new plan. For our analysis we restrict attention to renewed and consolidated
plans because our empirical method requires a plan to be observed for at least two consecutive years.
By definition, terminated and new plans do not meet this criteria. Excluding them from the sample
is unlikely to bias results because they compose such a small fraction of the market.
Table B.2 also reports comparative summary statistics for the control group, plans unaffected
by merger, and treatment group, plans offered by companies involved in a merger deal. The pre-
merger plan characteristics of merger affected plans are generally similar to all other plans.
1.5 Estimation Strategy: Differences-in-Differences
To estimate the effect of mergers and plan consolidation, we use a differences-in-differences
(DD) identification strategy. Differences-in-differences is a popular method for identifying effects of
policy treatments most often applied to household-level data in labor, health, and development
economics fields (Bertrand et al. (2004)). DD and treatment effect approaches are used less often for
studies of the firm and in particular merger outcome studies. However, there are notable applications
 Hastings (2004) (retail gas stations) and Dafny et al. (2012) (health insurance). The detailed
panel of product-level data and large sample of merger-treated plans make such a DD approach
feasible and provide an attractive alternative to structural-based modeling and estimation of merger
outcomes (Angrist and Pischke (2010)).
1.5.1 Merger Treatment Effects
We run several specifications of DD regressions to estimate the treatment effect of an M&A
deal on plan outcomes. Specification (1) considers the effect of deals on our first outcome of interest
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 the monthly premium, p.
pit − pit−1 = α+ βDit−1 + (Xit −Xit−1)′β + ϕt + ϕmarket + ϕinsurer + it−1 (1.1)
where i indexes the plan, and t the year. The deal treatment Dit−1 = 1 if plan i was involved in an
M&A deal that was completed in year t − 1, such that the effect of the deal could be expected to
appear in year t. Note that the dating of deals is determined by the time line in figure 1.1 and does
not necessarily match the calendar year in which the deal was officially announced. The controls for
plan characteristics Xit include various measures of plan design and drug coverage. We also include
fixed effects for years (ϕt), markets (ϕmarket), and also insurer fixed effects (ϕinsurer) in our most
heavily controlled specification. The term it−1 is a plan-year specific error term. To estimate the
effect of mergers on plan characteristics, we apply the DD approach to drug formulary counts, f ,
and the out-of-pocket drug price index, copay. The dependent variables in these regressions are the
first differences in outcome measures, fit − fit−1 and copayit − copayit−1 respectively.
To identify the merger effect, we take advantage of the two dimensions present in the data:
time and merger status. First, we look at the across time variation in outcomes, i.e. plan premiums
immediately before the deal to premiums immediately after. This comparison is possible if a plan
is observed in the data for at least two consecutive years. For this reason, our sample includes
renewed and consolidated plans, excluding new and terminated plans (see figure 1.2). The unit of
observation is indexed to year t − 1 in equation (1.1). This timing issue matters for consolidated
plans. For example if plans A and B sold in year t− 1 are consolidated into plan C for year t, there
are two observations in the data for plans A and B in year t − 1. Observations of A and B may
have different pit−1 and Xit−1 values in year t− 1, but will have the same pit and Xit values in year
t because of consolidation.3
On the merger status dimension, we compare merger-affected plans to a control group of
plans unaffected by an M&A deal. Combining both sources of variation in the DD estimator provides
a very robust means of identifying average treatment effects.
To understand the intuition behind the DD approach, it is useful to break down the compo-
nents of the estimator. Applying only one of the differences could result in confounded estimates of
3Note that there is no splitting of plans. That is, plan A in year t − 1 cannot be split into plans B and C for
year t.
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the treatment effect. In the raw data, a before and after comparison across time of average premi-
ums for merger-treated plan shows a (44.81-40.27=)$4.54 increase in premiums caused by a merger
(see table B.2). A comparison of average premiums for merger (treatment group) and non-merger
(control group) plans shows a (44.81-45.16=)$0.36 decrease in premiums caused by a merger.
Neither of these results necessarily measures the causal treatment effect. The increase in-
dicated by time differencing could simply reflect an increasing trend in premiums over time that
affects all plans. Such a trend is plausible given plans not affected by a merger experience average
premium increases of (45.16-42.54=)$2.62. The decrease indicated by differencing the treated and
untreated group could be attributed to differences in unobserved plan characteristics of the two
groups of plans. The DD estimate of (44.81-40.27)-(45.16-42.54=)$1.92 controls for both confound-
ing time trend effects and unobserved plan characteristics. The estimate of $1.92 is the causal average
treatment effect if firms' decisions about merging are orthogonal to plan, market, and time period
characteristics. To control for selection on observables, we include first differences in plan charac-
teristics Xit −Xit−1. For example, if merger-affected plans are more likely to lower the deductible
between years than non-merger plans, the $1.92 could simply reflect the fact that lower deductible
plans are more costly. The year and market fixed effects control for their respective correlation with
mergers. Year fixed effects are needed because mergers do not all occur in the same year. From the
data (table 1.1), mergers happened more intensively in the years following the 2010 health reform
legislation, which itself may have altered trends in health insurance premiums. Market fixed effects
control for market characteristics, such as the number of competing plans in the market and its
size. Note, unlike Dafny et al. (2012), we do not include measures of market competition such as
Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI) as it is controlled for by the fixed effects.
The DD estimate of the merger effect is the causal treatment effect if the decision to merge
is exogenous or random, conditional on the control variables and fixed effects. Two features of
the insurance industry during this time period support the plausibility of the merger exogeneity
assumption. First, the mergers in our sample involve large diversified insurance companies. Part D
is a relatively small component of the firms' business activities, which suggests merger decisions are
likely exogenous to the Part D market. Second, nearly every major firm offering a Part D plan has
been involved in a merger since 2006. Including recent mergers announced after our sample period,
22 of the top 25 Part D insurers have merged with another Part D insurer. This high intensity
of merger activity suggests merger decisions are not a matter of if a firm will merge, but rather
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a question of when it will merge. Matters of if firms merge raise concerns about whether the
DD estimator measures causal treatment effects; matters of when to merge are controlled for by
the year fixed effects. These two justifications aside, we cannot rule out the possibility that there
are other unobserved insurer characteristics correlated with the specific year, when a particular
insurer merges. To purge such correlation our most heavily controlled specifications include insurer
fixed effects. The DD estimator becomes a triple differences-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) with
insurer fixed effects (Bertrand et al. (2004)). Identification is a comparison of year-to-year differences
in premiums within an insurer in the year(s) it merges compared to year-to-year differences in
premiums in the year(s) it does not merge. Insurer fixed effects change the control group from
being all other Part D plans that don't merge, to plans of the same insurer in years that the insurer
does not merge. We should note that for these specifications it is necessary to compute insurer
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, which given the limited variation in the data results in
large standard errors. Nonetheless our results are economically significant and in many specifications
statistically distinguishable from the null hypothesis of zero merger effect.
Interpreting the DD estimates requires care because of equilibrium effects and the possibility
of multiple merger events occurring simultaneously in the same time period. In the product and
upstream supplier market, equilibrium effects can cause a merger event to have an effect on all plans
in a market, not just plans sold by the parties to the merger. In the product market, Bertrand
pricing models of differentiated products predict that all firms, including rivals to merging parties,
gain market power when a merger increases market concentration. Likewise, mergers can increase
monopsony power with upstream suppliers for all firms in a market. The analysis in Dafny et al.
(2012) estimates the market-wide effects of concentration induced by the Aetna-Prudential merger
on product market pricing and payments to the upstream market for doctors and nurses. Lucarelli
et al. (2012) estimate a structural discrete choice model of the Part D market under Bertrand pricing
and simulates the effect on premiums from the 2006 merger of United Healthcare and Pacificare. The
average premium increases 4.7% for the plans of the merged firms, and just 0.9% for all other plans.
Our DD results measure the merger effect on a treated plan over and above the equilibrium effects
of mergers on the untreated group. For example, if the data matched that in the simulated model
in Lucarelli et al. (2012), the DD estimator on premium would show a (4.7-0.9=)3.8% increase
in premiums. When there are multiple merger events occurring at the same time, the estimator
measures the marginal effect of a merger on a particular plan, not the total effect of all simultaneously
18
occurring mergers. Market and year fixed effects control for the intensity of merger activity in a
given year and market. For example, there was a lot of merger activity in 2008 when prices increased
by a very large amount of $6 on average. The 2008 fixed effect would be higher than other years.
The last consideration for the DD estimator is sample selection. In Part D, plans are allowed
to freely enter and exit the market. The DD estimator requires observation of a plan across two
consecutive years. As such, new and terminated plans must be dropped from the sample. The DD
estimate is potentially biased by sample selection if factors that influence decisions to terminate or
introduce a new plan are also related to merger decisions. The issue of plans selecting into or out of
the market is analogous to the issue of program participation decisions in the typical DD estimator
used for household studies. In our case, selection is not a major concern because there is very little
churn in plans entering and exiting the market, and the little churn that exists does not appear to
be related to merger decisions.4 In particular, plans of merged firms are not more or less likely to
introduce new plans or terminate plans than non-merging firms (see table B.2). There are good
reasons to expect little churn in Part D. First, lock-in effects stemming from switching costs give
strong incentives for plans to renew plans from year-to-year and make it difficult for new plans to
attract enrollees (Miller and Yeo (2012); Ericson (2014)). Second, subsidy amounts are calculated
based on the previous year's enrollment figures which discourages plan entry and exit (Miller and
Yeo (2013)). For these reasons new insurers that want to enter the Part D market do so by acquiring
the plans of incumbent insurers, not by organically creating new plans. The leading example is the
2012 acquisition of Medco by Express Scripts.
1.5.2 Plan Consolidation Treatment Effects
The next set of DD specifications includes plan consolidation as an additional treatment
effect. In contrast to a merger that is a combination of two distinct insurance companies offering
Part D plans into a joint company, plan consolidation is a combination of two or more plans offered
by an insurance company into a single plan for the upcoming year. In this sense, our classification
of a merger event can be though of as an inter -firm combination, and plan consolidation is an intra-
firm combination. Note that a non-merging insurer can consolidate its own plans; in periods that
an insurer merges it can consolidate its own plans or consolidate with plans offered by its merger
4The exceptions where a lot of entry is observed are 2006, when all plans were new plans by definition, and 2007
when the market was still in its nascency.
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partner. Insurers cannot consolidate plans with a rival company.
We specify the following DD estimator for consolidation:
pit − pit−1 = α+ β1Dmergeit−1 + β2Dconsit−1 + β3Dconsit−1 ∗Dmergeit−1 + (Xit −Xit−1)′β
+ ϕt + ϕmarket + ϕinsurer + it−1
(1.2)
The treatment dummy for plan consolidation Dconsit−1 = 1 if plan i is consolidated with another plan
between years t−1 and t, and the M&A treatment dummy Dmergeit−1 = 1 follows the same definition as
that described in equation (1.1). The additional term Dconsit−1 ∗Dmergeit−1 measures the interaction effect
of a plan being affected by both a merger and consolidation event. We also consider the treatment
effect on formulary counts fit − fit−1 and the copay price index copayit − copayit−1.
The same identification issues discussed above for mergers apply for plan consolidation
treatment effects. The exogeneity assumption is perhaps more tenuous. A major concern is that
insurers consolidate under-performing plans as a way to remove them from the market. In addition
to the many product characteristic control variables, we control for under-performance by including
measures of prior year enrollment and markets shares. There is also strong evidence that institutional
features of the Part D program are primary drivers of plan consolidation. The rules for determining
the LIS threshold and subsidies are pegged to enrollment figures, giving insurers a strong incentive
boost enrollment by consolidating plans. This is evident in the data. The normal frequency of
consolidation is 20%, but for plans that switch status to becoming LIS eligible benchmark plans, the
frequency rises to 42%. The other marked increase in consolidation came in 2011 when Medicare
first announced guidelines directing insurers to consolidate low enrollment and meaningfully similar
plans. Year fixed effects and covariates for LIS status capture both of these institutional features.
The interaction term of mergers and consolidation is plausibly exogenous given the data indicate a
similar fraction of plans are consolidated by merging firms as non-merging firms (see table B.2).
1.5.3 Testing the Three Theories of Mergers
One our of main objectives is to distinguish the three channels through which mergers affect
markets: market power, cost efficiencies, and upstream monopsony power. In many industries, all
three channels likely impact merger outcomes. Retrospective merger studies that examine product
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market prices are interesting in that they show the net effect of the three channels, but do not
distinguish how much each factor contributes to the outcome. Prospective merger simulation studies
have difficulty forecasting cost efficiency and monopsony power effects and instead are often based
on modeling approaches that assume there are only market power effects (Weinberg and Hosken
(2013)). Our contribution is to show that all three are important.
We use two extra pieces of informationover and above price datato test the theories.
First, we exploit the distinction between inter-firm mergers and intra-firm plan consolidation. Sec-
ond, we test how mergers affect product characteristics: in our application coverage characteristics.
Throughout the results section, we discuss a series of assumptions about the market to test the
theories. The basic idea of our hypothesis can be summarized as follows. Only merging firms gain
market power and monopsony power. Firms realize cost efficiencies and monopsony power by con-
solidating plans. Taken together, the hypothesis implies the merger dummy in specification (2)
measures the market power effect on prices, the consolidation dummy measures cost efficiencies, and
the interaction term measures monopsony power. The same logic applies to the product characteris-
tic measures; however given the design of the Part D program we expect upstream monopsony power
to be a more important determinant of coverage characteristics than market power. There is little
reason to believe that administrative and marketing cost efficiencies would translate into changes in
coverage characteristics.
1.6 Results
In this section we report results of the differences-in-differences estimates for plan premiums
and the three coverage characteristics: the total number of drugs covered on formularies, the number
of top 100 drugs on formularies, and the out-of-pocket cost for a basket of the top 100 drugs.
The results for each outcome variable are presented using three panels. Our main findings
are shown in the panel labeled C. They are estimates from specification (2) that includes the merger
treatment Dmerge, consolidation treatment Dcons, and their interaction Dmerge × Dcons. Panel A
shows results from specification (1) that includes only the merger treatment Dmerge; panel B reports
for the specification that only includes the consolidation treatment Dcons. These two specifications
are reported for comparison purposes. We also show estimates with and without insurer fixed effects.
The standard errors are large in specifications with insurer fixed effects because there is less within-
21
insurer variation in the covariates. However, the point estimates generally have the same signs and
magnitudes as the specifications without insurer fixed effects. We focus our interpretation on the
results that include insurer fixed effects.
1.6.1 Mergers and Plan Premiums
Table 1.3 reports the results for the effect on premiums. The tables suppress coefficients on
the control variables; full results are in the appendix. Panel A shows the merger treatment effect
in isolation, without regard to consolidation. The results indicate that when insurers merge, the
premiums on their plans go up by $3.61 relative to the premiums for insurers that do not merge.
Given the average premium of $45 across years, the rise corresponds to an 8% increase. Theory
suggests the higher premium for merged firms is due to a strong market power effect dominating
cost efficiency and upstream-monopsony power effects.
Panel B reports the consolidation treatment effect in isolation. The results show how pre-
miums for plans that were consolidated (treatment group) change with respect to the premiums
for plans that were renewed (control group). Premiums for consolidated plans are $3.86 (8.7%)
lower relative to the control group of plans that are renewed across years. This result suggests that
insurers are either achieving cost efficiencies or gaining monopsony power over drug suppliers by
consolidating their plans.
Panel C reports estimates from the specification that jointly estimates merger and consoli-
dation effects. This specification measures three treatment effects relative to the omitted category of
not-merging/not-consolidating. The coefficient on the merger dummy, Dmerge, indicates premiums
are $3.84 (8.5%) higher for the plans of merged insurers that are renewed but not consolidated.
This result supports a strong market power effect of mergers. The coefficient on the consolida-
tion dummy, Dcons, shows consolidated plans of non-merging insurers are $3.42 (7.6%) lower than
renewed plans of non-merging insurers. This drop could either be caused by a cost efficiency or
upstream-monopsony power effect. This result is not influenced by market power effects because
the comparison is between plans of non-merged insurers. The difference in premiums between con-
solidated plans of merged insurers and renewed plans of non-merged insurers is given the by sum
of the merger, consolidate, and interaction term coefficients, Dmerge + Dcons + Dmerge × Dcons.
The premiums are $1.69 (3.8%) lower, suggesting cost efficiencies and/or monopsony power effects
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dominate market power effects when merging insurers consolidate their plans.5 This result stands
in stark contrast to the finding that renewed plans of merged insurers are priced higher.
The results for plan premiums provide the first set of evidence that we use to disentangle
the three competing effects in the merger theory. The effects are separately identified under two
assumptions. First, if the act of renewing plans by merging insurers implies that the insurers do
nothing to restructure the management of plans or renegotiate contracts with drug suppliers, then
there is no cost efficiency or upstream-monopsony effect. Under this assumption the coefficient on
the merger dummy measures the market power effect stemming from the ability of merging insurers
to coordinate pricing decisions. Second, the cost efficiency and monopsony power effects can be
separated by further assuming that monopsony power over drug suppliers is solely determined at
the insurer level, not the plan level. To the extent that enrollment determines bargaining positions
with drug suppliers, this assumption can be interpreted to mean that insurer-wide enrollment (in
both Part D and non-Part D plans) matters for monopsony power, not how an insurer's enrollees
are allocated across individual plans. Under this assumption the coefficient on the consolidation
dummy measures the cost efficiencies achieved from restructuring the management and marketing
of its plans. This coefficient does not measure a market power effect because no merger takes place,
and, under our assumptions, it does not represent a monopsony power effect because there are no
overall gains in enrollment at the insurer level for a non-merging insurer consolidating its plans. The
monopsony power effect is given by the coefficient on the interaction of the merger and consolidate
dummy: Dmerge×Dcons. If insurers renegotiate contracts with drug suppliers when they consolidate
plans, a merged insurer with a larger base of enrollees will have stronger monopsony power.
In summary, the disentangled results indicate the market power effect of mergers raises
premiums $3.84, cost efficiencies reduce premiums $3.42, and the extra monopsony power effect
reduces premiums $2.11. The net effect for merging insurers that consolidate plans is the sum of
the three effects: a decrease in premiums of $1.69.
1.6.2 Mergers and Drug Coverage: Formularies
Our next set of results investigates how mergers and plan consolidation affect coverage
characteristics. First, we look at the composition of drug formularies to gouge the generosity of
5When insurer fixed effects are excluded and the estimates are less noisy, the combined effect of merging and
consolidating remains negative and passes an F-test of joint significance differing from zero. However it fails at
reasonable significance levels in the specification with insurer fixed effects.
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Table 1.3: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Premiums.
A B C
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Merger-affected plan 1.703 3.607 2.241 3.840
(0.363) (2.219) (0.400) (2.494)
Consolidated plan -4.221 -3.861 -3.911 -3.422
(0.320) (1.339) (0.343) (1.547)
Consolidated x Merger plan -2.199 -2.105
(0.827) (2.127)
Year & Region F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Insurer F.E. Y Y Y
N of year-pairs 8,839 F-test 29.7 0.6
N of M&A affected plans 1,375
N of consolidated plans 1,994
N of M&A consolidated plans 296
Notes: Panel A shows estimates for the plans involved in a merger; this specification does not distinguish between
mergers that consolidated plans and mergers that didn't. Panel B shows estimates for the plan consolidation effect on
premiums. Panel C includes the merger-consolidated plan interaction term. The F-test null hypothesis is that the sum
of the coefficients on merger dummy, consolidation dummy and their interaction term is zero. Standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered by pre-merger insurer for specification with pre-merger insurer fixed effects. Coefficients on the
suppressed controls are presented in Table B.4 of the Appendix.
drug coverage offered by a plan. We use two measures: the number of top 100 drugs covered on a
plan's formulary in table 1.4 and the total number of all NDCs in table 1.5. The top 100 captures
how generous coverage is for a general Medicare population that is likely to take some of the most
popular drugs. The all NDCs list reflects how well the plan serves a diverse population, with some
individuals requiring special treatments outside of the most common medicines list. Note that these
measures are not necessarily closely correlated. At the extreme, one plan may cover all drugs from
the top 100 and a minimal number of drugs outside the top 100. Another plan may have a limited
selection of the most common drugs but have a variety of other options on its formulary.
For the top 100 drugs, panel A and panel B show that mergers and plan consolidation when
taken in isolation have a near zero effect on drug formularies. For the all NDCs list, the effects are
also near-zero, however there may be some evidence in the specification with insurer fixed effects
in panel A that mergers lead to less formulary coverage. Although these results don't reveal any
meaningful effect on formulary coverage, we find large effects in the specification that includes the
interaction of merging and plan consolidation in panel C. The coefficient on the merger dummy,
Dmerge, indicates renewed plans of merged insurers delist 1 of the top 100 drugs and 320 from the
all NDCs list. Given that the average plan lists 90 out of top 100 drugs and 2,700 NDCs, these
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changes represent decreases in percentage terms of 1.2% and 11.9% respectively. The top 100 figure
may seem small, but, stated equivalently, one fewer listed drug corresponds to a 12% increase in the
number of top 100 excluded from formularies. The coefficient on the consolidation dummy Dcons
indicates a decrease in coverage, slightly less than the merger effect for the top 100 drugs (-0.9),
and much smaller in magnitude for all NDCs (-62). The largest effect is for merged insurers that
consolidate plans. The interaction term Dmerge×Dcons, is an increase in the top 100 of 4.5 top 100
drugs and 550 NDCs, which in percentage terms represent increases of 5% and 20% respectively. The
combined effect of merging insurers consolidating plans nets a very large increase in drug coverage
relative to the more modest effects for merging insurers that renew plans and non-merged insurers
consolidating plans.
These results provide further evidence on the three theories of mergers. The large increase
in coverage for consolidated plans of merged insurers indicates a strong monopsony power effect. By
consolidating and renegotiating contracts with drug suppliers, merged insurers with a larger base
of enrollees have greater bargaining power to extract better terms from drug suppliers. The results
suggests greater bargaining power allows insurers to offer substantially broader drug coverage for
both top 100 drugs and across the full spectrum of all NDCs. Apart from greater bargaining power,
it is also plausible that the merging insurers are able to combine their pre-merger formularies into a
single more extensive formulary.
The near zero effects (or modest effects) on formularies found for merged/non-consolidated
and non-merged/consolidated plans are also of interest. That consolidation by non-merging insurers
does not increase coverage (or somewhat decreases for top 100 coverage) supports the hypothesis that
bargaining power is not determined at the plan level. Returning to interpretation of the premium
results, these formulary results indicate the large drop in price from consolidation are attributed
to efficiency factors, not monopsony power. The modest negative effect on coverage for merged
insurers that renew plans could be indicative of a market power effect, whereby the larger firm
exercises market power by reducing the quality of their plan offerings. That the negative effect is
larger for the NDCs measure than the top 100, could indicate insurers exercise monopoly power by
horizontally differentiating their formularies. That is, after the merger, drugs for some specialized
classes of medical conditions are retained for one of their plans, yet dropped on another plan to
make the plans appeal to different sets of consumers.
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Table 1.4: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Formulary, Top 100 Drugs.
A B C
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Merger-affected plan 0.391 -0.146 -0.492 -1.081
(0.172) (1.872) (0.189) (2.025)
Consolidated plan -0.196 -0.176 -0.866 -0.880
(0.155) (0.922) (0.165) (0.940)
Consolidated x Merger plan 4.357 4.459
(0.396) (2.244)
Year & Region F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Insurer F.E. Y Y Y
N of year-pairs 8,839 F-test 77.4 1.48
N of M&A affected plans 1,375
N of consolidated plans 1,994
N of M&A consolidated plans 296
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in the number of drugs ranked in top100 by prescriptions filled, in the formulary.
Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by insurer for specification with insurer fixed effects. Coefficients on the
suppressed controls are presented in Table B.5 of the Appendix.
1.6.3 Mergers and Drug Coverage: Out-of-pocket Drug Cost
For a complete picture of the effect on drug coverage, we consider out-of-pocket drug costs.
The outcome of interest is the out-of-pocket cost in copays/coinsurance that an enrollee pays for
a basket of top 100 drugs in the initial coverage zone after deductibles have been met. Three
components influence out-of-pocket costs: the number of drugs out of top 100 list covered by a
plan's formulary, copay and coinsurance rates, and the list price for each drug negotiated with
drug manufacturers. The negotiated price matters for out-of-pocket costs for drugs covered by a
coinsurance scheme (percentage of drug price) as opposed to copayment which is a fixed dollar
amount. If a drug is covered by the plan, it enters the basket with its respective copay rate or
its coinsurance rate times negotiated price. For drugs not listed on the formulary, we assume that
an enrollee pays the full retail price which we set to the average regional (if available) or national
drug price. The out-pocket-cost complements the formulary count outcome as it measures not
just the number of covered drugs, but also the cost of covered drugs. With negotiated prices and
copay/coinsurance rates included, it encompasses the most direct measure of the bargaining power
insurers have with drug manufacturers and as such may be a better indicator of monopsony power
effects.
The results for the out-of-pocket cost measure are generally consistent with those found
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Table 1.5: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Formulary, All Drugs.
A B C
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Merger-affected plan 43.56 -182.80 -47.08 -320.23
(25.83) (338.65) (29.15) (354.33)
Consolidated plan 16.57 30.60 -45.12 -62.34
(22.58) (109.96) (24.29) (123.18)
Consolidated x Merger plan 373.07 552.93
(56.41) (221.75)
Year & Region F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Insurer F.E. Y Y Y
N of year-pairs 7,396 F-test 34.9 0.2
N of M&A affected plans 1,082
N of consolidated plans 1,746
N of M&A consolidated plans 276
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in the number of drugs included into the formulary. 2006-2007 year-plan pairs
are excluded. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by pre-merger insurer for specification with insurer fixed effects.
Coefficients on the suppressed controls are presented in Table B.6 of the Appendix.
for the drug formulary measures but are noisier. The most stark result in panel C of table 1.6 is
the large negative coefficient (-$3) on the interaction term of merging and consolidating. Given an
average cost for the basket of top 100 drugs of $63, the result represents a decrease in cost of 4.8%.
Following our interpretation of the theories, the decrease indicates a strong monopsony power effect
that merging insurers can achieve by consolidating plans. For non-merging insurers, consolidation
has the opposite effect; out-of-pocket costs increase $1.40. This supports the notion that insurers
cannot increase their monopsony power by consolidating plans, and further supports the hypothesis
that premium reductions for consolidated plans are due to cost efficiency effects. The estimate on
the merger dummy Dmerge indicates a monopoly power effect for merging insurers that renew plans.
Although the regulations require insurers to pass on all negotiated drug prices to enrollees, they can
exercise monopoly power over out-of-pocket drug costs by raising copay and coinsurance rates. This
appears to be happening for renewed plans of merged insurers, in which out-of-pocket costs increase
by $2.41. However, the result is not robust to the exclusion of insurer fixed effects.
Comparing the results on formulary coverage to out-of-pocket costs for the interaction term,
Dmerge ∗Dcons leads to the same conclusion that merging and consolidating plans improves coverage
through increased monopsony power. But the combined effects Dmerge + D
cons + Dmerge ∗Dcons,
which is the ultimate outcomes for consumers, leads to divergent conclusions. Drug coverage in-
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creases in terms of the number of drugs on the formulary (+2.5 top 100 drugs and +170 NDCs), yet
decreases in terms of out-of-pocket costs (a rise of $0.80 for the top 100 drugs). Whether coverage
improves depends on what is more important: drug costs or the scope of covered drugs. The bargain-
ing process between insurers and drug manufacturers is certainly very complicated, involving many
decisions about the inclusion of drugs, copay/coinsurance rates, and drug prices. The relatively
stronger effect on the interaction term for formulary counts relative to that for the out-of-pocket
cost, suggests that the decision about what drugs to include on formularies matters more in the
bargaining process than the costs of those drugs.
Table 1.6: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Price Index.
A B C
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Merger-affected plan -0.424 1.755 0.076 2.441
(0.311) (2.240) (0.344) (2.033)
Consolidated plan 1.706 0.908 2.132 1.440
(0.280) (1.152) (0.300) (1.299)
Consolidated x Merger plan -2.723 -3.070
(0.722) (3.311)
Year & Region F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Insurer F.E. Y Y Y
N of year-pairs 8,839 F-test 0.7 0.98
N of M&A affected plans 1,375
N of consolidated plans 1,994
N of M&A consolidated plans 296
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in the weighted price of the basket of top100 drugs under each plan. Standard
errors are in parentheses, clustered by pre-merger insurer for specification with insurer fixed effects. Coefficients on the
suppressed controls are presented in Table B.7 of the Appendix.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper examines the effects of horizontal mergers amongst Part D insurers on prices
and coverage characteristics. Our method applies a differences-in-differences identification strategy
to a large panel of all Part D plans sold between 2006 and 2012. We make a distinction between
mergersinter-firm combinationsand plan consolidationintra-firm combinationsto decompose
the three channels through which mergers affect markets: market power, cost efficiencies, and up-
stream monopsony power.
We draw two main conclusions. First, we find evidence that mergers cause premiums to rise,
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indicative of a strong market power effect. However, market power is offset when merging insurers
consolidate plans. These cost savings stem from two sources: economizing on administrative expenses
and market activities (cost efficiencies) and improving bargaining positions with drug suppliers
(monopsony power). As further evidence on bargaining power, we find merging and consolidating
plans leads to greatly improved drug coverage, yet merging on its own has a near zero effect on
coverage. Our second conclusion is that plan consolidation by non-merging firms results in lower
premiums, but does not improve drug coverage. These results suggest insurers can organically achieve
cost efficiencies through plan consolidation, but only mergers alter market power and monopsony
power.
Given the rapid pace of M&A activity in the industry, there is keen interest amongst anti-
trust authorities and healthcare policy makers to scrutinize these deals. Our results offer a few
lessons. Merger deals create considerable market power. However, there can be benefits in the form
of lower premiums and improved coverage if the merging insurers restructure their plans to streamline
costs and exercise monopsony power. Yet, cost efficiency alone is not a sufficient justification as non-
merging insurers can also realize cost efficiencies. Balancing bargaining power and market power
and weighing the importance of coverage versus price become the keys to an anti-trust investigation.
There are also specific ramifications for Part D. Current policy aims to reduce the number of plans.
Our results suggest policies should favor plan consolidation, as opposed to the elimination of insurers
and restrictions on new entrants. Consolidation has the added benefit of creating cost efficiencies,
and the further benefit of improved drug coverage if consolidation involves merging insurers.
There are several avenues for extending this work. A similar analysis could be conducted
for vertical mergers. There are two types: mergers with pharmacies, such as the CVS Caremark
deal, and M&A deals with pharmacy benefits managers (PBMs). PBMs historically acted as third
party administrators who process claims and consult on formulary construction. Recently PBMs
have been entering the market by acquiring the Part D assets of health insurers; at the same
time, health insurers have been bringing PBM functions in-house through acquisition. Much of the
current merger activity impacts broader health insurance markets outside Part D. A key difference
is that bargaining with providers (hospitals, doctors) occurs at a local level, whereas it is at a
national level for prescription drugs. Finally, new individual level administrative claims data is
becoming available for Part D. Future work could examine how mergers and plan consolidation
affect enrollment decisions and prescription drug usage.
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Chapter 2
The Effects of Investment in Child Well-Being over Time:
Children with ADHD
2.1 Introduction
The most recent National Survey of Children's Health 2011/12 reports that over 5 mil-
lion children aged 217 (7.9%) have been diagnosed with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD) in the U.S. Over 68% of these children are taking medications for the disorder.1 However,
very little is known about the relative effectiveness of available treatments and their effects on health,
behavioral, and school outcomes, especially in the long-run.
In the Medicaid population, these statistics are even more pronounced. For example, in a
cohort of children born in 1996 and ever eligible for SC Medicaid between 20032012, over 23% of
children have been diagnosed with ADHD during the sample period. About 80% of those diagnosed
with the condition were prescribed pharmacological or non-pharmacological treatment.
In 2012, SC Medicaid spent $62.1 million on ADHD prescription medications. That is three-
fold the amount the program spent in 2003, despite a 200% increase in share of generic prescription
claims over this time period.2 The increase comes from the rise in the number of enrollees diagnosed
with ADHD (68%), prescriptions per patient (18%), and cost of medications for Medicaid (98%). In
contrast, SC Medicaid total spending on physician visits by patients with ADHD increased by just
3% between 2003 and 2012, which translates into a 38% decline in per patient spending.
In recent years the media launched an attack on the rapidly rising trend of ADHD diag-
1National Survey of Children's Health. NSCH 2011/12. Data query from the Child and Adolescent Health
Measurement Initiative, Data Resource Center for Child and Adolescent Health website. Retrieved on 09/25/2014
from www.childhealthdata.org.
2Author's calculations from the SC Medicaid 2003-2012 claims data set.
30
noses and prescriptions.3 In these articles, mental health professionals argue that ADHD drugs are
overprescribed. The drugs are said to be overused by young people due to their immediate effect
on the ability to concentrate. They warn the reader that the life-long consequences of taking these
medicines are unknown. Moreover, there is no evidence of any long-term positive effects on educa-
tional or behavioral outcomes, but there are a number of worrisome side effects such as slowdown
in growth and addiction.
This stance on ADHD medications may come from the fact that clinical studies last just a
few weeks; they are unable to study long-term effects of treatment. Excluding the extreme cases when
ADHD drugs are taken solely to improve performance on a particular test, the argument misses the
fact that the stock of human capital is inherently dynamic in nature. Even if the contemporaneous
effects of treatment are short-lived, the child has an opportunity to learn how to manage her condition
while on treatment and accumulate social and cognitive skills that will improve her outcomes later
in life.
This paper focuses on the effects of human capital investments on health and socio-economic
outcomes of children with ADHD. It is a common chronic mental condition that impairs children's
noncognitive skills. Patients of the hyperactive type lack self-control and patience; they demonstrate
immature behavior that is inconsistent with their age group. Inattentive type patients have a poor
ability to concentrate and complete tasks; they are forgetful.
Once a child is diagnosed, her family can invest in medical treatment to reduce the gap in
abilities of a child with ADHD compared to her non-ADHD peers. While on treatment, the child
is able to improve her outcomes in the short-run, accumulate cognitive and noncognitive skills and
possibly improve her long-run outcomes.
Using a large 10-year panel of SC Medicaid claims, I evaluate available ADHD treatment
strategies in the framework of investment in child development. The length of the panel allows me
to take advantage of an empirical approach that is commonly used for dynamic processes that have
potential unobserved heterogeneity problem (see Mroz and Savage (2006) and Yang et al. (2009)).
I model and simultaneously estimate the event of the initial diagnosis, treatment choice,
and the probability of adverse events later in life. The discrete factor random effects estimator
3See for example, Ritalin Gone Wrong. by Sroufe, L. Alan. The New York Times, January 28, 2012; Risky Rise
of the Good-Grade Pill. Schwarz, Alan. The New York Times, June 9, 2012; Drowned in a Stream of Prescriptions.
Schwarz, Alan. The New York Times, February 2, 2013; A Nation of Kids on Speed. Cohen, Pieter and Rasmussen,
Nicholas. The Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2013; and The Truth About Smart Drugs by Marek Kohn, BBC, July
29, 2014.
31
is beneficial in this setting because it can be used to control for endogeneity biases in nonlinear
models where fixed effect estimators would be inconsistent. For comparison purposes, I estimate
single-equation discrete choice models for all of the events and outcomes.
I find that there is a strong persistence in treatment choices across time periods. The results
also suggest that pharmacological treatment has only short-term positive impact on the probability
of such adverse events as injuries, teenage pregnancy, and STDs, and no impact on substance abuse
disorders. Behavioral therapy alone is not as effective as it is in combination with ADHD drugs, but
for STDs and substance abuse disorders it seems to show relatively long-lasting effects in contrast
to drugs alone.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I review the relevant
literature and outline my contribution. In section 2.3 I discuss the background of ADHD and
develop a model using human capital accumulation framework; section 2.4 outlines the empirical
model, followed by the data section 2.5. I conclude with results and discussion.
2.2 Literature Review
The literature on child development indicates that gaps in abilities that form early in life
persist into adulthood and can explain a large array of differentials in adult outcomes. Conti and
Heckman (2014), for example, provide an extensive review of the empirical evidence on the ef-
fects of the two dimensions of child well-being, cognitive and noncognitive skills, on educational
attainment, asocial and risky behaviors, and health. They emphasize the importance of modeling
multidimensional capabilities as opposed to the earlier literature on human capital development that
concentrated on cognitive abilities of a child, often measured by IQ, to explain the outcomes later
in life.
One of the earliest studies to account for the latent noncognitive skills is Heckman et al.
(2006). They find that both cognitive and noncognitive abilities affect wages, schooling, work expe-
rience, occupational choice, and participation in a range of adolescent risky behaviors. These results
have important policy implications, but most interventions target children's cognitive rather than
noncognitive abilities. The Perry Preschool experiment, for example, did not result in the IQ im-
provements. Nonetheless, the program had a beneficial impact on many child outcomes. Heckman
et al. (2006) argue that these beneficial impacts were achieved by altering social skills.
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There is an emerging health economics literature on the effects of ADHD treatment on short-
and long-term outcomes. For example, Currie et al. (2014) use a quasi-natural policy experiment
that lowered prices on all prescription drugs in Quebec, Canada but not in other provinces. They find
little evidence of positive effects on academic outcomes and even some evidence of negative impact of
treatment on grade repetition, math scores, and emotional stability of girls. Dalsgaard et al. (2014)
look at health services utilization (hospital and ER visits) and behavioral outcomes (crime), using
the variation in the doctor propensity to prescribe pharmacological treatment as an IV. They find
a positive effect of treatment on patient health and behavior. Treated children had fewer hospital
visits, due to fewer injuries, and they also had fewer encounters with the police. Using the same IV
applied to a sample of children and young adults enrolled in SC Medicaid in 20032012, Chorniy
and Kitashima (2014a) find that ADHD treatment reduces the probability of teenage pregnancy,
contraction of an STD, and substance abuse for ADHD population  teenage pregnancy.
I contribute to this literature by explicitly capturing the dynamic nature of the process of
human capital accumulation. I concentrate on the long-run effects of ADHD treatment on health
outcomes (injuries), consequences of the risky sexual behavior (teen pregnancy and STDs) and other
risky behaviors (substance abuse). I also distinguish between meaningfully different pharmacological
treatments and include behavioral therapy into the choice set. This approach allows me to compare
effectiveness of particular treatment sequences, accounting for treatment interruptions.
The problem of treatment selection is also addressed in the recent literature on choice under
uncertainty (Crawford and Shum (2005), Dickstein (2014a), and Saxell (2013)). They use learning
with a Bayesian updating framework to model the process of patient search for most suitable and
cost-efficient drug. This approach is limited in that the only relevant information in the current
period is the choice made in the period immediately prior to the current period.
In contrast, my model allows the entire past sequence of treatments to affect the current
decision. Thus, I can directly test a hypothesis that some treatments are more valuable in the
beginning period of treatment and others are more suitable for an established patient. To my
knowledge, this approach has not yet been applied to the problem of the demand for treatment.
Another limitation of the literature on demand for medical treatment under uncertainty is
the lack of data on patient outcomes. They rely on the assumption that a patient is cured when
she exits treatment. ADHD is not curable. My data allow me to introduce a more realistic measure
of treatment effectiveness  a number of behavioral and health outcomes that I identified from the
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medical literature (see Barkley (2006) for a detailed review) and the literature on child well-being
(e.g. Heckman et al. (2006)). The three adverse outcomes identifiable in my data are outcomes
associated with risky sexual behavior, teenage pregnancy and STDs, health outcomes associated
with poor attention and hyperactivity, injuries.
2.3 Conceptual framework
2.3.1 ADHD and noncognitive ability
Every child is born with a multidimensional endowment of abilities. They include cognitive
(e.g. IQ, memory) and noncognitive skills (e.g. self-control, patience, time preference)(Conti and
Heckman (2014)). Most recent medical research suggests that genetic and neurological factors are
the greatest contributors to the ADHD (see Barkley (2006) for an extensive review). Due to their
genetic condition, children who suffer from ADHD have a relatively low initial stock of noncognitive
skills.
Poor noncongitive abilities may lead to a number of negative health and social outcomes,
such as teen pregnancy, contraction of STDs, injuries, and substance abuse (as described in Section
2.4.3). According to the medical literature, ADHD can seldom be cured. It persists into adolescence
in up to 70% of cases and into adulthood in up to 66% of childhood cases4 (Barkley (2006)). In
order to relieve symptoms of the condition and augment the stock of noncognitive skills, patients take
ADHD drugs and/or attend psychotherapy sessions. The pharmacology of ADHD medicines is such
that the contemporaneous effect of treatment goes away as soon as the patient stops taking them.
However while on treatment, pharmacological or behavioral, patients are able to accumulate human
capital. They can learn planning and self-control skills in order to better manage their ADHD
symptoms in the future. Accumulation of ADHD management skills reduces the probability of
adverse events in the future. Furthermore, treated children are more likely to do better in school
and accumulate cognitive abilities. This makes up a link between previous ADHD treatment, current
stock of noncognitive and cognitive skills, and future health and social outcomes, as well as the future
treatment choices.
ADHD treatments can only be prescribed after the initial diagnosis. According to the Amer-
4The same professional opinion was expressed in an interview that I conducted with a developmental pediatrician
who specializes in developmental pediatrics in December 2013.
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ican Academy of Pediatrics guidelines5, primary care clinicians should evaluate children between 4
and 18 years old for ADHD if they show some of the symptoms.6 Since ADHD is a hereditary rather
than an acquired condition, the timing of diagnosis depends on the severity of symptoms and ADHD
type. Hyperactive and impulsive types are more likely to be diagnosed earlier than inattentive types
simply because inattentiveness might be confused with poor cognitive skills. But if a child is acting
up, parents and teachers are more likely to suggest medical diagnosis and treatment.
One of the important findings of the literature on child development is that investments in
human capital are more productive earlier in life (Cunha and Heckman (2007)). I directly test this
prediction by comparing the outcomes of early to later diagnosis and treatment. To formalize the
model, I use the general theoretical framework of the technology of skill formation and investment
in human capital laid out in Cunha and Heckman (2007) and Cunha et al. (2010).
2.3.2 Notation
In what follows I introduce the main variables and vectors of variables that I use in the
model.
1. Initial endowment (latent variable), θi0. Child i is born with an initial endowment of cognitive
and noncognitive abilities.
2. Adverse outcomes, Y outcomeit . ADHD-related adverse outcomes are injuries, Y
inj,k
it , risky-sexual
behavior outcomes, Y sex,mit , and substance abuse, Y
s.abuse
it at time period t. For injuries, k
indexes the three most prevalent kinds of injuries for ADHD population: superficial injuries,
open-wound injuries, and internal injuries; and all other injuries as defined by the ICD9 cat-
egories, k = 1, ..., 4. For the outcomes of risky sexual behavior, m = 1, 2 and corresponds to
teenage pregnancies and contraction of STDs. More detailed description of the outcomes is
outlined in Section 2.4.3.
3. The event of the first ADHD diagnosis, Dit.
5Subcommittee on Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, steering committee on quality improvement and
management, ADHD: Clinical Practice Guideline for the Diagnosis, Evaluation, and Treatment of Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder in Children and Adolescents, Pediatrics, 2011.
6Since a number of ADHD prescription drugs are approved by the FDA for use in children as young as 3 years
old (e.g. Adderall, Adderall XR), I use age 3 as the first time period when a diagnosis can be made and treatment
initiated.
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4. Medical treatment,Mijt. Children with ADHD can be prescribed pharmacological, behavioral,
or a combination treatment, Mijt, where j indexes the type of treatment. The full choice set
of pharmacological treatments is presented in Table 3.1. In this paper I estimate a simplified
empirical model with m = 1, 2, 3 corresponding to medicines-only, behavioral therapy-only,
and a combination of treatments choice options.
5. Medical treatment characteristics, Zjt. A number of pharmacological treatment characteristics
affects treatment decision. They include drug branded status, side effects, dosing frequency,
preferred-drug list status, and drug prices paid by the patient and by Medicaid.7 For behavioral
therapy treatment, this vector includes session duration, type (individual, group, and/or with
parent present), and its cost.
6. Child characteristics, Xchildit . This vector includes constant (race and gender) and period-
specific (age and county of residence) variables.
7. Mother characteristics at the child's birth,Xmotheri0 . They include mother's age, race, education
level, and history of mental disorders.
8. Medical provider characteristics, Xprovideri . They include provider office location (county) and
specialty (e.g. pediatrician, psychiatrist, etc.).
9. Family and home environment characteristics, Xenvironmentit . I follow previous literature and
use the child's foster status in year t and mother's current mental health status to approximate
for the home environment. In addition, I use yearly information on the number of children
and adults in the family.
2.3.3 Timing
The model timeline can be divided into three parts. First, when a child i is born she receives
an initial endowment of noncognitive skills, θi0, that depends on genetic and environmental factors.
Second, once the child reaches the age of 3, she can be tested for and diagnosed with ADHD in
year t (Dit) if she has some of the symptoms. Finally, once the patient who has the condition is
diagnosed, she can be prescribed a medical treatment (Mit) to relieve and treat symptoms of ADHD.
7Earlier literature finds that insurers exert pressure on doctors to prescribe cheaper options, e.g. see Dickstein
(2014b).
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Figure 2.1: Decision Timeline
The treatment augments the stock of noncognitive skills that feeds into the next time period. It also
affects the probability of the adverse outcomes that could be realized in the next period (Y outcomeit+1 ).
Figure 2.1 depicts the dynamics of the stock of child's abilities and the probability of adverse
events linked to the low level of human capital. It shows a representative year of the time period
after the patient was diagnosed with ADHD. At the start of the year t the patient has information
(Ωt) on her stock of skills, adverse events that were realized in the past years, and past treatment (if
any). During year t she will be making decisions on treatment for her condition. The adverse events
will or will not be realized. Then, by year t + 1 the individual will have an updated stock of skills
due to medical treatment and she makes decisions based on the updated information set, Ωt+1.
More precisely, at the beginning of each time period (year) an individual and her parents
have the following information that influences the treatment choice in that time period: current
stock of skills (θit), occurrence of adverse events in the past years (Y
outcome
i,t−τ , ..., Y
outcome
i,t−1 ), ADHD
diagnosis status (Di,t−1) and if diagnosed, what treatment have they undergone in the previous pe-
riods (Mij,t−τ , ...,Mij,t−1). The observed information also includes patient characteristics (Xchildit ),
physician characteristics (Xphysiciani ), and drug characteristics (Zjt). Finally, they have informa-
tion on current and lagged variables unobservable to the researcher that feed into the optimization
problem.
Prior to the initial diagnosis of ADHD no treatment can be prescribed. The timeline for
a representative year before the initial diagnosis is similar to the one shown on Figure 2.1, except
for there is no treatment decision to make since no medical treatment can be prescribed before
without the ADHD diagnosis. Individuals transition into the next period with an unaffected stock
of noncognitive skills (θi,t+1 = θit). In what follows I describe an empirical specification for every
component of this dynamic system.
37
2.4 Empirical specification
The focus of this paper is investments in child noncognitive skills made in the form of ADHD
treatments. The model has three main components: the event of the initial ADHD diagnosis, per-
period treatment decisions, and the incidence of adverse events (injuries, teen pregnancy, STDs, and
substance abuse).8 Below I specify an equation for each of these components and an initial condition
for the stock of the child's abilities at birth.
2.4.1 Initial Condition
Children are born with a multidimensional initial endowment of abilities that include cog-
nitive (θC0 ) and noncognitive skills (θ
N
0 ).
θi0 = (θ
C
i0, θ
N
i0) (2.1)
ADHD is a chronic medical condition that impairs noncognitive skills. Some children, albeit be-
ing capable learners of high intellectual ability, have difficulty concentrating and controlling their
behavior.
The process I am modeling includes two effects of ADHD treatment: direct effect on noncog-
nitive skills and indirect effect on cognitive skills. When a child is able to manage her behaviors
(noncognitive abilities), she is able to boost her IQ as well (cognitive abilities). Previous literature
found that both cognitive and noncognitive abilities explain behavioral outcomes later in life (e.g.
Heckman et al. (2006)). Since both kinds of skills are latent, my model is not distinguishing between
the effect of treatment of cognitive and noncognitive skills. Nor does it distinguishes between the
effect of cognitive and noncognitive stock of skills on the probability of adverse outcomes. I model
the stock of skills as a unidimensional vector. It means that I am estimating the effect of investment
in noncognitive skills that might be potentially multiplied via a cognitive skills channel, or an overall
effect of treatment on child skills accumulation and thus the incidence of adverse outcomes later in
life. It is left for the future research to disentangle these potentially important multidimensional
effects.
Genetic factors are major inputs into the formation of the initial endowment of skills (Olds
(2002), Levitt (2003)). They are captured by a set of mother's characteristics at birth (Xmother0i ):
8In the current version of the draft I do not estimate the effect of treatment on STDs and onset of substance abuse.
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mother's age, education level, and history of mental disorders prior to the child's birth.9
θi0 = αX
mother
i0 + ρ
I
i0µi, (2.2)
where i indexes individuals with ADHD and µi denotes permanent unobserved heterogeneity, or
mother, child, family environment characteristics at birth that are not observed by the econometri-
cian. I do not directly estimate the Equation 2.2. Instead, I substitute it into the equations on the
timing of the first diagnosis, treatment decision, and adverse outcomes equations.
2.4.2 Treatment
The initial stock of noncognitive skills can be altered with investments in child's develop-
ment. Higher noncognitive abilities reduce the likelihood of adverse health and social outcomes that
children and adolescents with ADHD are prone to. One way to improve the abilities of children
with ADHD is to treat their disabling mental condition. In each period when a treatment is admin-
istered, ADHD symptoms subside and the child's ability to concentrate and control her impulses
improves. Moreover, the child gets a chance to perform better at school and learn more cognitive
and noncognitive skills. In other words, ADHD treatment alters the stock of noncognitive skills in
the current period which is passed on to the next period.
In the model, pharmacological and behavioral ADHD treatments are assumed to be the
only investments available to the parents to improve their child's noncognitive skills. I assume that
both physician and parents are perfect agents of the child.10
At the beginning of year t patient i diagnosed with ADHD has the stock of abilities θit. The
current stock of skills depends on the stock of skills and investments in skills in the previous period,
t− 1 as shown in Equation 2.3. Investments in the form of a variety of ADHD medical treatments,
Mj , are available, where j denotes a particular treatment regimen: a medication from the choice set
or behavioral therapy, or a combination of the two. Acquired skills do not depreciate with time. If
a child does not receive any treatment in the current period, her stock of skills remains unchanged
9In the current version of the draft the empirical estimation does not include mother's mental health.
10Admittedly, this assumption is a significant simplification. In the literature, there is evidence on the importance
of parent preferences and overall family environment on child skills formation (see Conti and Heckman (2014) for a
review). Furthermore, physician preferences, incentives and information available to them were shown to be important
in the treatment decision process (see for example, Dickstein (2014b), Saxell (2013)). However, it is left for the future
work to relax this assumption.
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from the current period to the next.
θit = ft(θit−1,Mit−1) (2.3)
Recursively, it can be written as follows.
θit = g(θi0,Mit−1,Mit−2, . . . ,Mit−9) (2.4)
where t is a year in survey, t = 1, . . . , 10; i is a patient, and j is a medical treatment.
The indirect utility from each treatment alternative (j = {0, ..., 11}) depends on the severity
of ADHD, θit, adverse events realized in the past years (Y
outcome
i,t−τ , ..., Y
outcome
it ), provider characteris-
tics, Xprovideri , patient characteristics X
child
it , treatment characteristics, Zj , and family environment,
Xenvironmentit , where τ = {1, ..., 9} since there are at most 9 years of history available for each patient
i at time t. For detailed description of these vectors see Section 2.3.2.
At the beginning of period t, the patient, her parents and doctor observe
Ωit = (Y
outcome
it , ..., Y
outcome
i,t−τ ,Mijt, ...,Mij,t−τ , Xit, Zjt), whereXit = (X
child
it , X
provider
it , X
mother
i0 , X
environment
it ).
Then, the expected indirect utility of treatment j for child i is
VMijt = v(θit, Y
outcome
i,t−τ , ..., Y
outcome
it , Xit, Zjt,Mij,t−τ , ...,Mij,t−1,Mit = j) + u
M
ijt (2.5)
where τ = {1, ..., 9} and uMijt is unobserved individual heterogeneity that influences treatment choice
decisions.
There are unobserved individual characteristics in this model that may affect the choice of
treatment and the efficacy of treatment. For example, child's cognitive skills may have a positive
effect on treatment choice if the child is relieved from ADHD symptoms and improves her academic
performance significantly when treated. To account for the unobserved characteristics, I follow
Mroz and Savage (2006) and Yang et al. (2009) among others and decompose the error term, uMijt,
into the three components. The first component, µi, captures permanent unobserved heterogeneity
(e.g. preference for medical treatment). The second component captures time-varying unobserved
heterogeneity, νit (e.g. cognitive abilities). The third part is a serially uncorrelated error term, 
M
ijt,
that expresses an individual's random preferences for medical treatment of ADHD.
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Equation 2.6 details the error term structure.
uMijt = ρ
M
ij µ+ ω
M
ij νt + 
M
ijt (2.6)
where ρM , µ, and ωM , and νt are estimated parameters of the empirical model. The discrete mass
points of the permanent and time-varying heterogeneity distributions are denoted µ ∈ {µ1, µ2, ..., µG}
and νt ∈ {ν1t, ν2t, ..., νLt}, respectively, where G and L are the number of mass points in the discrete
approximations to the distributions.
Substituting Equation 2.6 into Equation 2.5 and assuming an Extreme Value distribution
of the additive idiosyncratic error term, Mijt, in the alternative-specific value function for treatment,
the individual's decision rule is to choose a treatment regimen with the highest indirect utility.
This assumption yields a multinomial logit distribution of current treatment choices as a function
of the theoretically relevant variables known to the individual at the start of the period t including
treatment choice in the previous periods.
ln
[Pr(Mit = j)
Pr(Mit = 0)
]
= β0j + β1jθit +
9∑
τ=1
λτjMijt−τ +
4∑
κ=1
9∑
τ=1
νκτjY
injκ
t−τ + β3Xit + β4jZjt
+ ρMj µi + ω
M
ijtνit
(2.7)
where j = 1, 2, ..., 11.
Substituting θt−1 for θt from the equation 2.3, we obtain
ln
[Pr(Mt = j)
Pr(Mt = 0)
]
= β0j + β1j [θt−1 +Mt−1] +
9∑
τ=1
λτjMjt−τ +
4∑
κ=1
9∑
τ=1
νκτjY
injκ
t−τ + β3Xit + β4jZt
+ ρMj µi + ω
M
ij νit
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Continued substitution results in the following expression:
ln
[Pr(Mit = j)
Pr(Mit = 0)
]
= β0j + αβ1jX
mother
i0
+
9∑
τ=1
δτjMijt−τ +
4∑
κ=1
9∑
τ=1
φκτjY
injκ
i,t−τ + β3jXit + β4jZt + ρ
M
j µi + ω
M
ijtνit
(2.8)
where j = 1, 2, ..., 11.
2.4.3 Adverse events
A low level of noncognitive skills is an important determinant of poor educational, labor
market, and social outcomes. Following the medical literature (a detailed review is provided by
Barkley (2006)) and the literature on child development and well-being (Dalsgaard et al. (2014),
Heckman et al. (2006), Carneiro et al. (2007), Conti and Heckman (2010), Goodman et al. (2011)),
I concentrate on the three adverse events that are common among children and young adults with
ADHD: teen pregnancy, contraction of STDs, and injuries. Chorniy and Kitashima (2014b) extend
this paper to include educational attainment and schooling outcomes.
2.4.3.1 Risky sexual behavior
Adolescents with untreated ADHD have difficulty controlling their impulses and planning
ahead. These teens also tend to struggle with low self-esteem and for that reason, teenage girls
often seek affirmation through the sexual attentions of boys (Arnold (1996)).11 Their condition
makes them more likely to become sexually active earlier than their peers, to have more partners on
average, and to use inconsistently use birth control (Kessler et al. (1997), Payne (2014)). I focus on
the two adverse events associated with risky sexual behavior: teen pregnancy and contraction of a
sexually transmitted disease (STD).
In 2013, in the U.S. 274,641 babies were born to mothers aged 1519 years and 3,108 babies
to mothers under 15 years old, a live birth rate of 26.6 and 0.3 per 1,000 women in these age groups
11Adolescent girls' symptoms of ADHD often worsen due to the hormonal changes at puberty (Resnick (2005)).
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respectively (Hamilton et al. (2014)).12 About 80% of teenage births are unplanned or unwanted
(Mosher et al. (2012)) and only 59% of them ended with a live birth in 2008 (Finer and Zolna
(2011)).
Teenage pregnancy is a negative social and health outcome. Adolescent mothers are more
likely to be single, to be on welfare and to have a hard time getting off welfare. Teenage pregnancy is
also associated with negative consequences for the mother later in life (low educational attainment,
poor employment outcomes, and marital instability) and poor child outcomes (low birth weight,
delay in cognitive development, school problems, and behavioral disorders, see Kessler et al. (1997)
for a review.
While the incidence of teen pregnancy in the U.S. is declining, the trend for cases of STDs
has been increasing since the early 2000s. In 2012, there were 49,903 cases of STDs (16.0 per 100,000
population). Adolescents ages 1524 account for nearly a half of the new cases of STDs each year
(STD Fact Sheet (2013)).
To my knowledge, there is no research that looks at the effects of ADHD treatment on
teenage pregnancies and incidence of STDs directly. However, there is empirical evidence of the
importance of both latent cognitive and noncognitive skills for teenage pregnancy, among other
adverse behavioral outcomes (Carneiro et al. (2007) and Heckman et al. (2006)).
2.4.3.2 Injuries
Inattentiveness, difficulty in assessing potential outcomes, and motor incoordination are a
frequent cause of accidental injuries (e.g. fractures) for patients with ADHD. Besides having more
frequent injuries, these children also tend to have more severe injuries than their peers (Barkley
(2006), Swensen et al. (2004)). In particular, among the stronger findings in the medical literature
is that ADHD adolescents are more likely to have a car crash and they are more often at fault in
such accidents (Barkley (2006), Weiss and Hechtman (1993)).
In their work on the long-term consequences of ADHD treatment, Dalsgaard et al. (2014)
find that pharmacological treatment of ADHD results in fewer hospital and emergency room visits.
They argue that this result is driven by the reduction in injuries.
12CDC classifies births as teenage births if mother is between 10 and 19 years old. The subclassification by age
splits teen moms into three groups: ages 10-14, 15-17, and 18-19.
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2.4.3.3 Substance use and abuse
According to the 2011 Youth Risk Behavior Survey, 20.5% of the teens drank alcohol and
8.1% tried marijuana for the first time before 13 years old; 6.8% ever used cocaine, 11.4% ever used
inhalants, and 2.9% ever used heroin in the U.S. The estimated economic cost of substance abuse
is non-trivial. Miller and Hendrie (2009) combine condition-specific studies published between 2000
and 2004 and report that alcohol abuse cost the nation $191.6, tobacco use was responsible for
$167.8 billion, and drug abuse accounted for $151.4 billion making up a total of $510.8 billion.13
These costs include the costs of medical treatment and productivity costs.
Medical literature documents conflicting evidence on the association of ADHD and substance
use and abuse, including alcohol, tobacco, and drugs. Looby (2008) provides a thorough review of
major studies that address this question. Some of them find that teens with ADHD are more likely
on average than individuals without ADHD to smoke, use and abuse alcohol and drugs, and develop
health problems related to these activities. However, others conclude that there are additional
related conditions that contribute to the likelihood of these adverse events, e.g. conduct disorder
symptoms and association with deviant peers.
Despite a disagreement on the relationship between ADHD and substance use, Looby (2008)
review suggests that ADHD treatment reduces the risk of substance use disorders in children with
ADHD. Using a meta-analysis, Wilens et al. (2003) also find that stimulant medications reduce the
risk for subsequent drug and alcohol use disorders.
Following the methodology described in Bouchery et al. (2012), I was able to identify cases
of substance abuse from the insurance claims data using ICD-9 diagnosis codes: 291, 292, 303, 304,
and 305.
2.4.3.4 Empirical specification
In order to estimate the effect of treatment on the adverse outcomes of interest I specify an
equation for an occurrence of each outcome. Each of these events is modeled as a discrete outcome.
Adverse outcomes depend on the current stock of skills the child i has accumulated by period t.
Y ∗outcomeit = γ0θit + γ1Xit + ρ
Y
itµ+ ω
Y
itνt + 
Y
it (2.9)
13Estimates are given in 1999 dollars. For alcohol, Harwood (2000), trend-adjusted from 1998 to 1999; for tobacco,
Fellows et al., (2002) except illness earnings loss from Harwood & Bouchery (2001); for other drugs, Harwood &
Bouchery (2004).
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where Y outcomeit = 1 if Y
∗outcome
it > 0 and 0 otherwise, t indexes years, t = 1, 2, ..., 10 that correspond
to the survey period 2003-2012.
Similarly to above, by continuously substituting θt−1 for θt from the equation 2.3, I obtain the
following expression:
Y ∗outcomeit = γ0αX
mother
i0 +
9∑
τ=1
ζ1Mij,t−τ + γ1Xit + ρYitµi + ω
Y
itνit + 
Y
it (2.10)
The outcomes of risky sexual behavior are age-specific. As discussed earlier, teenage pregnancies
are defined as a pregnancy-related medical treatment for female patients older than 11 and younger
than 19 years of age. STDs are an adverse outcome for the same age group of the entire ADHD
population.
2.4.4 First diagnosis of ADHD
An eligible child-enrollee can be tested for and diagnosed with ADHD at a medical provider
office. Any doctor is able to diagnose and prescribe treatments (except for psychologists). In order
to be diagnosed (Dit = 1), the test should reveal at least six of the inattention symptoms and/or at
least six of hyperactivity-impulsivity symptoms that have persisted for a least 6 months to a degree
that is maladaptive and inconsistent with developmental level.14 It is extremely rare for a child to
be diagnosed before age 3 because the symptoms are not apparent at this age.
Whether ADHD is diagnosed in any given year depends on the contemporaneous stock of
noncognitive skills (θit, t = 3, 4, ...19 and θi3 = θi0 by assumption) and on the history of adverse
outcomes (Y outcomeit−τ ). My default specification uses five lags leaving it to future research to refine
time period and have a less restrictive specification.
Besides noncognitive skills level and history of adverse events associated with ADHD, the
probability of being diagnosed depends on individual, Xchildi , family, X
environment
i , and medical
14The American Psychiatric Association publishes the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM),
where it sets criteria for the classification of mental disorders. It is the standard classification of mental disorders used
by mental health professionals in the United States. The DSM consists of three major components: the diagnostic
classification, the diagnostic criteria sets, and the descriptive text. The most current version is DSM-5 published in
May 2013, a revision of DSM-IV-TR that came out in 2000.
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provider, Xprovideri characteristics.
Diagnosis is specified as a latent variable and can be written as follows.
D∗it = δ0θit +
4∑
κ=1
5∑
τ=1
χκτjY
injκ
t−τ + δ2Xit + ρ
Y
itµi + ω
Y
itνit + 
D
it (2.11)
where Dit = 1 if D
∗
it > 0 and 0 otherwise; t indexes the year of potential diagnosis, t = 1, 2, ..., 10
that correspond to the survey period 2003-2012.
Substituting θi0 from the equation 2.4, I get the following expression:
D∗it = δ0αX
mother +
4∑
κ=1
9∑
τ=1
χκτjY
injκ
t−τ + δ2Xit + ρ
Y
itµi + ω
Y
itνit + 
D
it (2.12)
This is a discrete time hazard model of the age at which ADHD is first diagnosed.
2.4.5 Likelihood function
Following Mroz and Savage (2006), Yang et al. (2009), and Fout and Gilleskie (2014) I use the
discrete factor maximum likelihood (DFML) method to control for heterogeneity and endogeneity by
integrating out the unobserved factors µi and ηit. the contribution to the likelihood of the individual
i in year t is:
Lit(Ω|µi, νit) =
[
Pr{Dit = 1|µi, νit} · Pr{Mijt = j|µi, νit}Mijt · Pr{Mijt = 0|µi, νit}(1−Mijt)
]Dit ·
[Pr{Dit = 0|µi, νit}](1−Dit) ·[
Pr{Y outcomeit = 1|µi, νit}
]Y outcomeit · [Pr{Y outcomeit = 0|µi, νit}](1−Y outcomeit ) (2.13)
where Ω is a vector of parameters to be estimated. I use Fortran programs to obtain maximum
likelihood estimates.
For comparison purposes, I first estimate single-equation specifications for every outcome
of interest which are the incidence of injuries and teenage pregnancy, as well as for the event of the
first ADHD diagnosis and decision on medical treatment. All my dependent variables are specified
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as discrete and I use binary logit regressions for adverse outcomes and a three-choice model for
the treatment decision. I compare the results from these single-equation regressions to the results
obtained using the discrete factor maximum likelihood approach.
2.4.6 Identification
In my model, I simultaneously estimate a system of dynamic equations that requires exo-
geneity of some of the explanatory variables conditional on the unobserved individual-level hetero-
geneity for identification. The theoretical argument for identification in these models is outlined in
Bhargava (1991). Empirical applications include Mroz and Savage (2006), Yang et al. (2009), and
Fout and Gilleskie (2014) among others. I follow these studies in relying on time-varying exogenous
variables to identify the model. In this study they are treatment prices to individual and Medicaid,
children's age, number of adults and children in the family, and county-level variables. The latter
include yearly unemployment rate, average income, population density, number of physicians who
accept Medicaid patients, and the share of patients with ADHD that receive ADHD medication.
Additionally, the equations' functional form is nonlinear, and this specification reduces the number
of exogenous variables needed for identification.
2.5 Data
2.5.1 Medicaid Claims
I use a large panel data set of SC Medicaid claims that spans 10 years from 2003 to 2012.
In South Carolina, Medicaid is one of the major health insurance providers with about 20% of
the state population being active enrollees15 and over $5 billion in spending in FY201216. The
state administers a separate Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) program as a part of its
Medicaid program.
Medicaid eligibility is based on income determined on the state level. Families with income
below 150% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) are eligible for Medicaid and children from families
with income below 200% of the FPL are eligible for Medicaid coverage through CHIP.17 My sample
15State Medicaid Fast Facts SFYTD 2014 (July-December). https://www.scdhhs.gov/historic/countyleveldata.html.
Accessed on 03.04.2015.
16The estimate includes CHIP program expenditures. CMS-64 Quarterly Expense Report, www.medicaid.gov.
Accessed on 03.04.2015.
17Changed slightly over time. I requested these stats.
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represents a large part of children population of the state. Over half of the Medicaid insured are
children18 and 87.5% of eligible children are estimated to be enrolled.19
My data set includes Medicaid eligibility information, hospital, outpatient, and pharmacy
claims for individuals who were diagnosed with ADHD between 3 and 21 years old in 2003-2012.
These data are supplemented by several variables from the enrollees' birth certificates. They are
mother's de-identified ID, age, race, and education level. Given that children who were diagnosed
with ADHD arguably do not constitute a random sample, I face a potential sample selection problem.
In the future work, this data limitation can be addressed by including children who were never
diagnosed with the condition.
Eligibility file contains information on the individual monthly eligibility status, Medicaid
qualifying category, demographic characteristics (date of birth, gender, and race), living arrangement
and family characteristics (number of children and adults in the family and income). Once eligibility
for Medicaid is established, the health insurance coverage is available for an enrollee for a 12-month
period (unless the enrollee becomes ineligible during this time), after which the eligibility needs to
be reconfirmed. An eligible individual who received services prior to the actual enrollment, can be
covered retroactively for up to three months before the month when eligibility was established.
Eligibility status file also specifies the type of plan an individual is enrolled in. Medicaid
has two components: traditional fee-for-service (FFS) and services provided through managed care
organizations (MCO). Due to the differences in reporting requirements, the complete information
on all services provided to a patient are only available for those enrolled in the FFS plan. However,
mental health is one of the carved-out conditions that are covered by the FFS component even
if an individual is enrolled into a managed care plan. I use all available claims and when possible,
perform robustness checks by excluding MCO enrollees.
Medicaid hospital and outpatient claims files have a similar structure. Each claim includes
at least one ICD-9 diagnosis code.20 ICD-9 codes for ADHD are 314.00 (Attention deficit, without
hyperactivity) and 314.01 (Attention deficit, with hyperactivity). Every patient in our sample has at
least one claim with ADHD diagnosis. Claims also have details on the provider (location, specialty,
and a unique identifier), services provided (timing, CPT procedure code(s)), and the amount that
18CMS, Medicaid & CHIP Monthly Application, Eligibility Determination, and Enrollment Reports and Updated
Data, July - December, 2014, as of February 23, 2015.
19http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-State/south-carolina.html. Accessed on
03.04.2015
20A hospital claim may have up to 9 diagnosis codes and an outpatient claim may have up to 3 codes.
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was paid by Medicaid. In 2013, most eligible individuals faced a small copay per doctor visit ($3.30),
per prescription ($3.40 for adults over 19 years old and zero otherwise) and per hospital stay ($25).
ICD-9 diagnosis codes and CPT procedure codes are also useful in identifying adverse events
in the data. In order to find cases of pregnancy and STDs among medical records, I compile a list of
ICD-9 diagnosis codes that correspond to each of these events respectively. In addition, I distinguish
cases of testing for STDs using CPT procedure codes. The ICD-9 codes for injuries were borrowed
from Marcus et al. (2008) and we followed the methodology described in Bouchery et al. (2012) to
find cases of substance abuse among patient claims. For the outcomes of risky sexual behavior and
substance abuse disorders I focus on the first occurrence of the adverse event, or the earliest date
when a respective diagnosis code appears in the data. Claims data are not as detailed as medical
history records making it hard to distinguish two different instances of an STD or even pregnancy.
In addition to adverse events, hospital and outpatient claims allow me to identify instances
of behavioral therapy treatment. Patients with ADHD may benefit from pharmacological treatment
and/or from behavioral therapy. Therapy usually consists in assisting children in managing their
condition and in educating parents and teachers on how to provide positive feedback on desired
behaviors and how to discourage unwanted behaviors. Behavioral therapy alone was found to be
less effective than pharmacological treatment alone, but no consensus exists on whether medications
are inferior to the combination treatment (Barkley, 2006). A combination of behavioral therapy and
pharmacological treatment constitutes yet another choice in the set.
Pharmacy claims contain records of all prescriptions filled by a patient. Each records has a
dispense date, National Drug code (NDC)21, quantity purchased, pharmacy ID, dispense fee and the
amount paid by Medicaid. Note that pharmacy claims do not have diagnosis record. I use medical
literature to identify drugs that were approved by the FDA to be prescribed for patients with ADHD.
Table 3.1 lists these medications with their respective in-sample market shares calculated for the
entire period between 2003 and 2012. The last category, Others includes medicines that had an in-
sample market share lower than 5%. The market is dominated by the extended-release formulations
of relatively old drugs: together amphetamine salts and methylphenidate comprise almost a half of
the market for ADHD pharmacological treatments. Stimulants are often recommended as the first
step in treatment. In this paper, I combine all pharmacological treatment into a single choice set
21NDC is an 11-digit classification issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for all the approved drugs.
Under this system, different package and dosage sizes of the same drug molecule have separate NDCs.
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option leaving it to the future research to refine the selection. I also ignore off-label medications
that were not approved for the treatment of ADHD.22
In SC, children and young adults (under age 19) face zero copayment for the prescription
drugs and are only responsible for the pharmacy dispense charge (about $5). The state maintains
preferred drug lists for medicines that include the most commonly used ADHD medications. These
drugs do not require prior authorization; all other drugs can be prescribed and covered by Medicaid
if a doctor-filed authorization request is approved. The quantity restrictions are also common with
a typical prescription capped at a 30-day supply.
My original sample contains 131,008 Medicaid enrollees who had at least one ADHD claim
between 2003 and 2012. For a cohort born in 1991, my sample represents 23% of all Medicaid
enrollees. We estimate the model on a sub-sample of all identified children with ADHD.
First, I exclude individuals with missing family and demographic records leaving me with a
sample of 118,655 patients. We also exclude 129 children (0.1%) who died between 2003 and 2012.
Second, we only select Medicaid enrollees who are continuously eligible for the program because there
is no information on individual outcomes when they are ineligible. In the data, about 30% of the
individuals have lapses in eligibility that are on average 9 months long. For lapses in eligibility that
last under three months, we assume that patients received no medical treatment. For inconsistent
eligibility periods that have longer lapses in coverage, I only keep the medical history to the point
prior to the lapse. Furthermore, I exclude 6,836 (5.2%) patients who had no single eligibility spell
that lasted 365 days or the spell they were diagnosed in or took a prescription lasted less than that
between 2003 and 2012. If a patient is observed for less than a year, I can not observe a potential
effect of treatment that is realized in the next time period (year).
Third, my identification strategy hinges on the outcome of the first doctor visit, so I only
keep patients for whom I observe the event of the first diagnosis. Based on earlier literature, I
exclude patients who fill a prescription prior to their first doctor visit ADHD claim (30,700, or
23.4%) and patients who had their ADHD visit within the first 180 days from their first date in
the sample. In addition, only patients who have at least one full year of eligibility after their first
ADHD diagnosis and who were diagnosed between 3 and 18 years old are selected. This left-censoring
22Although not approved for the treatment of ADHD, certain antidepressants and sleep-disorder medications are
prescribed to patients off-label. For example, Provigil (sleep disorders); Wellbutrin (antidepressant); tricyclic an-
tidepressants; Catapres and Tenex (short-acting forms of high blood pressure medicines); Abilify, Zyprexa, Seroquel,
Risperdal, and Geodon (antipsychotics).
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problem eliminates a significant part of our sample.
Furthermore, I drop patients for whom I was unable to calculate provider propensity to
prescribe. My final sample has 64,031 individuals. Table 2.2 shows summary statistics on individual,
mother's and home environment characteristics. Boys comprise over 66% of the sample of children
diagnosed with ADHD, whites and blacks are represented nearly equally. On average, children are
first diagnosed with ADHD at 8 years old.
Data on mother's characteristics are pulled from in-state birth certificates. Only 40% of the
original sample IDs of children with ADHD were matched to their mother's ID. Most mothers in the
sample have at least some high-school education or a high school diploma. About 7% of children
in the sample were in foster care at least for some time between 2003 and 2012. The families
predominantly consists of a single adult and two children. Their reported net monthly income is
about $620 on average.
Table 2.3 reports summary statistics on medical treatment of ADHD and adverse outcomes
that I observe in the sample. The majority of all ADHD-diagnosed children have hyperactive symp-
toms rather than inattentiveness. Nearly 65% of the patients filled at least one prescription, 13% had
a behavioral therapy session, and 27% had a combination of the two after they were diagnosed. To
account for potential data issues, I define pharmacological treatment as a prescription filled within
a year from the first diagnosis.
On average, I observe every Medicaid enrollee for seven years. During this time, 1,244
of them become pregnant before age 19; 4,301 contract an STD and/or are tested for an STD
condition. I also observe 4,602 teens having at least one claim that indicates one of the substance
abuse disorders. The most frequent outcome that I observe yearly are injuries. About 74% of children
and teens had at least one injury while in sample. In order to take into account injury severity, I
calculate the total Medicaid spending on injury-related injuries. These expenditures vary widely; on
average SC Medicaid spent $4,291 per patient during their period of eligibility in 2003-2012.
2.6 Discussion of results
This section presents the results obtained using DFML estimator on 5 points of support
for the permanent and 2 for the time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. For comparison, I estimate
single-equation logit models for every outcome: the event of the first diagnosis, decision on medical
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treatment, probability of teen pregnancy, STDs, substance abuse, and injuries. There are three
treatment modalities: medications only, behavioral therapy only, and a combination of the two.
Time periods are years. It is left for future research to refine both the choice set and time periods.
2.6.1 Initial diagnosis
For the event of the initial diagnosis, the effects estimated by the model with and without
unobserved heterogeneity point in the same direction, but the effect is larger in the model with
unobserved heterogeneity. The effect of injuries on the probability of being diagnosed fades with
time. Given the severity of ADHD, the effect of injuries on the probability of the initial diagnosis
with ADHD is the highest in the time period t− 1 and smallest in t− 3. The estimated coefficients
are presented in Table 2.11 and marginal effects for single-equation logit are shown in Table 2.5.
Boys are more likely to be diagnosed and the probability increases with age since everybody
in the sample has the condition. Similarly, children who show hyperactivity-related symptoms rather
than inattentiveness are more likely to receive the ADHD diagnosis. Consistent with the work by
Doyle (2013), I find that patients who were eligible for Medicaid as foster children are more likely to
receive the diagnosis since they have to go through a checkup procedure. Family income is negatively
related to the probability of the diagnosis and is supportive of the argument that relatively better
off parents resort to other than pharmacological treatment options as their first choice.
2.6.2 Choice of treatment
Treatment choice estimates mostly coincide in signs across DFML and simple multinomial
logit models (see Tables 2.6). Medical choice in this specification is binary. Treatment decisions
are persistent over time. In particular, if a patient was on particular type of treatment in previous
period, she is extremely likely to continue with the same choice of treatment, although the impact
fades with time.
Having a history of injuries positively affects the probability of treatment. This suggests
that ADHD children are in fact more prone to injuries and treatment is seen as a way to reduce the
probability of these adverse events. Children diagnosed with a hyperactive type of ADHD are more
likely to receive treatment.
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2.6.3 Adverse outcomes
2.6.3.1 Injuries
The model with unobserved heterogeneity shows that individuals who were on either phar-
macological, behavioral, or combination treatment were less likely to experience injuries in the
following year. The effect of treatment from further back in time is less precise. Only combination
treatment seems to have effects that hold over time and from which patients could benefit by fol-
lowing the regimen consistently, year after year. These results differ from the single-equation logit
model that is affected by the endogeneity problem. The results are presented in Tables 2.8 and 2.14.
Consistent with the medical literature, behavioral therapy is the least efficient treatment
and its combination with pharmacological treatment has the largest effect. Notably, behavioral
therapy does not create lasting effects. If the patient was on treatment two years ago, he or she
is no less likely to experience injuries in the current year than the patient who did not go through
therapy sessions.
Among other results, boys are more injury-prone than girls as are relatively hyperactive
kids when compared to inattentive types.
2.6.3.2 Teen pregnancies & STDs
The estimates from the model with unobserved heterogeneity also show that ADHD treat-
ment is successful in reducing risky sexual behavior activity, measured by the probability of teen
pregnancy (Tables 2.7 and 2.12) and STDs (Tables 2.9 and 2.13). As with injuries, combination
of behavioral therapy and medicines has the highest impact on reducing the probability of adverse
events. However, for both outcomes, STDs and pregnancy, behavioral therapy is preferred to drugs
alone. Moreover, for STDs there seem to be a relatively longer lasting effect of behavioral therapy,
suggesting that these sessions might be effective in teaching children and their parents on how to
manage their condition effectively.
Teens with hyperactive type of ADHD are more likely to experience teen pregnancy and
STDs than predominantly inattentive types. Higher family income and being in foster care are
negatively related to the probability of pregnancy.
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2.6.3.3 Substance Abuse
Finally, I look at another potential outcome of risky behavior  substance abuse. In this
case, the most effective treatment is behavioral therapy that has not only immediate effect from
t− 1 period, but also a smaller long-run effect from earlier treatment. Medicines have no beneficial
impact on the probability of substance abuse but the combination of behavioral therapy and drugs
has positive effect (Tables 2.10 and 2.15). This result may follow from the fact that some of the
ADHD treatments may cause addiction and individuals who attend behavioral therapy sessions are
likelier to seek treatment for their substance abuse disorders as well.
2.7 Conclusions
Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is a common mental chronic condition
that negatively affects noncognitive abilities. Over 5 million children aged 217 (7.9%) have been
diagnosed with ADHD in the U.S. and the majority of them are taking medications for this condition.
This paper sheds light on the effectiveness of ADHD treatment in reducing the probability
of adverse health and behavioral outcomes. I use a 10-year panel of SC Medicaid claims to model the
probability of the initial diagnosis of ADHD, dynamic treatment choice decisions and subsequent
adverse events later in life. Controlling for endogeneity, I find that there is a strong persistence
in treatment choices across time periods. The results also suggest that pharmacological treatment
has only short-term positive impact on the probability of such adverse events as injuries, teenage
pregnancy, and STDs, and no impact on substance abuse disorders. Behavioral therapy alone is not
as effective as it is in combination with ADHD drugs, but for STDs and substance abuse disorders
it seems to show relatively long-lasting effects in contrast to drugs alone.
In general, these results are consistent with medical literature and the theory of human
capital accumulation. It is left for the future research to simulate the cost of treatment to Medicaid
under various treatment sequences, including the cost of poor adherence and late diagnosis.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Empirical Model Specification
Outcome Estimator Explanatory Variables
Endogenous Exogenous
Unobserved
Heterogeneity
First diagnosis, Dit logit Yit−1
Xmotheri , X
child
it ,
Xh.env.it , X
provider
it
µDi , ν
D
it , 
D
it
Treatment choice, Mt mlogit Yit−1,
(TDit−τ , ..., T
D
it−1)
Xmotheri , X
child
it ,
Xh.env.it , X
prov
it , Zjt
µMi , ν
M
it , 
M
it
Adverse outcomes, Yt:
µYi , ν
Y
it , 
Y
it
Teen Pregnancy, Y pregn logit
(Mit−τ , ...,Mit−1)
Xmotheri , X
child
it ,
Xh.env.it
STD, Y std logit
Subst. abuse, Y sa logit
Injuries, Y injury logit
Stock of skills at birth, θi0 latent  X
mother
i µ
I
i
Notes: The table decomposes the main components of the equations comprising the empirical model. The notation is defined in Section
2.3.2
Table 2.2: Summary statistics: Individual and family characteristics.
N obs Mean Median Std Min Max
Individual characteristics
Age 1st in sample 64,031 5.56 5.00 4.23 0 18
Age at 1st ADHD diagnosis 64,031 8.54 8.00 3.50 3 19
Male 64,031 0.66 0 1
Race: White 64,031 0.53 0 1
Black 64,031 0.44 0 1
Family & home environment
Family net monthly income 64,031 619.95 438.28 641.60 0 6,352
N adults 64,031 1.07 1.00 0.62 0 6.00
N children 64,031 2.09 2.00 1.02 0 10.00
Ever in foster care 64,031 0.07 0 1
Mother's characteristics
Age when gave birth 39,576 23.05 22.00 5.30 11 46
Educ: Less than HS 39,576 0.05 0 1
Some HS 39,576 0.38 0 1
HS diploma 39,576 0.40 0 1
Some college 39,576 0.13 0 1
College diploma/grad school 39,576 0.04 0 1
Notes: The sample includes every SC Medicaid enrollee, who was eligible for at least one year after their first
diagnosis and who was diagnosed with ADHD for the first time at any age between 3 and 19 years old in 2003-2012.
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics: Medical Treatment and Adverse Outcomes.
N obs Mean Median Std Min Max
Medical diagnosis & treatment
1st diagnosis: hyperactive type 64,031 0.73 0 1
inattentive type 64,031 0.25 0 1
mixed type 64,031 0.02 0 1
Ever filled 1+ Rx 64,031 0.65 0 1
Behavioral therapy 64,031 0.13 0 1
Combo treatment 64,031 0.27 0 1
Years of data 64,031 6.93 7.00 2.68 1 10
Outcome: Risky sexual behavior
1. Teen Pregnancy
Age at 1st pregnancy 1,244 16.71 17.00 1.70 11 19
Race: White 1,244 0.53 0 1
Black 1,244 0.46 0 1
2. STD
Age at 1st STD (incl. testing) 4,301 15.02 15.00 2.34 11 19
Male 4,301 0.40 0 1
Race: White 4,301 0.52 0 1
Black 4,301 0.46 0 1
Outcome: Substance Abuse
Age at 1st substance abuse 4,602 15.25 15.00 2.06 11 19
Male 4,602 0.64 0 1
Race: White 4,602 0.54 0 1
Black 4,602 0.44 0 1
Outcome: Injuries
Ever injured 64,031 0.74 0 1
Age at injury 47,293 8.71 8.00 3.93 0 21
Male 47,293 0.67 0 1
Race: White 47,293 0.54 0 1
Black 47,293 0.43 0 1
Notes: The sample includes every SC Medicaid enrollee, who was eligible for at least one year after their first
diagnosis and who was diagnosed with ADHD for the first time at any age between 3 and 19 years old in 2003-2012.
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Table 2.4: Choice Set in the U.S. ADHD Drugs Market, 2003-2012.
Active Ingredient Speed
Mkt
share
Major Brands G Entry
Avg.
Price
Amphetamine salts E 25.16 Adderall XR Y 2001 150.67
Methylphenidate E 20.26 Concerta Y 2000 131.00
Methylphenidate N 11.13
Ritalin LA, Metadate CD,
Methylin ER
Y 2002 127.35
Lisdexamfetamine E 11.04 Vyvanse N 2007 141.11
Amphetamine salts M 8.15 Adderall Y 1996 37.27
Dexmethylphenidate E 7.19 Focalin XR N 2005 144.85
Atomoxetine n/a 6.37 Strattera N 2002 130.27
Methylphenidate M 5.82 Methylin, Ritalin Y 2002 30.16
Others  4.89 Various  81.15
Notes: Speed stands for the drug release speed, where E means extended release, N - intermediate and M  immediate
release speed. Extended release drugs are superior than immediate release drugs in that their active ingredient is released over a
longer period of time, often allowing for once-a-day dosing. In-sample market share is based on the number of prescriptions filled
in 2003-2012. G stands for generic drugs availability. Average price is calculated by averaging SC Medicaid reimbursement
payments to pharmacies.
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Table 2.5: First ADHD Diagnosis. Single-equation logit estimation.
Selected variables (A) (B)
t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2 t-3
History of injuries 0.017a 0.015a 0.003 0.019a 0.012b 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Individual characteristics
Male 0.041a (0.002) 0.038a (0.003)
Race (white omitted):
Black -0.036a (0.002) -0.040a (0.010)
Other -0.048a (0.006) -0.041a (0.010)
ADHD symptoms (inattentive omitted)
hyperactive 0.037a (0.002) 0.035a (0.002)
mixed 0.135a (0.090) -0.146a (0.011)
Age 0.100a (0.001) 0.149a (0.002)
Age sq. -0.004b (0.001) -0.007a (0.0001)
Mother's characteristics
Age when gave birth -0.001b (0.0003)
Education (high school degree omitted):
Less than HS -0.010 (0.006)
Some HS -0.0005 (0.003)
Some college 0.0005 (0.004)
College degree or higher 0.003 (0.006)
Family & home environment
Family net income -0.003b (0.001) -0.004b (0.002)
Foster care 0.059a (0.005) 0.081a (0.007)
Number of adults -0.001 (0.002) -0.008a (0.002)
Number of children -0.016a (0.001) -0.015a (0.001)
Time trend (4th degree polynomial) YES YES
County time-varying characteristics YES YES
LF -109,491 -67,904
N person/year obs 215,428 141,841
Notes: The coefficients are marginal effects at means and standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficient estimates that are
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted with a, b, and c respectively. Panel (A) excludes mother's characteristics and
uses the entire sample of 64,031 individuals in the original sample. Panel (B) includes mother's characteristics as controls.
Many children were not matched to their moms because of the Medicaid data constraints in usage of birth certificate data
and the fact not all mothers are on Medicaid when their children are eligible.
58
Table 2.6: Summary results on the probabilities of treatment choices. Single-equation mlogit.
Selected variables Time period
t-1 t-2 t-3
Medicines only
History of treatment
Medicines 0.740a (0.003) 0.531a (0.004) 0.501a (0.005)
Btherapy 0.112a (0.007) 0.390a (0.012) 0.439a (0.013)
Combo 0.272a (0.005) 0.485a (0.006) 0.467a (0.007)
No treatment 0.266a (0.002) 0.428a (0.003) 0.449a (0.002)
Behavioral therapy
History of treatment
Medicines 0.006a (0.001) 0.028a (0.002) 0.035a (0.003)
Btherapy 0.264a (0.009) 0.053a (0.004) 0.053a (0.005)
Combo 0.051a (0.003) 0.031a (0.002) 0.041a (0.004)
No treatment 0.031a (0.001) 0.038a (0.001) 0.036a (0.001)
Combination
History of treatment
Medicines 0.098a (0.002) 0.163a (0.003) 0.165a (0.004)
Btherapy 0.226a (0.008) 0.173a (0.007) 0.175a (0.009)
Combo 0.576a (0.005) 0.197a (0.004) 0.196a (0.006)
No treatment 0.071a (0.001) 0.157a (0.002) 0.159a (0.002)
Notes: The coefficients are marginal effects at means and standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficient estimates
that are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted with a, b, and c respectively. This sample includes
mother's characteristics as controls.
59
Table 2.7: Adverse Outcome: Teen Pregnancy. Single-equation logit estimates.
Selected variables (A) (B)
t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2 t-3
History of treatment
Medicines only -0.002a 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002b
(0.001) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Behavioral therapy only -0.0001 0.002 -0.0004 -0.0002 0.004b -0.001
(0.001) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.002) (0.001)
Combination -0.001 0.001 0.0002 0.0001 0.001 -0.0001
(0.001) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.001) (0.001)
Individual characteristics
Age 0.019a (0.001) 0.011a (0.002)
Age squared -0.0004a (0.00004) -0.0003a (0.0001)
Race (white omitted):
Black -0.001c (0.001) -0.001 (0.0005)
Other -0.008a (0.003)  
ADHD symptoms at first diagnosis (inattentive omitted)
hyperactive 0.002a (0.001) 0.001c (0.0005)
mixed -0.001 (0.002) -0.003a (0.0008)
Mother's characteristics
Age when gave birth -0.0001 (0.00005)
Education (HS diploma omitted):
Less than HS 0.002c (0.001)
Some HS 0.0004 (0.001)
Some college -0.002c (0.001)
College or higher -0.001 (0.002)
Family & home environment
Family net income -0.002 (0.0004) -0.001a (0.0004)
Foster care -0.002 (0.0008) -0.002b (0.001)
Number of adults -0.001 (0.0003) 0.0001 (0.0003)
Number of children 0.0002 (0.0002) -0.0002 (0.0002)
Time trend (4th degree polynomial) YES YES
County time-varying characterics YES YES
LF -4,014 -1,174
N person/year obs 39,125 18,631
Notes:The coefficients are marginal effects at means and standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficient estimates that are
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted with a, b, and c respectively. Panel (A) excludes mother's characteristics
and uses the entire sample of 21,770 girls in the original sample. Panel (B) includes mother's characteristics as controls.
Many children were not matched to their moms because of the Medicaid data constraints in usage of birth certificate data
and the fact not all mothers are on Medicaid when their children are eligible.
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Table 2.8: Adverse Outcome: Injuries. Single-equation logit estimates.
Selected variables (A) (B)
t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2 t-3
History of treatment
Medicines only -0.0005 0.005 -0.001 -0.003 0.009c 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Behavioral therapy only 0.017a 0.016 0.011 0.014b 0.014 0.009
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
Combination 0.017a 0.006 0.004 0.014 0.009 0.007
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Individual characteristics
Male 0.024a (0.002) 0.023a (0.003)
Age 0.014a (0.001) 0.005b (0.002)
Age squared -0.001a (0.0001) -0.0003a (0.0001)
Race (white omitted):
Black -0.071a (0.002) -0.076a (0.003)
Other -0.052a (0.006) -0.054a (0.010)
ADHD symptoms at first diagnosis (inattentive omitted)
hyperactive 0.012a (0.002) 0.011a (0.003)
mixed 0.001 (0.006) -0.0004 (0.008)
Mother's characteristics
Age when gave birth -0.0005b (0.0002)
Education (HS dimploma omitted):
Less than HS 0.018a (0.005)
Some HS 0.009a (0.003)
Some college -0.011a (0.004)
College or higher -0.018a (0.006)
Family & home environment
Family net income -0.008a (0.001) -0.006a (0.002)
Foster care 0.057a (0.004) 0.056a (0.006)
Number of adults -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002)
Number of children -0.0004 (0.001) -0.005a (0.001)
Time trend (4th degree polynomial) YES YES
County time-varying characteristics YES YES
LF -148,213 -91,638
N person/year obs 252,421 153,282
Notes: The coefficients are marginal effects at means and standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficient estimates that are
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted with a, b, and c respectively. Panel (A) excludes mother's characteristics and
uses the entire sample of 64,031 individuals in the original sample. Panel (B) includes mother's characteristics as controls.
Many children were not matched to their moms because of the Medicaid data constraints in usage of birth certificate data
and the fact not all mothers are on Medicaid when their children are eligible.
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Table 2.9: Adverse Outcome: STDs. Single-equation logit estimates.
Selected variables (A) (B)
t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2 t-3
History of treatment
Medicines only -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Behavioral therapy only 0.003 0.0004 0.006c -0.005c 0.0004 0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Combination 0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.007 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Individual characteristics
Male -0.028a (0.001) -0.020a (0.001)
Age 0.017a (0.003) 0.009b (0.004)
Age squared -0.0003a (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001)
Race (white omitted):
Black -0.003 (0.001) -0.006 (0.001)
Other 0.001 (0.003) -0.003 (0.007)
ADHD symptoms at first diagnosis (inattentive omitted)
hyperactive 0.001 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001)
mixed -0.001 (0.003) -0.009 (0.004)
Mother's characteristics
Age when gave birth -0.00004 (0.0001)
Education (HS diploma omitted):
Less than HS 0.002 (0.003)
Some HS 0.000 (0.001)
Some college 0.001 (0.002)
College or higher 0.002 (0.003)
Family & home environment
Family net income -0.001 (0.001) 0.0005 (0.001)
Foster care 0.009a (0.002) 0.003 (0.003)
Number of adults -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
Number of children -0.0002 (0.0004) -0.002 (0.001)
Time trend (4th degree polynomial) YES YES
County time-varying characteristics YES YES
LF -14,573 -6,175
N person/year obs 101,145 48,604
Notes: The coefficients are marginal effects at means and standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficient estimates that are
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted with a, b, and c respectively. Panel (A) excludes mother's characteristics and
uses the entire sample of 64,031 individuals in the original sample. Panel (B) includes mother's characteristics as controls.
Many children were not matched to their moms because of the Medicaid data constraints in usage of birth certificate data
and the fact not all mothers are on Medicaid when their children are eligible.
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Table 2.10: Adverse Outcome: Substance abuse. Single-equation logit estimates.
Selected variables (A) (B)
t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2 t-3
History of treatment
Medicines only -0.0003 -0.001 0.002 0.0004 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Behavioral therapy only 0.007a 0.004c 0.007b 0.005c 0.002 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Combination 0.015a -0.002 0.005b 0.011a -0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Individual characteristics
Male 0.004a (0.001) 0.005a (0.001)
Age 0.045a (0.002) 0.030a (0.003)
Age squared -0.001a (0.0001) -0.001a (0.0001)
Race (white omitted):
Black -0.008a (0.001) -0.008a (0.001)
Other -0.010a (0.003) -0.009 (0.006)
ADHD symptoms at first diagnosis (inattentive omitted)
hyperactive 0.005a (0.001) 0.005a (0.001)
mixed 0.007b (0.003) 0.001 (0.003)
Mother's characteristics
Age when gave birth 0.00004 (0.0001)
Education (HS diploma omitted):
Less than HS 0.007 (0.002)
Some HS 0.002 (0.001)
Some college -0.004 (0.002)
College or higher -0.007 (0.003)
Family & home environment
Family net income -0.003a (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
Foster care 0.008a (0.001) 0.007 (0.002)
Number of adults -0.002a (0.001) -0.002 (0.001)
Number of children -0.001 (0.0004) -0.001 (0.001)
Time trend (4th degree polynomial) YES YES
County time-varying characteristics YES YES
LF 102,805 -5,841
N person/year obs -14,925 50,234
Notes: The coefficients are marginal effects at means and standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficient estimates that are
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted with a, b, and c respectively. Panel (A) excludes mother's characteristics and
uses the entire sample of 64,031 individuals in the original sample. Panel (B) includes mother's characteristics as controls.
Many children were not matched to their moms because of the Medicaid data constraints in usage of birth certificate data
and the fact not all mothers are on Medicaid when their children are eligible.
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Table 2.11: First Diagnosis: DFML estimates.
Selected variables LOGIT DFML
t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2 t-3
History of injuries 0.089a 0.077a 0.013 0.213a 0.175a 0.109a
(0.013) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023)
Individual characteristics
Male 0.206a (0.011) 0.351a (0.017)
Age 0.505a (0.007) 1.005a (0.013)
Age squared -0.019a (0.0003) -0.038a (0.001)
Race (white omitted):
Black -0.183a (0.011) -0.400a (0.017)
Other -0.243a (0.031) -0.426a (0.025)
ADHD symptoms at first diagnosis (inattentive omitted)
hyperactive 0.195a (0.012) 0.393a (0.018)
mixed 0.642a (0.039) 1.397a (0.026)
Family & home environment
Family net income -0.017a (0.007) -0.042a (0.013)
Foster care 0.298a (0.028) 0.703a (0.025)
Number of adults -0.006 (0.009) -0.064a (0.014)
Number of children -0.081a (0.005) -0.142a (0.009)
Time trend (4th degree polynomial) YES YES
County time-varying characteristics YES YES
N person/year obs 215,428 215,428
Notes: The table shows coefficient estimates from single-logit equation and DFML model; both exclude mother's character-
istics. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficient estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted
with a, b, and c respectively.
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Table 2.12: Adverse outcomes: Teenage pregnancy. DFML estimates.
Selected variables LOGIT DFML
t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2 t-3
History of treatment
Medicines only -0.317a 0.047 -0.025 -0.207a 0.096a -0.026
(0.103) (0.123) (0.125) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Behavioral therapy only -0.023 0.236 0.051 -0.314a 0.116 -0.226a
(0.131) (0.145) (0.163) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Combination -0.143 0.083 0.033 -0.405a -0.019 -0.176a
(0.14) (0.167) (0.166) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Individual characteristics
Age 2.617a (0.294) 1.895a (0.023)
Age squared -0.063a (0.009) -0.039a (0.001)
Race (white omitted):
Black -0.116c (0.068) -0.067a (0.025)
Other -1.164a (0.388) -1.283a (0.027)
ADHD symptoms at first diagnosis (inattentive omitted)
hyperactive 0.267a (0.070) 0.307a (0.026)
mixed -0.086 (0.294) -0.103a (0.027)
Family & home environment
Family net income -0.247a (0.054) -0.249a (0.024)
Foster care -0.304a (0.111) -0.340a (0.027)
Number of adults -0.110b (0.044) -0.160a (0.023)
Number of children 0.034 (0.034) 0.051a (0.021)
Time trend (4th degree polynomial) YES YES
County time-varying characterics YES YES
N person/year obs 39,125 39,125
Notes: The table shows coefficient estimates from single-logit equation and DFML model; both exclude mother's character-
istics. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficient estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted
with a, b, and c respectively.
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Table 2.13: Adverse outcomes: STDs. DFML estimates.
Selected variables LOGIT DFML
t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2 t-3
History of treatment
Medicines only -0.040 -0.032 0.068 -0.003 -0.013 0.059a
(0.055) (0.068) (0.067) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Behavioral therapy only 0.111 0.014 0.205 -0.082a -0.098a 0.025
(0.08) (0.094) (0.099) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Combination 0.026 0.064 0.103 -0.157a -0.012 -0.043
(0.074) (0.089) (0.087) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Individual characteristics
Male -1.068 (0.035) -1.191a (0.022)
Age 0.656 (0.099) 0.509a (0.019)
Age squared -0.013 (0.003) -0.008a (0.001)
Race (white omitted):
Black -0.133 (0.037) -0.171a (0.022)
Other 0.022 (0.121) -0.043 (0.027)
ADHD symptoms at first diagnosis (inattentive omitted)
hyperactive 0.051 (0.038) 0.058a (0.022)
mixed -0.056 (0.132) -0.025 (0.027)
Family & home environment
Family net income -0.036 (0.024) -0.033 (0.018)
Foster care 0.354 (0.063) 0.396a (0.025)
Number of adults -0.038 (0.024) -0.064a (0.018)
Number of children -0.009 (0.017) -0.009 (0.015)
Time trend (4th degree polynomial) YES YES
County time-varying characterics YES YES
N person/year obs 101,145 101,145
Notes: The table shows coefficient estimates from single-logit equation and DFML model; both exclude mother's character-
istics. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficient estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted
with a, b, and c respectively.
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Table 2.14: Adverse outcomes: Injuries. DFML estimates.
Selected variables LOGIT DFML
t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2 t-3
History of treatment
Medicines only -0.002 0.025 -0.005 -0.068a 0.003 -0.028
(0.015) (0.019) (0.021) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Behavioral therapy only 0.086a 0.079b 0.054 -0.047a 0.006 -0.016
(0.026) (0.031) (0.035) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022)
Combination 0.084a 0.030 0.022 -0.071a -0.035a -0.069a
(0.019) (0.025) (0.026) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
Individual characteristics
Male 0.118a (0.01) 0.134a (0.009)
Age 0.068a (0.007) 0.146a (0.005)
Age squared -0.004a (0.0003) -0.007a (0.0002)
Race (white omitted):
Black -0.354a (0.010) -0.376a (0.009)
Other -0.258a (0.029) -0.318a (0.020)
ADHD symptoms at first diagnosis (inattentive omitted)
hyperactive 0.063a (0.011) 0.094a (0.010)
mixed 0.008a (0.03) 0.118a (0.021)
Family & home environment
Family net income -0.040a (0.006) -0.038a (0.006)
Foster care 0.286a (0.021) 0.416a (0.016)
Number of adults -0.004 (0.007) -0.001 (0.006)
Number of children -0.0002 (0.005) -0.013a (0.004)
Time trend (4th degree polynomial) YES YES
County time-varying characterics YES YES
N person/year obs 252,421 252,421
Notes: The table shows coefficient estimates from single-logit equation and DFML model; both exclude mother's character-
istics. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficient estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted
with a, b, and c respectively.
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Table 2.15: Adverse outcomes: Substance Abuse. DFML estimates.
Selected variables LOGIT DFML
t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2 t-3
History of treatment
Medicines only -0.012 -0.050 0.095 0.004 -0.033 0.098a
(0.057) (0.070) (0.070) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Behavioral therapy only 0.295 0.171 0.283 -0.090a -0.052b -0.043
(0.079) (0.093) (0.102) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Combination 0.541 -0.077 0.202 0.196a -0.253a -0.037
(0.069) (0.09) (0.088) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Individual characteristics
Male 0.152 (0.035) 0.183a (0.023)
Age 1.942 (0.109) 1.788a (0.019)
Age squared -0.053 (0.004) -0.046a (0.001)
Race (white omitted):
Black -0.360 (0.036) -0.412a (0.022)
Other -0.429 (0.136) -0.554a (0.027)
ADHD symptoms at first diagnosis (inattentive omitted)
hyperactive 0.240 (0.038) 0.317a (0.023)
mixed 0.314 (0.116) 0.407a (0.027)
Family & home environment
Family net income -0.108 (0.025) -0.136a (0.019)
Foster care 0.322 (0.062) 0.465a (0.025)
Number of adults -0.103 (0.024) -0.163a (0.018)
Number of children -0.022 (0.017) -0.023 (0.015)
Time trend (4th degree polynomial) YES YES
County time-varying characterics YES YES
N person/year obs 102,805 102,805
Notes: The table shows coefficient estimates from single-logit equation and DFML model; both exclude mother's character-
istics. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficient estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted
with a, b, and c respectively.
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Chapter 3
Dynamic Sequencing of Drug Treatments for ADHD Patients
with Medicaid Coverage
3.1 Introduction
The most recent 2011/12 National Survey of Children's Health reported that about 5 million
children were reported as having an ADHD diagnosis and almost 70% of them were on medical
treatment in the U.S. Although there is a strong belief that ADHD medication is overprescribed,
very little is known about the existing prescribing practices and physician learning process in ADHD
treatment. Based on the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) 1996-2010 data, ADHD is one
of the top-25 conditions by the number of prescriptions filled. The evidence suggests that children
and teenagers diagnosed with ADHD face significant uncertainty regarding efficacy and severity
of adverse effects of ADHD medications. The typical patient is prescribed between one and two
different drugs before they find a suitable treatment. The switch from the initial choice occurs
approximately within half a year with over 33% of patients switching after the first prescription.
Using South Carolina Medicaid claims data for 2003-2012, I estimate a dynamic model of
demand for ADHD drugs with learning under uncertainty. Uncertainty comes from two sources: little
evidence on newly introduced ADHD treatments and uncertainty about the response to treatment
of a particular patient. In the model, heterogeneous patients learn about the efficacy of available
treatments through experimenting. Their preferences are embedded into the preferences of their
physician (decision-maker).
This paper is an extension of Crawford and Shum (2005). Their analysis of demand for anti-
ulcer drugs suggests that treatments' rankings differ in their curative and symptomatic effects and
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although there is substantial heterogeneity in these effects across patients, learning enables them to
reduce the cost of uncertainty. In a more recent paper, Dickstein (2014a) analyses depression drugs
and suggests that insurer copayment policies and drug promotions for the most efficient treatments
can improve patient outcomes while minimizing insurer cost.
In this paper, I explore a dimension that has not been addressed in the literature  drug
holidays. I will evaluate the effect of interruption in treatment on its cost and duration, accounting
for patient heterogeneity in response to treatment for ADHD. I will explore the potential to develop
better guidelines that can improve the quality of drug-patient matches and patient outcomes.
3.2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the literature on prescription drug demand under uncertainty and
more broadly, on demand for experience goods. The quality of these so-called experience goods is
imperfectly observed so, in order to establish product qualities, a consumer has to try the good(s).
Erdem and Keane (1996) and Ackerberg (2003) look at the effects of advertisement on consumer
demand in markets where there is uncertainty regarding product quality, which can be resolved
with experience and outside information. The first paper looks at scanner data on sales of laundry
detergent to estimate how changes in marketing strategy affect brand choice both in the short run
and long run. They find that the intensity of promotion has small short-run effects but is significant
in the long run.
Ackerberg (2003) examines sales of yogurt, where consumers also learn from experience and
advertisement. However, they distinguish between the two potential effects of promotion: informa-
tive and prestige effects, where the latter affect both experienced and inexperienced consumers,
while the former affect the demand of inexperienced consumers only. Ackerberg finds that consumers
learn from their experience and informational component of advertisement.
Early work on the demand for prescription drugs (e.g. Ellison et al. (1997), Berndt et al.
(1996), and Hellerstein (1998)) does not feature consumer learning. Crawford and Shum (2005)
build a model of demand with learning based on the premise that patients and their doctors face
uncertainty regarding the efficacy and severity of the side effects of a drug in a particular patient
before she tries it. Prescription drug consumption is modeled as a bivariate matching problem, where
the existing uncertainty is resolved over time through experimenting. With the agency problem
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assumed away, physicians maximize their patients' expected utility by selecting a sequence of drug
treatments.
The authors measure the effects of uncertainty and learning in the demand for drugs. They
find that learning reduces the costs of uncertainty in the anti-ulcer pharmaceutical market. Learning
in this class of drugs occurs very quickly. Over two-thirds of patients resolve initial uncertainty and
remain on their choice drug after the first prescription. To determine the costs of uncertainty, two
counterfactuals are estimated. First, patients make the best-case scenario choice under complete
information about their matching values. Second, the learning is eliminated by forcing patients to
stay on their first choice of treatment. Complete information results in about 9% higher average
discounted utility over the baseline case with learning. If experimenting is not allowed, the average
utility level drops 6% below the baseline case.
Two recent working papers extend Crawford and Shum (2005). Dickstein (2014a) develops
a dynamic model of demand under uncertainty for antidepressant medications using employer-based
commercial claims from 2003 until 2005. He relaxes the perfect agency assumption and adopts a
different computational approach to accommodate a large set of available drug treatments. Patients
are enrolled in a variety of health insurance plans with differential copayment rates. This variation
allows Dickstein to study whether insurance cost-sharing policies and drug promotions can improve
the efficiency of drug choice, measured by better patient outcome and lower long-run insurer costs.
To answer the question, he estimates two sets of counterfactuals. In the first counterfactual, a
series of copayment schemes is evaluated: uniform pricing applied across the border, uniform pricing
applied to generic and brand drugs separately, and a value-based insurance design that channels
consumption into the most cost-effective drug classes. In the second counterfactual, the effects of
advertisement are simulated. The author selects two antidepressants and adjusts their product-level
fixed effects that proxy for promotion. Based on the estimation results, Dickstein argues that value-
based policies that are built from observed quit rates can improve patient health, and promotion of
cost-effective treatments is beneficial.
Another recent extension of Crawford and Shum (2005) is by Saxell (2013), who takes
into account physician private and social learning to study the importance of long-term continuous
physician-patient relationship. Using data on cholesterol drug prescriptions in Finland in 2003-2006,
Saxell analyzes the physician's attempt to learn patient-drug match value from her own experience
and the past choices of other doctors. She finds that treatment strategy is highly responsive to
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changes in the length of the doctor-patient relationship; changing physicians slows down learning
and increases the total cost of treatment.
This paper extends Crawford and Shum (2005) to account for treatment interruptions, or
drug holidays that are taken by most patients in my data. Also, I plan to adjust my model to
account for behavioral treatment therapy that is common for patients with ADHD. It is especially
beneficial to estimate such a model, because there is no consensus in the medical literature on the
effects of behavioral treatment alone and in combination with pharmacological treatment.
3.3 Background
3.3.1 ADHD
Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is one of the most common mental con-
ditions affecting children. It is often first diagnosed in school-aged children. The average age for
children to be identified as having the condition is seven years old. The National Comorbidity Sur-
vey Adolescent Supplement of 2001-2004 showed that 8.7% from a nationally representative sample
of youth aged 1318 years had ADHD, with males being three times more likely to be diagnosed
than females. Approximately half of these cases were classified as severe ADHD (Merikangas et al.
(2010)). ADHD can also affect adults. The American Psychiatric Association (APA) estimates that
4.1% of adults in the U.S. have this disorder, with 1.7% of adults affected severely.1
More than half of these children are reported as receiving medication treatment for the
disorder. Although there is a strong belief that ADHD drugs are overprescribed, very little is known
about the existing prescribing practices and physician learning process in ADHD treatment (e.g.
see Goldman et al. (1998)). In the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) 1996-2010 dataset,
ADHD is one of the top-25 conditions by the number of prescriptions filled. The IMS Institute
for Healthcare Informatics (IMS) ranks ADHD 11th among therapeutic classes by U.S. spending in
2011.2 Since 2007, expenditures on ADHD drugs increased from $4 billion to $7.9 billion in 2011.
The market is likely to continue to grow as more adults are being recognized as having ADHD as
well.
The description of the syndrome first appeared in 1902. Since then, its definition, catego-
1American Psychiatric Association website, http://www.psychiatry.org/adhd. Accessed on April 14th, 2013.
2IMS National Sales Perspectives, February 23, 2012.
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rization, and treatment practices have changed. The APA defines ADHD as a brain condition that
is said to be present if either six or more of the inattention symptoms or six or more hyperactivity-
impulsivity symptoms have persisted for a least 6 months to a degree that is maladaptive and
inconsistent with developmental level.3
Within the past several decades, ADHD has become one of the most studied childhood
behavior disorders (Barkley, 2006). In part, it can be explained by a high potential for fruitful
medical intervention. In the 1960s, it was shown that stimulant drugs have beneficial effects on both
behavioral and cognitive aspects of the condition. More recently, new drugs were introduced, with
the most recent being Kapvay and Intuniv in 2009. Development of both medications and therapies
broaden the set of choices for managing a wide variety of mental issues united under the umbrella of
ADHD. Most stimulant medications are now offered in a number of different strengths, forms and
dosages.
Specific causes of ADHD are not fully understood. It was found that although ADHD runs
in families, other factors like environment, biological proneness to the condition, and brain injury
may play a role in the onset of the condition. Some studies also suggest that children whose mothers
smoked, drank alcohol, or were exposed to extreme stress during pregnancy have an increased risk
of ADHD.
ADHD is a behavioral disorder that adversely impacts many major life activities from child-
hood to adulthood. The condition is severe enough to be distressing for children, their families, and
teachers. On average, children with ADHD display lower levels of intellectual and academic perfor-
mance than non-disabled children. They are also more likely to develop a learning disability, to have
delays in speech development, and to have lower working memory capacity. Individuals affected by
the syndrome were also found to discount the future more heavily than unaffected individuals, to
have problems with self-control and self-regulation, and to display riskier behavior, including more
dangerous driving. Although there are no studies of the impact of ADHD on life expectancy, issues
like more frequent accidents in childhood, auto accidents in adolescence and adulthood, higher crime
rates, and use and abuse of substances all can be associated with reduced life expectancy.
If they are left untreated, ADHD sufferers are at a greater risk for potentially serious conse-
3The American Psychiatric Association publishes the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM),
where it sets criteria for the classification of mental disorders. It is the standard classification of mental disorders used
by mental health professionals in the United States. The DSM consists of three major components: the diagnostic
classification, the diagnostic criteria sets, and the descriptive text. The most current version is DSM-5 published in
May 2013, a revision of DSM-IV-TR that came out in 2000.
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quences. Individuals with ADHD, when compared to their unaffected peers, are found to be 32-40%
more likely to drop out of school, to rarely complete college (5-10%), to have fewer or no friends
(50-70%), to underperform at work (70-80%), to engage in antisocial activities (40-50%), and to
use tobacco or illicit drugs more than normal. Furthermore, children growing up with ADHD are
more likely to experience teen pregnancy (40%), STDs (16%), depression (20-30%), and personality
disorders (18-25%) as adults (Barkley, 2006).
Although there is a consensus that ADHD is a disabling condition, there is little evidence
and, thus, agreement on diagnosing and treatment practices. Diagnosing ADHD is a subjective
evaluation. In addition to the direct child examination, it involves parents and teachers filling out
questionnaires describing the patient's behavior in different settings. The process is complicated by
the diversity of ADHD manifestations and by frequently present comorbid conditions.
Children with ADHD are a heterogeneous group who are believed to have in common the
characteristics of developmentally inappropriate levels of inattention, and in most cases hyperactivity-
impulsivity. With time, the definition of ADHD subgroups will become more refined but, as of today,
there are only two diagnosing subcategories to describe different ADHD subpopulations.4 ADHD
has a number of serious comorbid disorders, and it shares symptoms with most of them. They
include anxiety disorder, depressive disorder, bipolar I disorder, oppositional defiant and conduct
disorders, and others.
3.3.2 SC Medicaid
Medicaid is a means-tested health insurance program. Its target population is low-income
families, disabled, aged, and blind individuals, and pregnant women. Under broad federal guidelines,
each state manages its own Medicaid program. The provision of prescription drugs' coverage is an
optional benefit that is currently offered by all states.
Among other program parameters, the states decide on whether to charge premiums for
enrollment and whether to have cost-sharing provisions for the enrollees, but their amount is capped
by federal regulation. In most states, certain population groups, including children are exempt
from out-of-pocket spending provisions. In SC, children and young adults (under age 19) face zero
copayment for the prescription drugs. The state maintains preferred drug lists for medicines that
4ICD-9 codes for the Attention deficit disorder are 314.00 (Attention deficit, without hyperactivity) and 314.01
(Attention deficit, with hyperactivity). The American Psychiatric Association maps their classification into the ICD
codes.
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do not require prior authorization, all other drugs may be covered if a doctor-filed authorization
request is approved. The quantity restrictions are also common with a typical prescription capped
at a 30-day supply.
A child may be covered by the SC Medicaid program if she is a U.S. citizen or perma-
nent resident. She may be eligible for Medicaid regardless of the eligibility status of her parents
or guardians. In SC, the traditional Medicaid program is combined with the Children's Health
Insurance Program (CHIP) that has looser eligibility criteria than Medicaid itself. Individuals whose
income is below 150% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) are eligible for Medicaid in SC and those
whose income is below 200% of the FPL are eligible for CHIP. All eligible enrollees have access to
the same health benefits.
Once eligibility is established, Medicaid coverage is available for an enrollee for a 12-month
period (unless the enrollee becomes ineligible during this time), after which the eligibility needs to be
reconfirmed. If an eligible individual received medical services and applied for Medicaid after that,
her coverage may be activated retroactively for up to three months prior to the month of application,
if the individual would have been eligible during the retroactive period had she applied then.
Medicaid is similar to Medicare in that in addition to a traditional fee-for-service plan,
there are also managed care plans available. Most states expanded their managed care programs
in the past decade. However, the only complete data available are for the traditional Medicaid
enrollees. For this reason, I concentrate on the fee-for-service SC Medicaid population.
In SC, 892,583 individuals, about 20% of the state population, were enrolled in Medicaid
in FY2009. The majority of enrollees (62%) are female and half of the enrollees are children (52%).
The overall program spending in SC was $5.2 billion, 4% of which was spent on prescription drugs.
3.4 Data Description
3.4.1 Treatment Choices
As for most mental disorders, there are three major treatment strategies: medications,
behavioral therapy, or a combination of the two. Therapy usually consists of teaching parents and
teachers how to provide positive feedback for desired behaviors and consequences for negative ones.
Behavioral therapy alone was found to be less effective than pharmacological treatment alone, but no
consensus exists on whether medications are inferior to the combination treatment (Barkley, 2006).
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There are two major classes of ADHD medications: stimulant and, more recently, non-
stimulant drugs. Central nervous system stimulant medications have been used since the 1930s in
treatment of behavioral disorders. Today they are the most commonly prescribed drugs to ADHD
patients. Stimulants were found to improve the core symptoms of ADHD and to enhance behavioral,
academic, and social functioning in about 50-95% of children treated.5 Stimulants are likely to be
recommended as the first step in treatment. If one stimulant does not work, another one may be
tried. Children can respond differently to the stimulants, as well as to the other drugs less often used
to treat ADHD. The drugs are sometimes, but not often, used in combination. There is little evidence
that some stimulants are more efficient than others. There is also uncertainty about whether these
benefits last longer than two years.
Table 3.1: Choice Set in the U.S. ADHD Drugs Market, 2003-2012.
Active Ingredient Speed
Mkt
share
Major Brands G Entry
Avg.
Price
Amphetamine salts E 25.16 Adderall XR Y 2001 150.67
Methylphenidate E 20.26 Concerta Y 2000 131.00
Methylphenidate N 11.13
Ritalin LA, Metadate CD,
Methylin ER
Y 2002 127.35
Lisdexamfetamine E 11.04 Vyvanse N 2007 141.11
Amphetamine salts M 8.15 Adderall Y 1996 37.27
Dexmethylphenidate E 7.19 Focalin XR N 2005 144.85
Atomoxetine n/a 6.37 Strattera N 2002 130.27
Methylphenidate M 5.82 Methylin, Ritalin Y 2002 30.16
Others  4.89 Various  81.15
Notes: Speed stands for the drug release speed, where E means extended release, N - intermediate and M  immediate
release speed. Extended release drugs are superior than immediate release drugs in that their active ingredient is released over a
longer period of time, often allowing for once-a-day dosing. In-sample market share is based on the number of prescriptions filled
in 2003-2012. G stands for generic drugs availability. Average price is calculated by averaging SC Medicaid reimbursement
payments to pharmacies.
To form the choice set, I group all drugs that were approved by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) for treatment of ADHD in children, into nine classes by active ingredient
and release speed. Table 3.1 lists these classes, indicating their in-sample market share over the
entire sample period between 2003 and 2012. The last category, Others includes medicines that
had an in-sample market share lower than 5%. Note that most stimulant drugs had seen their
patent expire, and there are generic substitutes available in the market. The market is domi-
nated by the extended-release formulations of relatively old drugs: together amphetamine salts and
5Connor, Daniel F., et al. Proactive and reactive aggression in referred children and adolescents American
Journal of Orthopsychiatry 74.2 (2004): 129-136. Spencer, Thomas, et al. Pharmacotherapy of attention-deficit
hyperactivity disorder across the life cycle. Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 35.4
(1996): 409-432.
76
methylphenidate comprise almost a half of the market for ADHD pharmacological treatments.
Although not approved for the treatment of ADHD, certain antidepressants and sleep-
disorder medications are prescribed to patients off-label. For example, Provigil (sleep disorders);
Wellbutrin (antidepressant); tricyclic antidepressants; Catapres and Tenex (short-acting forms of
high blood pressure medicines); Abilify, Zyprexa, Seroquel, Risperdal, and Geodon (antipsychotics).
My data allow for identifying off-label prescription practices and I plan to examine them in the
future.
3.4.2 Evidence of Experimenting
In this section I analyze raw data for the evidence of uncertainty and experimentation in
the market for ADHD prescription drugs. I use panel data from SC Medicaid for children between
ages 3 and 19 years old, who were covered by Medicaid and diagnosed with ADHD between 2003
and 2012. The sample only includes patients who had consistent Medicaid coverage: I exclude
individuals who were covered for fewer than 10 months a year. For individuals who had periods of
consistent coverage from the beginning of the sample that were followed by inconsistent coverage,
I only keep the medical history to the point when the coverage becomes inconsistent and assign
a right-censoring flag to the observations that I keep. From this sample of 66,748 individuals I
exclude patients for whom I cannot determine the date of the onset of the ADHD condition. To
avoid difficulties associated with left-censoring, I drop another 17,399 patients. Excluding patients
who were prescribed several ADHD drugs at a time (polytherapy) and patients who had at least one
Managed Care claim for the purpose of consistency, I am left with a sample of 12,338 children who
take at least one ADHD prescription during the sample period. For the purposes of my baseline
model, I also drop patients who were diagnosed with ADHD but did not take any prescriptions
while being eligible for Medicaid. These 5,331 patients took an outside option that may stand for
behavioral therapy treatment, an off-label prescription for ADHD, or simply no treatment.
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics of prescription patterns observed in my data. Patients
take on average 12 prescriptions (drug purchase events). Most prescriptions filled that I observe in
the data are for the 30-day supply. Over the course of the treatment, patients try about 1.73 different
drugs (as presented in Table 3.1). Since the patients can switch to a drug they have tried before
from a current treatment, the number of spells is higher  about 2 drugs.6
6A spell is a period of time when one particular drug is being prescribed.
77
On average, patient treatment lasts for a year and 9 months and for some patients  for the
entire sample period of 10 years.
Table 3.2: Sample Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean Median St.d. Min Max
N of prescriptions 12,338 11.99 7.00 14.42 1 111
N of drugs, per person 12,338 1.73 1.00 1.00 1 8
Number of spells 12,338 2.00 1.00 1.79 1 39
Treatment length (in years) 12,338 1.77 1.05 1.94 0.1 9.69
N patients, who take ADHD drug 12,338
N right-censored patients 4,303
N patients, who took outside option 5,331
Notes: SC Medicaid, 20032012. The sample only includes continuously insured individuals.
The variables presented in Table 3.2 are very skewed in the data. Figure 3.1 illustrates the
extent of patient heterogeneity in the number of prescriptions filled, number of different drugs tried,
length of treatment and number of spells. This heterogeneity speaks in favor of the assumption that
patients differ in their underlying illness severity. Also, as Crawford and Shum (2005) suggest, the
difference in the length of treatment might also be a result of patient choices. If more effective drugs
are also more expensive, some patients and their doctors may favor a cheaper drug that is slower in
its curative properties.
Prescription drugs are a good example of an experience good. Although certain qualities
of most drugs have been established, there is no medical consensus on their relative efficacy. Even
more importantly, it is hard to say how a specific drug would affect any given patient. The human
body is very complex and it is nearly impossible to predict its reaction to a chemical component
with certainty. This uncertainty means that patients are likely to try more than a single drug in the
course of their treatment while they experiment with what is best for them. However, patients also
tend to persist in their drug choices, which might look like a lack of experimenting. This persistence
is usually explained with risk aversion and switching costs.
In the data, I see evidence of both: persistence in drug choices and experimenting. As Table
3.3 shows, 90.2% of individuals who took drug 2 in the previous month will continue with the same
treatment in the next month, while only 79.2% of those who tried drug 9 will continue with it. Table
3.4 presents the transition probabilities between the first and second periods. Patients are much
more likely to experiment when they are early in their treatment. The share of patients who stayed
on drug 2 after they first tried it is 8 percentage points lower than the average share across all time
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Figure 3.1: Histograms for Prescription Patterns in the Data.
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periods (presented in table 3.3) and for drug 8 it is 14 percentage points lower.
Table 3.3: Transition probabilities between periods (t-1) and t.
(t-1)\t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 92.8% 1.4% 1.0% 1.5% 1.5% 0.6% 0.5% 0.3% 0.3%
2 1.9% 90.2% 4.3% 1.3% 0.3% 0.7% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3%
3 2.0% 3.5% 89.9% 1.5% 0.3% 0.8% 0.5% 1.1% 0.4%
4 1.0% 1.1% 0.9% 94.7% 0.4% 0.8% 0.3% 0.2% 0.7%
5 9.5% 1.0% 1.0% 1.6% 84.4% 0.4% 0.6% 0.9% 0.6%
6 1.5% 1.4% 0.9% 2.3% 0.2% 91.2% 0.5% 0.5% 1.6%
7 2.7% 2.9% 1.4% 1.2% 0.7% 0.7% 89.4% 0.5% 0.6%
8 2.7% 3.8% 5.2% 1.4% 1.5% 1.4% 0.6% 82.6% 0.9%
9 3.0% 2.1% 2.6% 4.2% 1.1% 5.8% 0.8% 1.1% 79.2%
Notes: Previous period (t − 1) indexes rows and current period t indexes columns. For example, of patients who took drug #7
in period (t− 1) only 2.9% switched to drug #2 in the next period.
Table 3.4: Transition probabilities between first and second periods.
t=1\t=2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 84.3% 3.7% 2.8% 2.1% 2.4% 1.6% 1.4% 1.0% 0.7%
2 6.0% 82.2% 4.6% 1.9% 0.9% 1.3% 1.4% 1.3% 0.5%
3 7.1% 5.1% 78.9% 2.0% 1.0% 1.9% 1.2% 2.1% 0.7%
4 2.5% 3.7% 2.6% 84.8% 0.9% 2.9% 0.4% 1.1% 1.1%
5 16.7% 2.6% 2.4% 2.5% 69.2% 0.6% 1.3% 3.0% 1.6%
6 3.8% 2.5% 2.3% 3.6% 0.6% 82.9% 0.5% 1.4% 2.5%
7 5.6% 6.0% 2.8% 0.7% 1.1% 0.9% 80.5% 1.3% 0.9%
8 6.1% 7.6% 7.4% 2.1% 3.7% 1.9% 1.4% 68.5% 1.3%
9 3.8% 2.8% 3.4% 2.0% 3.2% 7.3% 1.3% 2.8% 73.5%
Notes: Previous (first) period indexes rows and current (second) period indexes columns. For example, of patients who took drug #7
in the first period 6% switched to drug #2 in the second period.
3.4.3 Drug Holidays
One of the interesting data features is the ability to observe time intervals during which
individuals did not consume any drugs. Earlier studies did not account for it. Formally, tempo-
rary suspension of pharmacological treatment is called structured treatment interruption or drug
holiday. In the case of ADHD, such treatment interruptions are generally not recommended by
doctors, but are considered acceptable for patients on stimulant drugs. Non-stimulant medicines
have a different mechanism of action. They take longer to produce effect and to leave the body, so
they effectively cannot be suspended for a short period of time. In the data, 74% of ADHD patients
have taken at least one month off their medication, and for a majority of them, it was no longer
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than four months. On average, I see patients taking about two to three holidays over the course of
treatment.
Drug holidays are thought to be initiated for one of the following reasons. Most commonly,
side effects are bothersome. They include symptoms such as loss of appetite and anorexia, slow
growth, and insomnia. Second, some parents may feel that they are overmedicating their children
and would like to suspend treatment for the periods of low demand for attention, e.g. school
holidays. Finally, taking a break from treatment could be an attempt for a patient, her parents and
doctor to test her ability to cope with the condition without pharmacological intervention, i.e., to
make sure that the drug is needed or not needed at all. There is significant heterogeneity in the
need for drug holidays. It might depend on individual-specific side effects' manifestations: school
attendance, presence of low versus high demand for attention periods, and parents' perception of drug
treatment. Also note that predominantly hyperactive types are less likely to suspend treatment than
predominantly inattentive types due to their condition symptoms' manifestation and their impact
on other people. Doctors typically recommend a daily regiment for both types.
It is important to distinguish drug holidays from gaps in treatment that are due to parent
forgetfulness to refill a prescription or/and adaptation of non-standard treatment regimen (i.e., one
pill every two days). The latter is believed to be systematic, while drug holidays are spikes in the
data.
Treatment suspension during school holidays can be considered strategic and can be identi-
fied in the data. These are periods of relatively low demand for attention, when side effects outweigh
benefits from treatment. I do observe patterns of such behavior in my data. Table 3.5 shows that
if there was treatment suspension of three months or more, patients are more likely to resume the
treatment in the Fall, when school starts. Similarly, the last time I would see them filling their
prescription is in April or May before the treatment suspension, which is the end of a school year.
Another important dimension of drug holidays is their outcome in terms of switches. When
a patient takes a break from her medicine, does she then restart on the same treatment or a different
treatment? In about 9% of cases, patients switch medication after a holiday. This switching behavior
might suggest that if a medicine is not working, a patient gets off of it, but then as the disease's
manifestations intensify they go to the doctor and obtain a prescription for a different drug. When
the patient restarts on the same drug, it probably means that side effects were tolerable and they
suspended the treatment for some other reason. Supportive of this assumption, average length of a
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Table 3.5: Seasonality of Drug Holidays.
Month
First month after holiday Last month before holiday
90+ days 60-120 days 90+ days 60-120 days
Jan 7.34 12.27 5.64 6.82
Feb 7.93 10.34 5.79 6.52
Mar 8.04 7.15 8.64 6.30
Apr 6.45 6.85 13.15 8.61
May 5.42 7.12 14.78 14.69
Jun 3.88 4.64 5.54 8.15
Jul 5.20 6.99 3.80 5.46
Aug 16.60 16.34 6.27 7.23
Sep 14.15 8.24 6.09 6.59
Oct 10.17 6.81 7.37 8.47
Nov 8.27 6.46 9.28 12.13
Dec 6.54 6.79 13.65 9.02
N obs 22,235 16,987 22,235 16,987
Notes: A drug holiday of 90 days means that 120 days pass since last prescription was filled until the
treatment is restarted, given that the last prescription was written for a 30-day therapy.
holiday diminishes over the treatment length. As a result of experimenting early in the treatment,
patients find a drug they are comfortable with and take it regularly as prescribed. The median
length of drug holidays does not vary significantly with the choice of drug. In this paper I will
examine how treatment interruption affects treatment length and cost.
3.4.4 Behavioral Therapy
Non-medicine treatments of ADHD include parental behavior training, psychosocial therapy
and school-based programs, all of which can be combined with one another and/or with pharmaco-
logical treatment. Parental training includes teaching parents how to understand and correct their
children's behavior. Psychosocial therapy sessions are designed to help a child acquire or improve
social skills and to control her behavior and emotions. School-based programs include special ed-
ucation services for children who qualify. Parental training, psychosocial therapy sessions and a
number of school- and community-based services are covered by SC Medicaid. I use Current Pro-
cedural Terminology codes (CPTs) listed on every doctor visit claim to identify behavioral therapy
sessions.7
7In doing that, I follow the ADHD Coding Fact Sheet for Primary Care Pediatricians from the Caring for Children
With ADHD: A Resource Toolkit for Clinicians, 2nd Edition published by the American Academy of Pediatrics in 2012
and Evaluation/Management and Psychotherapy Coding Algorithm developed by the American Academy of Child
and Adolescent Psychiatry, 2012, www.aacap.org/App_Themes/.../Code_Selection_Algorithm_v3.pdf. Accessed on
December 1st, 2013.
82
In the data, about 33% of identified behavioral therapy sessions are individual psychother-
apy, (e.g. CPT 90807 Individual psychotherapy, insight oriented, behavior modifying and/or sup-
portive, in an office or outpatient facility, approximately 45 to 50 minutes face-to-face with the
patient; with medical evaluation and management services). The majority (54%) of therapy ses-
sions are either group therapy or parent sessions or therapy with a parent present (e.g. CPT 96153
Health & Behavior Intervention  Group). I also include other psychological services like case
management and school-based mental health services for children diagnosed with ADHD. Note that
most school-based special education programs are not billed to Medicaid and are not included in my
sample.
Table 3.6 presents summary statistics on behavioral treatment claims paid by SC Medicaid
between 2003 and 2012. On average, a patient attends two to three sessions in a month. This
number is slightly below a typically recommended regimen of weekly sessions. It suggests that such
potential complications of non-medicine treatment as the need to adjust parent schedule and the
availability of providers in the area are likely to be real. Another difficulty is that behavioral therapy
treatment often requires long-term commitment: on average, patients attend sessions for 15 months.
However, almost 15% of patients in my sample attend a single therapy session over the course of
their treatment.
Therapy can also be costly. In SC, average monthly cost per patient with ADHD paid by
Medicaid is about $668. It is consistent with an estimate provided in AHRQ (2012) of between
$300 and $2,000, depending on the individual therapist or program and the amount of time needed.
SC Medicaid patients are responsible for a copay of $3.30 per visit and are limited to a certain
number of visits per day, month and/or year depending on the procedure performed. There are also
non-pecuniary costs of treatment  time spent to get to the physician's office and the session itself.
American Academy of Pediatrics (2001) and American Academy of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry (2007) guidelines state that behavioral treatment is not as effective as pharmacological
intervention, and the latter guideline does not recommend non-medicine treatment unless drugs are
found ineffective. In contrast, Fabiano et al. (2009) analyze 114 published research papers and
conclude that there is strong and consistent evidence that behavioral interventions are effective in
treating ADHD. However, they also note that there is not enough evidence of long-lasting positive
effects of behavioral treatment. In my sample, only 1% of patients are treated with behavioral
therapy alone, while most children (70%) rely completely on ADHD drugs for treatment.
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Even though long-term effects of behavioral treatment are not established, it has a ben-
efit of not causing side effects as drugs do. Also, while the ADHD drugs are known to decrease
ADHD symptoms, they do not change behavioral habits. As soon as a patient discontinues her drug
treatment, its symptom-relief effects go away due to the nature of ADHD medicines.
Table 3.6: Behavioral Therapy Summary Statistics, 2003-2012.
Variable N Mean Median St.d. Min Max
N sessions, per patient/month 4,879 2.52 1.67 2.97 1.00 43
Therapy cost, per patient/month 4,879 667.89 259.00 1,247.92 14.00 15,493
Months of therapy, per patient 4,879 14.88 6.90 19.63 0.00 113
% patients on therapy only 1.02%
% patients on drugs only 70.33%
N patients 16,444
N observations 209,259
Notes: The sample contains fee-for-service SC Medicaid enrollees only and excludes patients with left-censored obser-
vations, patients with noncontinuous eligibility status and patients, who take multiple ADHD prescription drugs in a
month. Zero months of therapy duration is assigned to patients who attend a single session during their treatment.
3.5 Model
3.5.1 Initial Diagnosis
I adopt a dynamic model of demand for pharmaceuticals with learning under uncertainty
developed by Crawford and Shum (2005) to study a phenomenon of drug holidays, or planned
treatment interruptions. It is a discrete choice model, where patients choose between available
drugs and occasionally choose to interrupt their treatment and take no medicines for a relatively
short period of time.
When a patient comes to a doctor's office for the first time, she receives an initial diagnosis.
In the context of ADHD, it is the type of the condition  with or without hyperactivity, and its
severity. Although ADHD type is known to the econometrician, condition severity is not. To address
the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, it is assumed that doctors classify patients into K discrete
types based on the initial diagnosis. These patient groups differ in two dimensions. First, they have
different condition severity, and second, they may respond differently to medical treatments. The
model handles the former by assuming that the initial probability of being healed for individual j
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(without any treatment at all) varies with patient type:
h0j = θk (3.1)
with probability pk, k = 1, . . . ,K, where j indexes patients, k indexes patient types by the underlying
illness severity, and h0j is the initial probability of being healed without taking drugs and 0 < pk < 1,
0 ≤ θ1, . . . , θK ≤ 1. The more severe is the condition, the lower is the probability of recovery without
receiving any treatment.
To account for the fact that patients of different types are likely to respond differently
to ADHD medicines, doctors' prior beliefs regarding symptomatic and curative match values are
allowed to vary by patient type.
3.5.2 Patient Preferences
Patient utility is a function of the symptomatic signal xjnt of treatment, i.e. of how successful
a drug is in treating the symptoms of ADHD for this patient and its side effects' profile, and the
cost of treatment n, pn. Side effects that are typically associated with ADHD drugs are decreased
appetite, sleep problems, headache, irritability, jitteriness, and stomach pain. The side effects may
be mild or in some cases severe enough to cause patients to switch to another treatment. Side effects
also vary by age of the patient, with preschoolers often having stronger side effects.
During a drug holiday, a patient continues to receive symptomatic signals that are associated
with the no-drug option and the cost of treatment becomes zero. Patients are modeled as risk-averse
individuals in order to accommodate significant persistence in choices that are observed in the data.
Imposing a Constant Absolute Risk Aversion specification yields the following utility function:
u(xjnt, pn, jnt) = −exp(−r × xjnt)− α× pn + jnt (3.2)
where jnt is an additive idiosyncratic error that measures idiosyncratic tastes for drug n by patient
j in period t, and r measures the level of risk aversion. Note that the utility is negative up to the
error term and the utility in the period just before the patient is cured is normalized to zero. This
is done to avoid a situation, when patients delay recovery in order to continue receiving positive
utility.
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3.5.3 Recovery probabilities
After patient j takes drug n in period t, she can recover at the end of period t and need no
more prescriptions with probability hjt. This posterior probability evolves through time according
to the following expression:
hjt(hjt−1, yjnt) =
(
hjt−1
1−hjt−1 ) + djntyjnt
1 + ((
hjt−1
1−hjt−1 ) + djntyjnt)
(3.3)
where h0j = θk. Note that since hjt depends on the curative signal yjnt, hjt is random when patient
j makes choice in period t.
3.5.4 Learning process
Upon initial diagnosis, doctors determine initial treatment choice according to their prior
beliefs on how a particular drug n affects patients of type K. Person-specific match values are
unknown, but they can be described by a multivariate normal distribution:
 µjn
υjn
 ∼ N(
µnk
υnk
 ,
σ2n 0
0 τ2n
) (3.4)
where µ
nk
and νnk denote prior mean symptomatic and curative matching values for each drug and
patient type, and σn and τn are standard deviations for these means respectively. Note that they
are assumed not to vary across patient types. Patient-specific matching values µjn and νjn are not
known at the start of the treatment, but every period patients receive two noisy normally distributed
signals that are centered around the true match values.
 xjnt
yjnt
 ∼ N(
µjn
υjn
 ,
σ2n 0
0 τ2n
) (3.5)
Signals are drawn every period t. Doctors are assumed to have rational expectations in a sense that
their prior beliefs about drug-specific match values distribution corresponds to their actual distri-
bution. Patients and their doctors know values µ
nk
, νnk, and their respective standard deviations
86
σn, τn. I estimate these parameters.
Following Crawford and Shum (2005), I accommodate new-to-market drugs by allowing prior
beliefs about match values to vary for the first two years since the drug entry. The idea behind this
set up is that when a new drug enters the market, its actual symptomatic and curative match values
are not clearly established. With time, doctors learn about these drugs through the experience of
their patients and from medical studies and symposiums.
In my sample, several new brand drugs enter the market between 2003 and 2012. The two
newest drugs are non-stimulants Kapvay and Intuniv that were launched in 2009. Their in-sample
market share has not reached 5% by 2013, so I bundle them into a composite drug with other low
market share drugs. Another relatively recent market entrant is Vyvanse, a stimulant that was
launched in 2007 and soon gained significant market share. I allow prior beliefs for it to vary every
half a year for two years, estimating four prior mean match value parameters for each drug/type,
instead of just one as it is for older drugs with established qualities in the population.
Patient j's posterior beliefs regarding her symptomatic match value µjn and curative match
value νjn are given by the sequence of normal distributions with the following mean and variance:
µt+1jn =
{ µtjn
V tjn
+
xjnt+1
σ2n
1
V tjn
+ 1σ2n
=
σ2nµ
t
jn + V
t
jnxjnt+1
σ2n + V
t
jn
, if drug n is taken in t+ 1,
µtjn, otherwise.
V t+1jn =
{
1
1
σ2n
+
lt+1jn
σ2n
=
σ2nσ
2
n
σ2n + l
t+1
jt σ
2
n
, if drug n is taken in t+ 1, (3.6)
V tjn, otherwise.
where µ0jn = µnk, V
0
jn = σn and l
t
jn is a count of number of times that patient j has taken drug n
by time t, including t.
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υt+1jn =
{
τ2nυ
t
jn +R
t
jnyjnt+1
τ2n +R
t
jn
, if drug n is taken in t+ 1,
υtjn, otherwise.
Rt+1jn =
{
τ2nτ
2
n
τ2n + l
t+1
jn τ
2
n
, if drug n is taken in t+ 1, (3.7)
Rtjn, otherwise.
where initial conditions are ν0jn = νnk, R
0
jn = τn.
3.5.5 Dynamic Drug Choice
Every period a diagnosed patient and her doctor choose a medication for treatment of
ADHD. It can be one of the drugs from the choice set, or a no-drug option (i.e., patient takes a
drug holiday). Entering period t, the state variables are: the patient j's posterior mean match
values µtjn and ν
t
jn; counts of the number of times patient j tried each drug n, l
t
jn; the re-
covery probability for patient j at the end of time period t, hjt; and the idiosyncratic error
terms υjnt. All of them are collected into a vector of state variables St for period t: St =
(µtj1, ..., µ
t
j10, υ
t
j1, ..., υ
t
j10, l
t
j1, ..., l
t
j10, hjt, j1t, ..., j10t).
The transition rules for mean match values are defined by the form of their posterior distri-
bution (see top rows of equations (3.6) and (3.7)). The recovery probability transition rule is defined
in equation (3.3). Finally, the transition rule for the count of times a patient had experience with a
particular drug n is:
lt+1jn =
{
ltjn + 1 if drug n is taken in t,
ltjn otherwise.
(3.8)
3.5.6 Dynamic Optimization Problem
Patients and their physicians maximize utility W (St) that is obtained as a solution to an
infinite horizon problem defined in the equation (3.2). It can be defined recursively using Bellman's
88
equation:
W (St) = max
n
E[u(xjnt, pn, jnt) + β(1− wjt)E[W (St+1)|xjnt, yjnt, n]|St]
= max
n
E[u(xjnt, pn, jnt) + β(1− E[wjt|yjnt])E[W (St+1)|xjnt, yjnt, n]|St]
= max
n
E[u(xjnt, pn, jnt) + βE(1− hjt(hjt−1, yjnt))E[W (St+1)|xjnt, yjnt, n]|St]
= max
n
(−exp(−rµtjn +
1
2
r2(σ2n + V
t
jn))− αpn + jnt
+βE(1− hjt(hjt−1, yjnt))E[W (St+1)|xjnt, yjnt, n]|St]
≡ maxn{Wn(St)}
Optimal policy for the patient j in every time period t is to choose the drug n with the highest
value function Wn(St). Assuming stationarity of the optimal policy, the Bellman equation can be
rewritten as follows:
W (S) = max
n
E[u(xjnt, pn, jnt)
+ βE(1− h′(hj , yjn))E[W (S′)|~xjn, n]|S] (3.9)
where ~xjn is a vector of symptomatic and curative signals from drug n, ~xjn ≡ (xjn, yjn)′. The value
function is computed using Keane and Wolpin (1994) approximation method.
3.6 Econometric Model
Each period patient j selects one of n drugs from the choice set or a drug holiday option.
Denote the sequence of choices as dj1t, ..., dj10t; treatment length as Tj and a censoring indicator as
Ij . Recall that if I do not observe the entire treatment sequence for a patient (I do not see the period
in which she is cured), I use the information on decision choices up to the point when censoring
occurs.8
Then, the likelihood function for patient j in period t can be written as follows:
8See Appendix A for a detailed discussion on the assumption of cure.
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∏
n
Ej1l,...,j10l(1(Wjn1,k > Wjn′1,k, n′ 6= n))djn1 , for t=1,
Exjnt−1,k,h0j,k [
(
(1− hjt−1,k)×∏
n
Ej1l,...,j5l(1(Wjnt,k > Wjn′t,k, n′ 6= n)djn1)
)
], 1 < t < Tj ,
E~xjnt−1,k,h0j,k [(1− Ij)× hjTj ,k] for t = Tj , (3.10)
where ~xjnt,k ≡ (xjn1,k, ..., xjnt,k, yjn1,k, ..., yjnt,k) is a vector of per-period symptomatic and curative
signals from drug n, patient type j. The signals and healing probability depend on the severity of
each patient's condition, group k. Note that the likelihood function is different for censored and
uncensored individuals in the last period, because for the censored patients the actual last period in
treatment is unobserved.
Assume that the per-period additive idiosyncratic shocks to the patient's utility are i.i.d.
Type I Extreme Value, choice probabilities can be re-written in multinomial logit expression:
E(1(Wjnt,k > Wjn′t,k, n′ 6= n))
= exp(Wjnt,k)/[
10∑
n′=1
exp(Wjn′t,k)] ≡ λjnt,k
Recall also that patient initial diagnosis is observed by doctors and patients, but not by
an econometrician. The probability of being type k is denoted by pk. Then the likelihood function
becomes:
K∑
k=1
pk · E~xjnTj,k|h0j,k [
Tj−1∏
t=1
((1− hjt,k)
∏
n
λ
djnt
jnt,k)] · hjTj ,k
∏
n
λ
djnTj
jnTj ,k
(3.11)
for uncensored patients, and
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K∑
k=1
pk · E~xjnTj,k|h0j,k [
Tj−1∏
t=1
((1− hjt,k)
∏
n
λ
djnt
jnt,k)] ·
∏
n
λ
djnTj
jnTj ,k
(3.12)
for censored patients.
3.7 Results
Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 report the estimates of two variants of a dynamic learning model of
demand for ADHD treatment.9 First, I estimate a baseline model that does not take into account
drug holidays or behavioral therapy sessions. It assumes that prescriptions are taken regularly every
month. Next, I estimate a model that includes drug holidays. I assume that drug holidays are a
part of the choice set, similar to the actual medicines. Patient treatment is initiated with a drug
holiday, when I observe a lag of at least two weeks between the first diagnosis of ADHD and first
filled ADHD prescription.
In this draft, I estimate both models with two discrete patient types (K = 2). I also reduce
my original choice set (see Table 3.1) and group drugs into 4 categories by their stimulant status and
release speed. Drug 1 is the newest stimulant drug in the sample  Vyvanse, which was introduced
in 2007 and is only available as a brand name. For Vyvanse, I estimate a two-period evolution in
physician beliefs. When the drug entered the market, there was little information available, so the
prior beliefs are allowed to change with time (for simplicity, only once after the first six months in
the current variant of the model). Drug 2 has older extended-release stimulants like Adderall XR
and Concerta. Drug 3 combines immediate-release stimulants like Adderall and Ritalin. Finally,
drug 4 is reserved for nonstimulant medicines: Strattera, Intunive and Kapvay.
The two columns of Table 3.7 present estimates of the model parameters for each of the
two unobserved patient types. The first panel indicates that the relatively healthy" type (highest
baseline recovery probability, ho) comprises 33.1% of the population while the less healthy type makes
up 66.9% of the sample. For the two patient types, the model suggests substantial heterogeneity
in the underlying illness severity, measured as baseline recovery probability. ADHD is a chronic
9In both empirical models, I follow Crawford and Shum (2005) and restrict the variances of the curative signals, τ2n,
prior variances of symptomatic (σ2n) and curative (τ
2
n) distributions to be identical across drugs to reduce parameter
space. In the future, I plan to estimate a less restrictive model.
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condition and here by recovery I mean a situation, when a patient is able to function successfully
in life without taking medicines.
The next panel in the table presents the prior means of the symptomatic match values for
each drug and each patient type (see µ
nk
in Equation 3.4). The third panel presents the prior means
for the curative match values for each drug and patient type (see νnk in Equation 3.4). The fourth
panel in Table 3.7 presents the estimates of the standard deviations of the symptomatic match values
(σ2n in Equation 3.4) and the fifth panel presents the standard deviations for the symptomatic signals
(σ2n in Equation 3.5). For simplicity I assume the standard deviations of the match values (σ
2
n and
τ2n) and signals (σ
2
n and τ
2
n) do not vary across patient types. I also restrict standard deviation of
the curative match values (τ2n) and curative signals (τ
2
n) to not vary across choices in the current
specification. Finally, the table presents estimates of the price coefficient (α) and risk-aversion (r)
parameters that enter the utility function (see Equation 3.2).
The parameter estimates of mean match values suggest that the two patient types differ
not only in the severity of their condition, but also in their response to treatment. The drug that
is the best for sick patients by symptomatic match (extended-release stimulants) ranks second
for healthy patients. By symptomatic match, relatively healthy patients are better matched to
Vyvanse, while for relatively sick patients it is their last choice. By curative mean match values,
extended-release stimulants are again the best option for the sick type, while for the healthy type
it is immediate-release stimulants.
Distributions of symptomatic and curative match values for both patient types are presented
in Figure 3.2. Standard deviations for symptomatic match values are relatively large in magnitude
in comparison to their respective means. Significant overlap between the four drugs' distributions
suggests that in terms of symptomatic match ADHD drugs are horizontally differentiated, so even
patients of the same type are likely to have very different match values by drug symptomatic prop-
erties. It means that within a group of patients of the same type, a significant uncertainty regarding
a specific patient-drug match is present.
This phenomenon is even more pronounced in the curative match value distributions. For
relatively sick type, extended-release stimulants stand-out, but all other treatments overlap com-
pletely. For healthy type, all drugs' distributions overlap with each other. Again, it means that
there is uncertainty of how good would be a match between a specific patient and a drug even if the
initial diagnosis (that determined baseline recovery probability) is definitive.
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Table 3.7: Baseline Dynamic Model: Parameter Estimates.
Parameter Est. Std. err. Est. Std. err.
Illness heterogeneity distribution Type 1 (Sick) Type 2 (Healthy)
Recovery probability 0.040 0.758
Type probability 0.669 0.331
Means, symptom match values
µ
vyvanse, Period 1
1.331 1.001
µ
vyvanse, Period 2
-0.114 1.145
µ
extended-release stimulants
1.572 1.141
µ
immediate-release stimulants
0.770 1.133
µ
nonstimulants
0.869 1.127
Means, curative match values
ν vyvanse, Period 1 1.085 0.976
ν vyvanse, Period 2 1.156 0.971
ν extended-release stimulants 1.717 0.708
ν immediate-release stimulants 1.071 1.034
ν nonstimulants 1.025 0.873
Std. dev., symptom match values
σ vyvanse 1.196
σ extended-release stimulants 1.329
σ immediate-release stimulants 1.262
σ nonstimulants 1.134
Std. dev., symptom signals
σ vyvanse 1.368
σ extended-release stimulants 1.220
σ immediate-release stimulants 1.193
σ nonstimulants 1.276
Std. dev., curative match values
τ 1.307
Std. dev., curative signals
τ 1.196
Price coefficient, α 1.125
Risk-aversion parameter, r 1.058
Discount rate, β 0.950 (fixed)
N patients 1,000
N time periods 36
N observations
N draws 10
Notes: Drug prices are averaged across time and patients. Vyvanse is a new drug and its mean
match values vary in time. Time periods are months.
93
Figure 3.2: Estimated Symptomatic and Curative Match Values Distributions. Baseline Model.
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Table 3.8: Dynamic Model with Drug Holidays: Parameter Estimates.
Parameter Est. Std. err. Est. Std. err.
Illness heterogeneity distribution Type 1 (Sick) Type 2 (Healthy)
Recovery probability 0.000 0.959
Type probability 0.932 0.068
Means, symptom match values
µ
vyvanse, Period 1
0.512 0.692
µ
vyvanse, Period 2
-0.778 0.489
µ
extended-release stimulants & nonstimulants
4.823 1.067
µ
immediate-release stimulants
0.279 0.452
µ
drug holiday
1.551 3.454
Means, curative match values
ν vyvanse, Period 1 1.477 0.772
ν vyvanse, Period 2 -0.178 3.153
ν extended-release stimulants & nonstimulants -4.919 1.737
ν immediate-release stimulants -1.805 2.391
ν drug holiday -0.160 0.025
Std. dev., symptom match values
σ vyvanse 1.266
σ extended-release stimulants & nonstimulants 1.364
σ immediate-release stimulants 1.192
σ drug holiday 1.392
Std. dev., symptom signals
σ vyvanse 1.435
σ extended-release stimulants & nonstimulants 1.894
σ immediate-release stimulants 1.602
σ drug holiday 1.030
Std. dev., curative match values
τ 1.097
Std. dev., curative signals
τ 1.034
Price coefficient, α 1.178
Risk-aversion parameter, r 1.047
Discount rate, β 0.950 (fixed)
N patients 500
N time periods 24
N observations
N draws 10
Notes: Drug prices are averaged across time and patients. Vyvanse is a new drug and its mean
match values vary in time. Time periods are months.
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In terms of time-varying beliefs about match values, the model estimates show that physi-
cians felt overly optimistic about Vyvanse side effects profile and its relief effects for sick patients and
slightly less optimistic for healthy patients. However, they revised their beliefs up for its curative
properties for sick type and did not change them for health type.
It is possible to cross-check some of the results with the actual market parameters. Extended-
release stimulants fare very well in terms of symptomatic effects for both types and also in terms
of curative effects for the larger class of patients - sick type. This combined class has a dominating
share of 52.6% in my sample. Non-stimulants that are rarely recommended as a first-line therapy
due to the lack of evidence on their efficacy, rank low on curative properties for both patient types,
but rank second for the sick type in terms of symptomatic effects. This reconciles with the fact that
nonstimulant medicines do not cause agitation or sleeplessness - typical stimulant side effects, and
also they are not a controlled substance and do not cause addiction.
Next, I estimate a model that accounts for interruptions in treatment, drug holidays. The
parameter estimates are presented in table 3.8. To keep the choice set small, I combine extended-
release stimulants with nonstimulants as they are relatively recent market entrants and are also
taken about once a day.
This model estimates even higher polarization between sick and healthy patient types: most
patients have severe ADHD and the chance that they will be able to function successfully without
treatment after the first prescription is extremely small. Although the models are not directly
comparable because of a different choice set, it is clear that when the extended-release stimulants
and non-stimulants ranked next to each other in the baseline case, the relative drug ranking was
preserved in the model with drug holidays.
As in previous model, patient types are heterogeneous in both their symptomatic and cu-
rative responses to treatments. Symptomatically, drug holidays feel best for healthy types. Their
ability to function without drugs is highly probable, so the relief they feel from taking any drug from
the choice set is not enough to compensate for the disutility from drugs side effects.
The distributions of match values are very similar to estimated distributions in the baseline
model (see Figure 3.3). However, in the model with drug holidays, extended-release stimulants and
nonstimulants stand out by their symptomatic properties for the sick type and drug holidays - for the
healthy type. The rest of the drugs' distributions overlap significantly, pointing at their horizontal
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Figure 3.3: Estimated Symptomatic and Curative Match Values Distributions. Model with Drug
Holidays.
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differentiation. There is also relatively little uncertainty regarding drugs' curative properties for the
sick type, but for healthy types, the drug distributions overlap a lot.
Finally, I estimate a variation of the baseline model that includes behavioral therapy ses-
sions and a combination of behavioral therapy and (any) ADHD drug (Table 3.9). Consistent with
the medical literature, behavioral therapy alone ranks very low for both patient types. However,
behavioral therapy combined with an ADHD medicine yields better results: it ranks second by both
symptomatic and curative match value for sick type, following immediate-release stimulants. Note
that introduction of behavioral therapy changed relative ranking of treatments. Immediate-release
stimulants, for example, ranked only third for sick types in the baseline model and in the model with
drug holidays. A more precise analysis and comparison will be possible after I estimate the model
on a larger sample that includes both behavioral therapy and drug holidays.
The estimates of the model with drug holidays will be used to construct a set of counter-
factuals to evaluate the effect of eliminating drug holidays. It will estimate the effect of forcing
patients to take a drug until they are cured or alternatively, adopting regular drug holidays as a
treatment strategy, on the length of treatment and its cost to Medicaid.
3.8 Conclusion
The incidence of diagnosis of ADHD in the U.S. among children increased significantly
over the past decade. While many believe that ADHD drugs are overprescribed, very little is
known about the existing prescribing practices, physician learning processes, and relative efficacies
of various ADHD treatment strategies. This paper sheds some light on it. I estimated two variants of
a dynamic model of demand for ADHD drugs under uncertainty. First, I estimate a baseline model
that ignores drug holidays and behavioral treatment. The choice set consists of four composite drugs
for a random sub-sample of 1,000 patients. Second, I rearrange the drug choice set to add on drug
holidays as a fourth option.
At this stage, the following conclusions can be made. First, patients are extremely het-
erogeneous in the underlying illness severity. Both models suggest that the probability of a child
functioning successfully in their everyday life without ADHD treatment differs from very low to
very high. Although merely suggestive, it might point at the presence of overdiagnosis and over-
prescription practices. Second, there is considerable uncertainty regarding patient-drug match by
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Table 3.9: Dynamic Model with Behavioral Therapy: Parameter Estimates.
Parameter Est. Std. err. Est. Std. err.
Illness heterogeneity distribution Type 1 (Sick) Type 2 (Healthy)
Recovery probability 0.025 0.808
Type probability 0.702 0.298
Means, symptom match values
µ
vyvanse, Period 1
1.483 1.333
µ
vyvanse, Period 2
-0.103 -0.911
µ
extended-release stimulants
0.855 2.723
µ
immediate-release stimulants
2.294 2.864
µ
non-stimulants
0.207 -0.016
µ
B-therapy
0.298 1.988
µ
B-therapy+drug
0.920 1.823
Means, curative match values
ν vyvanse, Period 1 1.864 0.276
ν vyvanse, Period 2 1.390 1.745
ν extended-release stimulants 2.197 1.874
ν immediate-release stimulants 4.616 -1.729
νnon-stimulants 1.574 0.237
νB-therapy 0.903 -2.962
νB-therapy+drug 3.061 0.358
Std. dev., symptom match values
σ vyvanse 1.086
σ extended-release stimulants 1.223
σ immediate-release stimulants 1.876
σ non-stimulants 0.827
σ B-therapy 0.626
σ B-therapy+drug 1.267
Std. dev., symptom signals
σ vyvanse 1.173
σ extended-release stimulants 1.302
σ immediate-release stimulants 0.979
σnon-stimulants 1.114
σB-therapy 1.141
σB-therapy+drug 1.367
Std. dev., curative match values
τ 0.985
Std. dev., curative signals
τ 1.138
Price coefficient, α 1.143
Risk-aversion parameter, r 1.108
Discount rate, β 0.950 (fixed)
N patients 1,000
N time periods 24
N observations
N draws 10
Notes: Drug prices are averaged across time and patients. Vyvanse is a new drug and its mean
match values vary in time. Time periods are months.
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both symptomatic and curative properties. Although some drugs are better than others for each of
the patient types, their match value distributions overlap significantly. In other words, knowing a
patient's type, does not resolve patient-drug match uncertainty.
Although the model with drug holidays yields overall similar results to the baseline model,
in their current formulation they cannot be directly compared because of the differences in the choice
set. Notably, drug holidays rank first for the healthy type by symptomatic relief properties.
Additionally, I will estimate a model that includes behavioral treatments that might influ-
ence drug choice as well as the length of therapy and the probability of a child being able to function
without ADHD treatment. The model with drug holidays and behavioral therapy will be used to
construct a set of counterfactuals to evaluate the effect of eliminating or alternatively, forcing drug
holidays and/or behavioral treatment on the overall length of treatment and its cost to Medicaid.
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Appendix A Methodological Appendix for Chapter 1
A growing string of health economics literature estimates prescription drug demand using
the learning model framework. Newly diagnosed patients face uncertainty regarding average drugs'
efficacy (Ching, 2010), regarding best-match for each particular individual (Crawford&Shum, 2005;
Dickstein, 2011; Saxell, 2013), or both (Chintagunta et al., 2009). These studies (Crawford&Shum,
2005; Dickstein, 2011; Saxell, 2013) focus on modeling individual choices every time period, using
Bayesian updating in formulating the process of information acquisition. The resulting estimates of
these models are moments of drug-specific distribution of match values that can be used to determine
optimal treatment.
Each of these models uses individual-level claims data. One of the limitations of claims data
is the scarcity of outcome variables. In contrast to survey data (Chintagunta et al., 2009), there
is no information on patient satisfaction with treatment, nor self-reported health measures. Com-
mon approach in this case is to define successful treatment based on patient exit from treatment
(cure) or adherence to treatment (a number of months treated without interruption). Because
of data limitations, these studies rely on a rather strong assumption of patient being cured af-
ter he or she had a medicine-free period in treatment for 90 days (Dickstein, 2011) or 180 days
(Crawford&Shum, 2005; Saxell, 2013). However, the conditions they look at are chronic: gastroin-
testinal conditions (Crawford&Shum, 2005), cardiovascular diseases (Saxell, 2013), and depression
(Dickstein, 2011) that technically cannot be cured and are likely to progress in cycles with disease
manifestation episodes. Dickstein's argument is more elaborate than Crawford&Shum and Saxell:
successful treatment should last for at least 6 months (adherence) and if the patient restarts her
treatment after not taking prescriptions for over 90 days, it is considered a new treatment episode,
separate observation.
My sample spans 10 years and allows for a much more accurate analysis than it has been
done previously in the literature. In order to make an assumption about how to determine the end of
treatment episode, I look at patients who have been observed for at least 1, 2, or 3 years after their
last ADHD claim.10 These time periods are listed in panels A, B, and C of Table 10 respectively.
The last ADHD treatment is defined flexibly because of the lack of medical evidence. I use a range
of criteria, from 90 days to 1.5 years, 3-month spaced to help guide my assumption on the duration
10Note that I distinguish last treatment from last claim. The former includes prescription or behavioral therapy
visit, and the latter also includes any doctor visit with ADHD diagnosis.
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of treatment.
As Table 10 shows, for ADHD patients it is fairly common to have a medication-free time
period of at least 3 months. Over 40% of patients restart treatment within 90 days from their last
ADHD treatment. Indeed, my data suggests that many children and their parents tend to suspend
ADHD treatment during summer holidays.
The data suggest that a more reasonable assumption would be to take a year of medicine-
and diagnosis-free period as a criterion for defining the end of episode, or cure. If a child after her
treatment went without it for a year, it means that this treatment was successful in managing her
condition and she didn't need the treatment any longer. Note that this is still not perfect, because
in 2 years that this sub-sample of patients is observed in the data, still 11% of children would restart
their treatment after a year and 29% will do so by the end of the second year since last treatment.
However, in one year, the student and her parents have time to fully evaluate short- and long-term
evidence of their child being able to function successfully in life. Even if school performance is not
being monitored regularly by parents, they would certainly notice poor outcome of no-treatment if
a child has to repeat a grade.
This assumption is also supported by medical literature. For example, for ADHD Chen et al.
(2009) use 12-month continuous Medicaid eligibility with no ADHD claims to identify first treatment
episode. In terms of treatment duration, medical profession has not come up with conclusive evidence
yet. Van de Loo-Neus et al.(2011) review 53 clinical studies with duration of treatment longer
than 12 weeks that were published between 1990 and 2010 for no fewer than 20 subjects, who are
between 6-18 years old. Out of 15 most relevant studies, only 10 span a year and just 5 of them
followed patients for 36+ months. They conclude that clinical decisions about starting, continuing,
and stopping ADHD medication have to be made on an individual basis. Decision to stop taking
medication is typically not a result of intolerable side effects that can be dealt with by an adjustment
of dose. Based on all reviewed work, they can only say that a substantial subsample of children
with ADHD continue benefitting from long-term medical treatment in terms of ADHD symptom
control, while other children with ADHD fail to show beneficial effects of medication after 1 or 2
years. They suggest to implement yearly medication-free periods for several days to one week or
longer to check the need for medication.
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Table 10: Testing assumption of cure
PANEL B PANEL C
Days since last
ADHD claim
Time after last ADHD: 2 years (720 days) Time after last ADHD: 3 years (1080 days)
No-ADHD spell, days No-ADHD spell, days
90 180 270 360 450 540 90 180 270 360 450 540
6,490 5,210 4,651 4,248 3,943 3,716 4,595 3,652 3,230 2,909 2,655 2,476
Restarted
within xx
days after
the last
ADHD
claim
0-90 H H H H H H H H H H H H
90-180 2,751 42% H H H H H 1,958 43% H H H H H
180-270 709 11% 1,118 21% H H H H 533 12% 825 23% H H H H
270-360 424 7% 608 12% 711 15% H H H 312 7% 447 12% 525 16% H H H
360-450 261 4% 347 7% 423 9% 477 11% H H 187 4% 252 7% 315 10% 357 12% H H
450-540 190 3% 249 5% 288 6% 315 7% 339 9% H 142 3% 189 5% 219 7% 235 8% 251 9% H
540-630 148 2% 199 4% 233 5% 247 6% 252 6% 260 7% 103 2% 144 4% 166 5% 177 6% 181 7% 187 8%
630-720 122 2% 163 3% 177 4% 189 4% 198 5% 200 5% 91 2% 120 3% 129 4% 139 5% 144 5% 146 6%
720-810 87 2% 103 3% 110 3% 114 4% 118 4% 122 5%
810-900 53 1% 70 2% 78 2% 88 3% 91 3% 96 4%
900-990 51 1% 70 2% 80 2% 84 3% 88 3% 88 4%
990-1080 49 1% 59 2% 72 2% 77 3% 78 3% 80 3%
N restarted, in sample 4,605 71% 2,684 52% 1,832 39% 1,228 29% 789 20% 460 12% 3,566 78% 2,279 62% 1,694 52% 1,271 44% 951 36% 719 29%
Notes: H stands for drug holiday.
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Appendix B Additional Tables for Chapter 3
B.1 Part D Plan-level Summary Statistics, 2006-2012.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Outcome variables
Premium 37.36 36.69 40.31 45.81 46.17 53.62 53.41
(12.82) (15.08) (20.02) (20.70) (19.13) (25.27) (26.72)
Out-of-pocket drug cost 45.12 46.99 53.36 58.02 71.25 77.05 87.48
(12.38) (12.91) (12.31) (10.77) (9.84) (9.42) (13.06)
N of NDCs covered* 14,688 4,791 4,117 4,014 3,401 3,359 3,441
(13,682) (1,484) (1,064) (965) (675) (613) (585)
N of top100 drugs covered 91.58 93.07 90.10 87.84 82.63 78.04 74.52
(5.92) (5.96) (7.67) (9.14) (7.43) (6.96) (7.38)
Controls
Deductible 92.51 93.57 103.73 110.02 144.18 153.50 153.40
(115.84) (121.81) (128.40) (136.56) (135.57) (141.97) (152.51)
Mean tier, all drugs 0.22 0.27 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.33 0.37
(0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10)
Mean tier, top100 drugs 0.20 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.22 0.23 0.25
(0.14) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
Mean restriction (0-3), all 0.16 0.20 0.28 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.36
(0.19) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13)
Mean restriction (0-3), top 0.17 0.23 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.26 0.28
(0.19) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Mean restriction (1-3), all 1.07 1.11 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.14 1.14
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Mean restriction (1-3), top 1.07 1.13 1.15 1.12 1.11 1.10 1.08
(0.10) (0.13) (0.14) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.08)
% of plans w/gap coverage 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.25 0.19 0.35 0.24
% of basic plans 0.58 0.52 0.48 0.45 0.51 0.57 0.52
% of benchmark plans 0.28 0.60 0.24 0.17 0.19 0.30 0.30
% of renewal plans 0.58 0.72 0.82 0.74 0.46 0.69
% of consolidated plans 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.19 0.46 0.19
% of new plans 0.30 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.09
N of observations 1,446 1,908 1,778 1,626 1,493 1,034 995
Notes: The unit of observation is a plan. All stand-alone Part D plans are included. Out-of-pocket cost of top 100 drugs assigns
a 1/100 weight to each drug. In 2006, requirements on formulary listing of NDCs differ from the requirements in 2007-2012. Gap
coverage and deductible standards for Part D plans were altered through 2006-2012 as described in detail in the paper. All prices
are in nominal terms. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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B.2 Control and Comparison Groups, 2006-2012.
Plans affected by M&A Plans unaffected by M&A
Before After Before After
Premium 40.27 44.81 42.54 45.16
(16.83) (19.51) (19.94) (22.03)
Out-of-pocket cost of top100 drugs 57.90 63.47 56.71 63.45
(16.65) (18.03) (15.78) (17.59)
N of NDCs covered 3,983 3,847 4,036 3,712
(1,143) (960) (1,190) (900)
N of top 100 drugs covered 88.22 86.31 88.06 85.32
(10.54) (11.15) (8.35) (9.49)
Deductible 121.46 117.78 112.52 118.14
(139.07) (145.21) (130.37) (135.06)
Mean tier, all drugs 0.30 0.32 0.29 0.31
(0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09)
Mean tier, top100 drugs 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.25
(0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.09)
Mean restriction (0-3), all 0.23 0.29 0.27 0.30
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13)
Mean restriction (0-3), top100 0.19 0.23 0.27 0.28
(0.14) (0.13) (0.16) (0.14)
Mean restriction (1-3), all 1.11 1.14 1.13 1.15
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09)
Mean restriction (1-3), top100 1.13 1.10 1.12 1.13
(0.14) (0.06) (0.12) (0.13)
Plan market share 0.014 0.019 0.008 0.009
(0.024) (0.033) (0.016) (0.017)
Enrollment 15,825 22,940 9,583 11,562
(33,560) (47,206) (23,577) (25,447)
LIS enrollment 8,681 12,167 4,436 5,276
(18,393) (25,319) (13,244) (14,171)
% of plans with gap coverage 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.26
% of basic plans 0.59 0.53 0.50 0.51
% of benchmark plans 0.33 0.41 0.31 0.29
% of renewal plans 0.76 0.67
% of consolidated plans 0.21 0.18
% of new plans 0.02 0.12
% of terminated plans 0.02 0.03
N of observations 1,379 7,598
Notes: The unit of observation is a plan. Only renewal and consolidated renewal stand-alone Part D plans are included.
Out-of-pocket cost of top 100 drugs assigns a 1/100 weight to each drug. Since the requirements on formulary listing of NDCs
differ from the requirements in 2007-2012, the data on NDC coverage in 2006-2007 are excluded. Standard deviations are in
parentheses.
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B.3 Comparative Summary Statistics for Non-renewed Plans, 2006-2012.
2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012
ALL T ALL T ALL T ALL T ALL T ALL T
Monthly premium 37.36 66.44 36.69 39.81 40.31 55.38 45.81 65.73 46.17 59.21 53.62 49.92
(12.82) (33.32) (15.08) (8.22) (20.02) (19.32) (20.70) (36.78) (19.13) (20.30) (25.27) (11.25)
Deductible 92.51 83.33 93.57 113.15 103.54 73.85 110.02 110.63 144.18 49.78 153.50 129.10
(115.84) (144.34) (121.81) (131.82) (128.35) (90.05) (136.56) (147.50) (135.57) (109.69) (141.97) (91.29)
Plan enrollment 10,730 267 8,473 122 8,573 310 9,415 1,514 10,594 3,263 16,201 568
(25,159) (443) (23,066) (487) (21,155) (750) (21,912) (3,058) (24,187) (14,307) (37,194) (1,123)
LIS enrollment 5,588 58 4,196 28 4,051 143 4,377 849 5,042 2,941 7,699 355
(13,368) (92) (13,820) (119) (11,104) (636) (12,387) (2,632) (14,401) (13,432) (20,340) (1,123)
Plan market share 0.009 0.00009 0.007 0.0001 0.007 0.0003 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.012 0.0006
(0.018) (0.0001) (0.016) (0.0004) (0.015) (0.0009) (0.015) (0.003) (0.016) (0.004) (0.024) (0.001)
% basic plans 0.58 0.34 0.52 0.83 0.48 0.10 0.45 0.44 0.51 0.49 0.57 0.94
% benchmark plans 0.28 0.00 0.60 0.25 0.24 0.05 0.17 0.06 0.19 0.12 0.30 0.06
% plans w/gap cover 0.31 0.67 0.29 0.15 0.30 0.90 0.25 0.38 0.19 0.51 0.35 0.06
N plans 1,446 3/0 1,908 89/2 1,776 87/0 1,627 16/0 1,493 104/2 1,034 33/27
Notes: The table compares plan characteristics of terminated plans to the all-plan average. For example, for 2006-2007 all plans offered in 2006 are compared to the plans terminated in
the end of 2006. "T" stands for terminated plans. Number of plans in "T" panels reports the total number of terminated plans/number plans terminated by merging parties. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
B.4 Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Premiums.
A B C
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Merger-affected plan 1.703 3.607 2.241 3.840
(0.363) (2.219) (0.400) (2.494)
Consolidated plan -4.221 -3.861 -3.911 -3.422
(0.320) (1.339) (0.343) (1.547)
Consolidated x Merger plan -2.199 -2.105
(0.827) (2.127)
Covariates in 1st differences
Price index -0.189 -0.196 -0.186 -0.188 -0.177 -0.190
(0.019) (0.079) (0.018) (0.085) (0.019) (0.083)
Deductible -0.023 -0.021 -0.026 -0.024 -0.026 -0.024
(0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008)
Gap coverage 8.879 8.819 8.660 8.774 8.773 8.780
(0.363) (1.906) (0.360) (1.821) (0.360) (1.869)
LIS eligibility -6.666 -6.557 -6.220 -6.085 -6.280 -6.224
(0.290) (0.852) (0.288) (0.823) (0.289) (0.846)
Benefit type -2.645 -3.089 -1.330 -1.778 -1.235 -1.834
(0.388) (1.391) (0.398) (1.399) (0.398) (1.404)
Top100 drugs covariates
N of covered drugs 0.025 -0.025 0.057 0.011 0.061 0.004
(0.034) (0.183) (0.034) (0.192) (0.034) (0.186)
Mean tier 0.236 -0.333 -0.069 -1.149 0.183 -0.435
(2.254) (14.373) (2.235) (14.575) (2.233) (14.420)
Mean number of restrictions 1.571 1.656 -2.003 0.593 -1.050 -0.388
(2.675) (13.715) (2.657) (14.532) (2.658) (14.028)
All drugs covariates
N of covered drugs, per 100 -0.019 -0.019 -0.024 -0.024 -0.021 -0.021
(0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008)
Mean tier -5.334 -3.539 -7.181 -5.563 -6.938 -5.557
(2.721) (14.751) (2.698) (15.310) (2.698) (14.935)
Mean number of restrictions 0.349 -4.015 5.196 -1.406 2.770 -2.163
(3.042) (14.052) (2.999) (14.690) (3.025) (14.288)
Covariates in levels
Lagged enrollment, in ('000) -0.048 -0.023 -0.043 -0.022 -0.044 -0.021
(0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.013)
Lagged log mkt share, in fractions 0.834 0.291 0.758 0.245 0.759 0.236
(0.077) (0.284) (0.076) (0.313) (0.077) (0.306)
Year & Region F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Insurer F.E. Y Y Y
N of year-pairs 8,839 F-test 29.7 0.6
N of M&A affected plans 1,375
N of consolidated plans 1,994
N of M&A consolidated plans 296
Notes: Panel A shows estimates for the plans involved in a merger; this specification does not distinguish between mergers
that consolidated plans and mergers that didn't. Panel B shows estimates for the plan consolidation effect on premiums.
Panel C includes the merger-consolidated plan interaction term. The F-test null hypothesis is that the sum of the coefficients
on merger dummy, consolidation dummy and their interaction term is zero. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by
pre-merger insurer for specification with pre-merger insurer fixed effects.
B.5 Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Formulary, Top 100 Drugs.
A B C
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Merger-affected plan 0.391 -0.146 -0.492 -1.081
(0.172) (1.872) (0.189) (2.025)
Consolidated plan -0.196 -0.176 -0.866 -0.880
(0.155) (0.922) (0.165) (0.940)
Consolidated x Merger plan 4.357 4.459
(0.396) (2.244)
Covariates in 1st differences
Deductible -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005)
Gap coverage 0.966 1.270 0.958 1.258 0.921 1.208
(0.170) (1.191) (0.171) (1.195) (0.169) (1.187)
LIS eligibility 0.450 0.647 0.483 0.656 0.393 0.561
(0.138) (0.346) (0.139) (0.323) (0.138) (0.326)
Benefit type 1.439 1.609 1.489 1.662 1.459 1.619
(0.186) (1.109) (0.192) (1.078) (0.191) (1.009)
Covariates in levels
Lagged enrollment, in ('000) -0.013 -0.007 -0.012 -0.007 -0.013 -0.006
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Lagged log mkt share, in fractions 0.084 0.088 0.086 0.082 0.035 0.017
(0.037) (0.129) (0.037) (0.132) (0.037) (0.130)
Year & Region F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Insurer F.E. Y Y Y
N of year-pairs 8,839 F-test 77.4 1.48
N of M&A affected plans 1,375
N of consolidated plans 1,994
N of M&A consolidated plans 296
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in the number of drugs ranked in top100 by prescriptions filled, in the formulary.
Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by insurer for specification with insurer fixed effects.
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B.6 Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Formulary, All Drugs.
A B C
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Merger-affected plan 43.555 -182.801 -47.084 -320.229
(25.834) (338.649) (29.148) (354.326)
Consolidated plan 16.570 30.604 -45.124 -62.340
(22.582) (109.959) (24.292) (123.18)
Consolidated x Merger plan 373.068 552.925
(56.411) (221.745)
Covariates in 1st differences
Deductible 0.014 -0.143 0.009 -0.084 0.081 -0.017
(0.118) (0.991) (0.118) (0.954) (0.119) (0.953)
Gap coverage 558.694 628.355 556.604 644.435 542.380 607.703
(30.792) (158.959) (30.795) (181.823) (30.887) (144.682)
LIS eligibility 123.063 158.140 124.321 149.531 108.372 136.986
(21.228) (82.448) (21.222) (74.715) (21.295) (75.545)
Benefit type 340.647 428.907 333.272 417.181 333.451 416.994
(29.097) (188.929) (30.509) (189.715) (30.429) (185.607)
Covariates in levels
Lagged enrollment, in ('000) -1.101 0.674 -1.085 0.733 -1.150 0.872
(0.418) (0.930) (0.418) (0.970) (0.417) (1.062)
Lagged log mkt share, in fractions -17.222 4.909 -16.649 2.633 -20.676 -2.332
(5.378) (16.24) (5.371) (18.206) (5.390) (16.356)
Year & Region F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Insurer F.E. Y Y Y
N of year-pairs 7,396 F-test 34.9 0.2
N of M&A affected plans 1,082
N of consolidated plans 1,746
N of M&A consolidated plans 276
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in the number of drugs included into the formulary. 2006-2007 year-plan pairs are excluded.
Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by pre-merger insurer for specification with insurer fixed effects.
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B.7 Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Price Index.
A B C
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Merger-affected plan -0.424 1.755 0.076 2.441
(0.311) (2.240) (0.344) (2.033)
Consolidated plan 1.706 0.908 2.132 1.440
(0.280) (1.152) (0.300) (1.299)
Consolidated x Merger plan -2.723 -3.070
(0.722) (3.311)
Covariates in 1st differences
Benefit type -2.456 -3.212 -2.978 -3.468 -2.967 -3.482
(0.337) (2.072) (0.348) (1.939) (0.348) (1.889)
LIS eligibility 0.609 0.087 0.440 0.078 0.504 0.079
(0.251) (1.237) (0.252) (1.213) (0.252) (1.237)
Deductible 0.0002 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009)
Gap coverage -0.176 -1.385 -0.114 -1.282 -0.092 -1.317
(0.309) (2.188) (0.309) (2.167) (0.309) (2.183)
Covariates in levels
Lagged enrollment, in ('000) 0.015 -0.001 0.014 -0.003 0.014 -0.002
(0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009)
Lagged log mkt share, in fractions -0.121 -0.103 -0.095 -0.063 -0.059 -0.037
(0.067) (0.263) (0.067) (0.260) (0.067) (0.236)
Year & Region F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Insurer F.E. Y Y Y
N of year-pairs 8,839 F-test 0.7 0.98
N of M&A affected plans 1,375
N of consolidated plans 1,994
N of M&A consolidated plans 296
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in the weighted price of the basket of top100 drugs under each plan. Standard errors
are in parentheses, clustered by pre-merger insurer for specification with insurer fixed effects.
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